DANTZIG AND POLAND

SIMON ASKENAZY

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DANTZIG AND POLAND

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DANTZIG & POLAND

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BY

SIMON ASKENAZY

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL POLISH

BY

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PREFATORY NOTE

THIS book appeared in Polish at the beginning of 1919, and later on in French and German. Its reminiscences of Dantzig's past were intended to foreshadow the future of the city in a restored Union with the restored Polish Republic. Only such a solution could have given satisfaction to the interests of Dantzig, Poland and Europe, and, quite certainly, to those of the old friend of both Dantzig and Poland—Great Britain. Things, however, have turned out differently. Instead of being reunited to Poland, Dantzig has been kept apart from her, and even to a certain extent has been put into an attitude of opposition. Such a solution is against the interests of Dantzig, Poland and Europe. It is, in truth, equally at variance with the real interests of Great Britain herself, although Great Britain was not irresponsible for its materialization. An English edition of this work, therefore, may seem only the more seasonable, as it may foster reflection and help to repair the mistakes which have been committed.

ASKENAZY.

GENEVA, FIRST ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS,
December, 1920.

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CONTENTS

I

PAGE

THE HEEL OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER 7

II

UNDER THE POLISH THRONE 14

III

THE DECLINE OF THE REPUBLIC 24

IV

THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 32

V

A FREE CITY 58

VI

IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY . . . 80

NOTES 103

DANTZIG AND POLAND

I

THE HEEL OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER

DURING the very first period of its existence and growth, Dantzig passed through widely diverse experiences and severe historical trials.[1] From being at the start a coastal colony, this native old-Slavic fisher-folk developed with an inevitable admixture of Polish blood. Good relations were maintained with Poland under the rule of her first dynasty, the Piasts; and it is evident that for a time at the end of the tenth century the city was under the direct influence of one of Poland's most illustrious kings, Boleslaw the Great, uncle of Canute of England.[2] In 1148, by a Bull of Eugene III, it was placed under the spiritual guardianship of a Polish bishop, being assigned to the diocese of Wloclawek, where it remained for several centuries.[3]

Under the rule of the Slav princes of Pomerania, Dantzig grew and was transformed step by step—thanks partly to the introduction of industrious German colonists during the thirteenth century. When at the close of this century the line of these princes died out, the city welcomed the Polish King, Wladislaw Lokietek, as its lawful lord, and that with rapturous homage. Thrice did it entertain him, 1298–99, 1306, when he came to lay his hand on Pomerania and put an end to the dissensions that were tormenting the country.[4]

From time immemorial this busy and enterprising town, developed from a fishing-village, did business with Poland and gained from the Polish lands its livelihood. And in those far-away savage times it found among the Polish lords and chieftains worthy customers as buyers and sellers,

men who were at once scrupulous and reliable. It found, too, "just and ready protection, which guarded carefully the interests of foreign merchants." Thus much a modern Prussian historian, who was no friend of Poland, has had to affirm: and that on the evidence of the oldest aldermanic records of the city.[5]

Scarcely, however, did the city begin to flourish, when, early in the fourteenth century, the mailed fist of the Teutonic Order fell upon her people. The ravenous brothers of this Order, with the white cross on their black mantles, were hardly settled on the right bank of the Vistula when they prepared to cross to the other and, by doing so, to get hold of the key to river, coast, and country—the city of Dantzig. At the invitation of the credulous inhabitants themselves, the deceitful, merciless, and greedy Knights first settled themselves in the castle, and then at once provoked a deliberate quarrel. The city was taken on a dark November night (1308) by a sudden murderous attack. Part of the people were slain, the survivors driven out. The peaceful habitations were destroyed and levelled to the earth. Nothing but desert and ruins was left.[6]

In the whole conception of this assault, an extraordinary one even for those times, and apart from the ostensible plan of execution with its treachery and violence, there are two significant politico-psychic traits which deeply impress us: terrorism and hypocrisy. Chill terrorism, as a conscious means of conquest, made its appearance. The Order intended, as Dlugosz, the ancient chronicler, put it, "that the far-sounding echo of this cruelty should so affright the hearts of men in other towns and fortresses, that no one would dare to oppose it, and so that the task of further occupations would be easier and safer." Again, as a further political instrument, we have here bottomless hypocrisy, and the gratuitous denial of perpetrated crime. The Head of the Order had the courage later, in a letter of self-defence to the Pope, to call the whole villainy committed upon Dantzig an act of summary justice. He mentioned the killing of some dozen or more "robbers" (*latrones*). What is more, he dared to assure the Pope that "the people of the city, of their own free will (*propria voluntate*), laid waste their homes, and settled in another place."

It is very significant that, right to our own day, this fearful tragedy of Dantzig was either presented as doubtful by the Prussian historians or else only mentioned as of no importance; it was even set in a specially propitious light. A modern Prussian professor of history, even though he questions the number of victims given as ten thousand by the sources, cannot deny the fact of a cruel slaughter, to which fell victims, as he puts it generally, "a certain number of Polish knights, many citizens, and a host of other people."

The latest historian of the fortress of Dantzig, a Prussian General, writing for the jubilee of the possession of the fortress by Prussia, admits freely and with the greatest frankness the work of destruction done by the Order, both explaining it as a military expert and justifying it as a politician.[7]

"In the action of the Order with regard to Dantzig and Tczew (Dirschau) we have the usual Mongolian method of warfare. Dzhengis Khan did the same sort of thing on a larger scale . . . when he had not enough troops to allow him to garrison larger cities. In view of the slender armies at its disposal, the Order could not help itself in any other fashion."

This sort of reasoning need not, of course, surprise us in the work of a modern learned specialist, who is a Prussian Major-General, especially when we recall the fact that the work was published on the anniversary of the seizure of Dantzig by Prussia, and dedicated on the title-page to Wilhelm II. As a matter of fact, that chivalrous and eloquent monarch is notorious for having openly become the apologist and restorer of the too long neglected tactics of the ancient "Huns," and that for the profit of the modern art of war.

The conquest of Dantzig was an event of the first importance for the further development of the Order. In the very next year (1309) the Grand-Master, who had hitherto had his seat in far-away Venice, declared the time to be right for transferring his final residence to Marienburg. Thus, Dantzig found itself involved in permanent slavery to that citadel of the Order. The native Kashubian-Polish population suffered most from the fearful visitation which

harassed it. Driven into the surrounding marshes, forced steadily into an ever lower industrial and social state, it was impoverished, Germanized, trodden down: and yet throughout it refused to be stamped out, but became permeated with an easily understood hatred of its Crusader oppressors.

In the same way, the neighbouring German colonists, although supported by the Order and indispensable for its future success, repaid the selfish favour granted them, united as it was with ruthless exploitation and open disdain, with feelings of hate, a hate that was deep and secret. For nearly a century and a half Dantzig had to hold out under the harsh rule of the Order, under the Teutonic sword. It goes without saying that it was deeply harmed, and was checked in the course of a healthy industrial development—this purely commercial town in the midst of the purely military organization of the Crusader State.

In the economy of things, the city really remained, through this almost fatal period, thanks to its exceptionally fortunate geographical position, an important centre of commerce in Europe, welcoming at its docks a couple of hundred British merchantmen, reckoning its turnover by millions, and winning its way to the headship of all Prussian cities. Yet this natural growth of the city's well-being was sensibly retarded and checked by the harsh and exceedingly covetous hand of the Order. For the latter was as greedy of riches as of power, and oppressed people for the sake of gain. Thus it was not content with grasping Dantzig in its iron hand, nor yet with levying high dues on its trade: but as a finishing stroke the Order itself organized trade, and that on an ever-increasing scale. It thus became no more a protector, but both an oppressor and in addition a rival of Dantzig: an intolerable one, too, because of its hegemony, which gave it special privileges.[8]

No wonder, then, that under such circumstances the aftermath of the great victory of Poland over the Order won by Wladislaw Jagiellon at Tannenberg was welcomed with joy in Dantzig, as a blessed earnest of emancipation from the Teutonic yoke. True, the people of the city had to provide their masters with a division of levies for the battle of Tannenberg. But there was no more rejoicing in Poland

itself because of that triumph than in Dantzig. When, after the disaster, part of the surviving Knights began to seek shelter in the city, " the folk became furious." They at once rang the bells, fell upon the hated guests, and beat them up, killing some and driving the rest from the city.[9] Further, the mayor and burghers at once hastened to appear in the camp of the victor, Wladislaw Jagiellon, for service (1410) : an act too gallantly conceived, for it exposed them to the mortal vengeance of the Order, still armed to the teeth. They were kindly received, and their city was guaranteed great and liberal privileges. But the result was unlucky, for they had hastened to do homage to the Polish King when the time was not yet ripe.[10]

The terrible vengeance of the Order awaited them on their return. It is well known that the bloody Count Plauen, brother of the Grand-Master, who was in possession of the castle of Dantzig, invited to his friendly roof-tree those imprudent mayors, Konrad Letczkow, Arnold Hecht, and the alderman Bartholomew Gross ; that he murdered them without compassion, and then returned their corpses to the terrified city after keeping them a week (1411). The ancient chronicler tells well how the citizens, smitten with fear, stood silent before the disdainful Commander ; and only one, the wretched mayoress Anne Gross, broke out in desperate reproofs :

" If you were a man, as you are a woman," the angry Commander said, " I should do with you as I have with your spouse and your sire."

" If I were a man, as I am a woman," was the reply, " and I could meet you face to face on the field, sir Commander, I should avenge them both on you with this arm of mine."

After which, she lifted up her voice, greatly wailing, says the chronicler. " I lay complaint before God in the high heaven for this frightful brutality and injustice which has come upon me, a wretched woman, and upon my children, against God and righteousness. I and my orphan children have lost father, husband, home and privileges, without any guilt on our part, without any verdict given. Do Thou, Almighty God, have pity and send the fitting punishment for such a mighty wrong." [11]

At last punishment and satisfaction came. When the Prussian Estates seeking the protection of Poland declared war on the Order, the people of Dantzig appeared at once in the van, remembering in their hearts so many injuries inflicted. As no others could have done, they set themselves to compass the ruin and end of the Order. In a twinkling they took their hated Teutonic castle (1454). They did not leave one stone on another. They razed to the ground that nest of beasts of prey, just as their city had been razed aforetime. In the Thirteen Years War between Poland and the Order they grudged neither blood nor money, if only they might help the Polish King utterly to wipe out the might of the Crusaders. Tireless in their voluntary service, which meant help to Poland and satisfaction and deliverance for themselves, they were most active to the very end.

They played a gallant part in the taking of Marienburg: witness the picture preserved even to-day in the Artushof in Dantzig, and the ancient rhyme underneath. Together with the Polish knighthood they scattered at Puck the last hosts of the Order. They kept during the struggle 15,000 at their own cost. They spent on the war nearly half a million florins, which means according to our values over 30,000,000 Polish guilders.

When for the first time the victorious Polish King Casimir Jagiellon came to Dantzig (1457), the city, delivered from the Order, not only welcomed him in triumph, but it made him a considerable contribution, greatly embarrassed as he was for lack of funds, to the immediate costs of the war: an essential contribution if the remaining strongholds of the Order were to be taken. From all sides the men of the city brought gold and silver to the King; and even the fair matrons came with their jewels. The King was touched, and is said to have assured them "that they shall have a royal reward." It was a handsome and kingly recompense they got for loyal, unstinted, and manly service, as the learned scribe and historian of the city averred with just pride. From the hand of the grateful Casimir they received at once the two chief statutes of the city for its incorporation (Privilegia Casimiriana 1454, 1457).[12]

On the strength of these two statutes, supplemented

later on, they obtained far-reaching internal autonomy and generous trade rights, some of the guarantees being almost sovereign in their character. They obtained the right to enact and execute their own laws, the right to coin money, the right to treat with foreign powers, a crown in their coat of arms, and the red wax in the mayor's seal. They were given considerable increase of lands for the city and suburbs. The basin of Dantzig, with the peninsula Nehring, was given to them, as well as the heights above the town. They were further granted the site of the castle of the Order, a reduction of two-thirds in their dues, and the right of taxes on the mills. They could maintain a fortress, open and close at will the port of the Vistula, control completely the bay, which meant, however, the reservation for the Polish State of the sovereignty of the sea.[13]

In a word, apart from their new relation to Poland, they gained the invaluable rights of a free city, and certain guarantees for a splendid development in the future.

II

UNDER THE POLISH THRONE

Now at last, after a century and a half of bondage to the Order, the people of Dantzig entered into a period of freedom and growth, lasting nearly three hundred and fifty years, under the Polish sceptre. This happy union with Poland was finally consummated in the Treaty of Torun (1466). Once more Casimir Jagiellon was heartily welcomed in the city, both as the conqueror of the Order and the benefactor of Dantzig. From him the city received the supreme dignity of " Admiral of Poland," and full privileges of free shipping. The banner of Dantzig, two white crosses covered by the Polish crown, on a red background, waved from this time on the Baltic, and right away to the western and southern seas. In a trice the number of vessels calling at the port was doubled and trebled.

The city's trade with Holland speedily increased. It reached as far as Portugal, Spain, and even to Turkey. Especially did it increase with France and England. The English had known Dantzig from the oldest days, and afterwards under the Crusaders had been invited by the Order, together with the French, to help in expeditions against the " Saracens " of the north, the Lithuanians and the Poles. Even at the end of the fourteenth century such noblemen as the Earl of Derby, afterwards King Henry IV, and Marshal Boucicaut passed through Dantzig, on these expeditions, in the best of good faith and innocence. Their task was represented to them as a wholly pious one, although it was in reality a pillaging expedition of the Order. All this ended with Tannenberg.[14]

From this time purely peaceful trade relations became fixed between Dantzig as the port of Poland, and London,

Hull, Nottingham, and other English sea-ports and industrial centres; while they kept developing in the most successful manner. Through the city the products of English industry found their way into Poland, chiefly drapers' wares. To England went grain, flour, oak and pine timber, which latter came to be used almost exclusively by the English fleet. Similarly the trade of Dantzig with France grew markedly at the end of the fifteenth century, especially during the wars of Karl V with Francis I, when the Hanseatic towns had to abandon their French trade. Dantzig was not slow to profit by this development. In the city the chief articles of trade were wines, oils, and French silks, which were exported in return for grain, timber, and Polish cloths.

Amid such conditions Dantzig's trade returns grew more and more imposing. The yearly export of grain alone soon reached 60,000 "lasts" (a measure of 2–2½ tons weight), to the value of 20,000,000 thalers. Only Amsterdam could compare with Dantzig at that time as an emporium of world-wide trade in corn. A modern historian of commerce, wishing to define the ancient position of these two cities, has assigned them a rôle corresponding to that of London and New York in our time.

"If, then, these Dantzig people get on so well with us," wrote a member of the Polish nobility with justice, "and get rich, thanks to our commercial dealings, they would be unnatural fools to think of changing their overlord." [15]

But they had no such thought. Their connexion with Poland, the natural mother and nurse of their native-city, brought them endless gain, not only as merchants in the way of trade, but as citizens in the way of dignity. They were indeed subjects of the Polish King, but they were also his electors. Their delegates, "the lords from Dantzig," took part in the Diet which elected Sigmund I and sat by the side of the bishops, palatins, and castellans of the Kingdom of Poland.[16]

Of a surety all this did not happen, nor could it, without involving sharp and even bloody differences. The religious and social unrest in the city, which came early in the fifteenth century with the opening of the Reformation era, led to a fateful explanation with the King.

"We have thought it more in keeping with our Grace,"

replied Sigmund I to the now penitent men of Dantzig, "to deal with you rather in the manner of a physician who supplies remedies than as those who exact vengeance for so many transgressions." As a matter of fact, the Statute of Sigmund I (1526) set limits to the caprice of the City Council, as Supreme Committee (*Ordnung*), establishing on a firm footing, a Second Committee, that of Aldermen, and still more, adding a Third Committee, to the already set number of a hundred representatives. These reflected in outspoken manner, even though they were nominated by the Council, the general and settled will of the people. Thus the Statute, securing a more democratic order of administration and public safety, in the long run redounded only to the good of the city.[17]

A little later, with the growth of the Reformation in Dantzig, the religious Statute of King Sigmund Augustus (1557) tactfully regulated the troublesome question of creeds —in a temporary fashion it is true, but as practically and satisfactorily as was possible. And the last of the Jagiellons was likewise able to break the opposition of the city to a real union with Poland (1569–70), along quiet and peaceful lines. It was all done without bloodshed, but with unbending decision of purpose.[18]

At that very time, in the course of the last disagreement, the wisdom of the Statute of Sigmund I was revealed. The significant fact came out, and was noticeable until the end of the Polish authority, that the Polish regime had won for itself by its kindness and beneficence solid support, both moral and political, in the township of Dantzig, even in the teeth of the City Council. It happened that a slender group of the patricians of the First Senatorial Committee was ready at times to make trouble for the Polish government. But the broad masses of the population represented in the Third Committee, while nominated by the Council, constituted the proper representation of the four quarters of the city. They were made up of the four great guilds, the butchers, the shoemakers, the smiths, and the bakers, and they naturally gravitated beneath the high guardianship of the Polish King, thus presenting an ever-increasing antidote to every separatist tendency of the Council.

It was clear that this citizen-class, merchants, apprentices,

and factory-workers, who had the largest share of ancient Kashubian-Polish blood in their veins—above all, the petty traders, artisans, the fishermen, the simple folk drawing their livelihood from the port, the river, and the sea—these all not only felt bound by a personal union to their King, but they also regarded themselves as united with the Polish Republic by ties that were material and real.

Once, and once only, was Dantzig to enter on a bitter conflict with the whole Republic, and that with King Stephen Batory, whose election they had not confirmed (1577). The city defended itself stubbornly, but finally surrendered without disgracing itself, without any regrets, but with honour and complete loyalty. For this it received, not punishment, nor yet vengeance in the fashion of the Teutonic Knights, but the confirmation of all its privileges, and even fresh and precious evidences of favour at the hands of the victor, King Stephen.[19]

From this time onwards the splendid progress of the gallant and industrious city continued at an accelerated pace. Never again did it lend ear to the deceitful whisperings of strangers, whether Hanseatic or Brandenburg, against Poland. It did not allow them to divert it from the path of natural development, prescribed for it by this political and commercial union with Poland. From year to year Dantzig grew and became more opulent, especially towards the end of the sixteenth century.

Men began to observe that it was getting too rich. The famous Latin poet and diplomat of Poland, Jan Dantiscus, native of Dantzig and Bishop of Warmia, favourite too of Sigmund the Elder, prophesied in stern verses the fall of his native city, as a result of her exaggerated prosperity. The poet Klonowicz, floating down with his wooden raft to Dantzig (or rather, as he said, to "Chlanzic"—city of gluttons), thundered against the greedy city, which encouraged by its trade covetousness, extravagance, and moral depravity.[20] [21]

But these plaints and homilies of moralists could not hide the enormously active part which Dantzig, as a powerful and indispensable "wind-pipe," played in the political and commercial organization of the Republic. To every criticism of the poet the best answer was the dry record

of the steadily growing import trade and still more the export trade of the city. On the eve of the Thirty Years War the export of grain from Dantzig reached close upon 120,000 measures, which means *circa* 10,000,000 bushels yearly—an enormous figure for those days.[22]

Happily united with Poland, and that in its own well-understood interest, the city achieved a full and natural measure of well-being and splendour. It recovered its proper character, for which nature destined it: becoming the distributor of the natural resources of the broad and fertile land of Poland, her fields, her forests, her prairies, her corn, her timber, her cattle; and, on the other hand, the provider of the produce of the tropics as well as of all that foreign factories supplied. She was the link and the medium connecting the agricultural life of Poland with the manufacturing world of the West.

The Republic did not grudge the city new privileges which would specially guarantee her prosperous industrial position. There came in free "corn, flour, products of the forest, and all else necessary for the upkeep of the nobleman's own home." There came oxen for draught and for slaughter, there came oaks for masts for Holland and England. Simultaneously, too, the city was given the precious monopoly of "stamping": the exclusive right to admit through the one port English, Flemish, and other foreign goods and to stamp them, "under peril of confiscation of their goods, if any dare to admit or import cloths by another way or without the stamp of Dantzig."

It is thus small wonder that the city which aforetime, suffering losses and wrongs, had torn itself free from the exploitation of the Order, but which now, under changed conditions, was enjoying comfort and liberty, should bind itself daily more firmly to the Republic which brought it wealth and shelter.

In truth, the worthy men of Dantzig did not cease from that time onwards to give the fairest proofs of this fruitful and unshakeable connexion with Poland. Still earlier they had sent voluntary assistance time after time to the Poland of the Jagiellons in her military distress. As already recorded, they helped King Casimir Jagiellon of their own free will in his bitter need. In the same way they offered Sigmund Augustus

three casks of gold for his war with Moscow. Likewise they provided help for Stephen Batory on his Moscow expedition, in money, heavy guns, and ammunition. Again, during the hard experiences of the seventeenth century, they stood by the Republic, weapon in hand, in the face of a foreign invasion of Polish domains. Accordingly, when blockaded in the first Swedish War (1626–29) by the grim might of Gustavus Adolphus, the people of Dantzig did not let themselves be carried away by the fair words of the great champion of Protestantism. Deaf alike to his temptings and to his threats, they held the field against him, and inflicted on him a serious defeat. In the issue they even made fun of the baffled Swedish tempter and "terrorizer," in mocking verses addressed to him. Thus keeping their word of good-faith sworn to the Republic, they earned words of high praise and thanks from King Sigmund. In three consecutive "proclamations" of the Diet (1627, 1628, 1629) deserved praise was awarded in the name of the Republic for the unbroken loyalty of Dantzig toward the Polish Crown.[23] [24]

Again, during the Great Northern War, the gallant city did not hesitate a moment in face of the siege-craft of the Swedish King, Carolus Gustavus. During the whole period (1655–60), one marked by the most cruel transitions and the most lamentable desertions in the history of Poland, Dantzig alone stood like an island amid the flood. We have here one of the fairest pages of Dantzig's history. The cautious citizens set their own suburbs on fire, burned their own prosperous farms and suburban villas, if only to hinder the Swedes from settling there. Then, full of daring, though surrounded by the foe, they made his ears tingle with salutes of their cannon and muskets on the walls and in the market-place, when they heard the first glad news of the return of their true monarch, Jan Casimir.

It was then that the simple townsfolk, with sober deference but with wise dignity, returned to Carolus Gustavus, who was storming the entrance to the port (*Weichselmuende*) at the time, and who kept urging them persistently to give themselves up to his "kindly care," as he was a fellow-Protestant, not only a definite refusal, but also a stern and splendid remonstrance.

"From the moment when Dantzig became subject and loyal to the King of Poland, the city has always held in due honour the Swedish sovereigns. . . . But alas, the sad news has come that the most gracious King to whom it had sworn fealty, has been fallen upon by King Carolus, that Swedish troops are plundering Poland, and that many lands, cities and strongholds have been laid waste. . . . The city has great respect for His Majesty the Swedish King, and does not wish to inquire and dispute as to whether he has rightly made war on Poland or not. That only the Most High, who dwells above, and is our judge, can decide. Yet, no doubt, He recognizes that no one on earth can affirm that the Swedes have a just ground for making war. The citizens know well what advantages will flow to them from reigning sovereigns, and especially from the favour of His Majesty, Carolus Gustavus ; but their loyalty to their most gracious King will not permit them to accept his terms. Their King has been given them by God, and through a free election. He is their lawful Lord, whom they have bound themselves by an oath to serve.

"This loyalty they have kept unbroken for two centuries, from the time when they were incorporated in the Republic of Poland. If they have fallen on an evil day for the time being, it is because they have gone the right path their fathers went, and willed to have a clear conscience before God and a good reputation among men of unbiased judgment. These are the reasons why they have resorted to arms. If His Majesty the Swedish King appreciates these reasons, they have no doubt that he will exonerate them. Let him not forget that he too is of the Protestant faith, and let him not permit them to be hindered in the performance of what the teaching of the New Testament enjoins upon all Christians. . . .

"Let him also bear in mind that the blow which has fallen upon Jan Casimir, in every way a very gracious and kindly Lord, as well as upon his kingdom and domains, may also at some future day fall upon Carolus Gustavus himself. And if in that event his senators, or subjects, or some city, shall stand by its rightful Lord with unwavering firmness, being led astray neither by bribes nor deceit, nay, though it should take up an even more hostile attitude

than at present Dantzig is taking, could the King deny that such valour would be praiseworthy in subjects and honourable even in foes ? For the rest, relying wholly on the Providence of God, the Commoners, Aldermen, and Council of Hundred, and the Three Estates of the City of Dantzig, except in so far as their duties towards Poland are concerned, remain the most obedient servants of His Majesty the King of Sweden."

Once more on the morrow a Protestant divine, sent from the Swedish camp, renewed the temptation, appealing directly to their business interests, as being the first and chiefest ground why they should submit. Forthwith, deeply annoyed, the Commoners enlightened the delegate-bishop in regard to " the customs and principles on which the city has governed itself for ages," with these prudent and beautiful words :

" Our fathers were attached above everything, to the Gospel of Christ. After this, their next attachment was to their Kings, as being those whom God Himself set in authority over them. In the third place, they were careful not to sever themselves from the Polish Kingdom, with which they were incorporated. Fourthly, they defended, while strength lasted, their rights, privileges, freedom, and customs. Lastly, they applied themselves to the improvement of trade, industry, and their own well-being.

" But these latter duties never took precedence over the former. Profit and business never stood before truth and goodness. No man, surely, will believe that God is pleased when people break the faith due to their King in order to further the cause of religion. The inborn understanding of the people of Dantzig, weak as it is, teaches them that nothing so impresses religion on the heart, or establishes it more securely in the life than simplicity of spirit and that peace for which all hearts and tongues should pray to Jesus Christ."

And they carried their point, at the cost of great exertions, of good citizen blood, of huge losses in buildings and trade, as well as of four and a half million Polish guilders in cash, given as a war contribution to the Republic. They awaited the solemn approach of Jan Casimir to set their city free (1656). In the speech of welcome to the Syndicus of Dantzig Fabricius,

they heard the high declaration from the lips of the Lord High Chancellor of Poland, that "by this city alone, in spite of the superior might, tyranny, and deceit of a cruel foe, the whole Republic has been conserved." They heard from the lips of the King and many Polish senators in the following Diets (1659, 1661) repeated and warm recommendations of worthy rewards for Dantzig from the Republic, in order "to rejoice her," and "the better to rouse the city to maintaining itself in such obedience, thus deeply rooted for all time."[25] [26]

During the next reign Dantzig was privileged to welcome in its midst for the longer space of some seven months the great King Jan Sobieski (1677–78). In addition to the numerous matters of finance and politics bound up with this longish royal visit, there arose also the matter of arranging the internal affairs of the city. Here again, as before so often, the common people turned for protection to its Polish King, as against its own oligarchic council. "Deputations of the guilds of Dantzig, especially of the shoemakers and the butchers, literally besieged Sobieski with complaints against the Council." The shoemaker George Meyer, leader of one of these deputations, told the King straight that "he would accomplish and realize more in Dantzig with the help of the guilds than Batory with the sword."

"God in heaven!" exclaimed Sobieski, moved by the attachment shown towards him by this worthy Dantzic shoemaker, "the man is a plain fellow, and yet with what eloquence does he speak, and address himself to me."

The King then granted the request of the guilds, and heard their complaints about the abuses of the City Council in the matter of the election and vote of the Third Committee. At the same time he considered in detail the wants of the Catholic elements in the guilds' associations of the city, which were especially devoted to him and the Republic. Finally, by his decree (Decretum Joannis III, 1678) the powers of the Third Committee were extended, and a definite number of artisans were included; and this was all carried out in the same democratic spirit which the royal Polish authority steadily kept in view throughout the whole of the stay in Dantzig.[27]

When at length, after many years, the men of Dantzig met for the last time the might of the Swedish Charles XII, the conflict took place amid virtually new conditions. For the rest, though they supported King Stanislaw Leszczynski at his first election (1705), they did not make serious trouble for August II the moment he was made rightful lord by the whole Polish nation. It then happened that, during the new war in the north, the people of Dantzig had twice to welcome the new ruler of the East, Peter the Great (1716, 1717). He was received in the Council-hall with the brilliance worthy of a crowned head. His speech, made in the Polish tongue, was listened to with fitting respect. They could not, indeed, keep the common people from less favourable manifestations. The Czar, with his numerous attendants, drank much, took great liberties, and brought much expense on the city, as the native historian recorded with a sigh.[28]

It was the first time that the covetous eyes of a Czar rested on Dantzig. Even then the City Council had to be on the watch against the espionage of his attendants, and even against a sudden armed attack. From this time the idea of reaching out after the wealthy Polish-German city became a part of Russian politics. It rose to the surface time after time later on, under Czarina Elizabeth, and again under Czar Alexander.

III

THE DECLINE OF THE REPUBLIC

At the great election contest of Poland, which followed closely after, the men of Dantzig had an opportunity of affording striking proof that they were truly at one with the national temper of the Republic, not only in material but also in moral affairs.

The occasion was that of the second election of Stanislaw Leszczynski (1733). The unhappy Stanislaw "I and II" was scarcely elected when he was driven out of Warsaw by the election of August III, carried out with the help of Russian arms. Forsaken by fortune and his supporters, he took refuge from pursuit behind the walls of Dantzig. The city had no obligations towards him. It had nothing to gain by welcoming an exile king, without authority, or troops, or even funds. Moreover, it could not doubt the necessity of thus assuming responsibility for his desperate cause, which was from the start hopelessly lost. All this meant risking serious conflicts, no small losses, and a dangerous and hopeless trial of arms.

But Leszczynski had all the same the weight of public opinion in Poland behind him. He was the rightly elected monarch, and thus the rightful sovereign lord of Dantzig. So the noble councillors of the city, after ripe deliberation, followed the unanimous decision of their citizen-body; and, with a loyal feeling of their solidarity and their duty as subjects, not only did they not refuse the exile hospitality, but took him in, and made it a point of honour to stand by him to the last—"to defend to the end the sacred person of His Majesty the King."

"Welcome, beloved Sovereign, to the good city of

Dantzig! It alone has the great joy of seeing its King with its own eyes in its midst!"

Thus did the "Joyful Dantzig" welcome the Polish King, with the rugged rhyme of a native singer. These curious and amusing expressions of regard for Stanislaw, in verse and prose, are worth reading. Much, indeed, was issued at the time in the same strain by the ancient presses of the city. Amusing they were, beyond a doubt, with their pedantry of sentiment and exaggeration. Yet they were certainly curious, even moving; especially if one recalls the honest intentions from which they sprang, and the special environing circumstances, such as the beating of alarm-bells, the shouting of enemy columns assaulting the city, the noise of bursting bombs, and the thunder of heavy guns of the Saxon and Russian besiegers.

In fact, as was to be expected, the city was enveloped by the iron ring of the Czarina's troops, in pursuit of the King. The pressure brought to bear by the famed Russian Commander-in-Chief, Muennich (1734) became daily severer. But Dantzig defended itself against the siege-craft of the Russian Field-Marshal with the same stoutness and stubbornness it had shown against the Swedes. It was fighting for a cause openly regarded as lost. Cut off from Poland and the world, it could not really hope for relief. From one source alone, from France, came valiant help, but in vain. Louis XV sent it—the son-in-law of the exile Stanislaw. Once, in the seventeenth century, when hard pressed by the Swedes, Dantzig had been helped by the Dutch fleet. Now, still harder pressed by the Russians, it saw for the first time the war-ships of France approaching, alas! with too weak succour. Then it was that, under the walls of Dantzig, French blood was spilt for the first time for Poland, under the leadership of the gallant young Count Plélo, who was killed here by a Russian bullet. The debt has since been paid back a hundred-fold by Polish blood, shed in the cause of France.

The French attempt at relief failed: but the city, left to its own resources, did not lose courage, but stoutly withstood the superior Russian army. Without distinction of class or guild, the wealthy patrician leaders at the side of the simple dock-workers, day and night served with per-

severance, bravery, and watchfulness, manning the guns and also taking turns at outposts. Even the gallant matrons, vigorous burgher-women, are said to have tried their hand at the art of war in this time of stress. " Ye womenfolk, matrons and maidens ! Let the foe see your womanly valour ! " Thus did the enthusiastic bard, Stanislaw's partisan, challenge the city's sisters and mothers to the conflict.

The truth is that the wretched Stanislaw was wearied by the refractory magnates and noblemen of Poland whom he had with him in the beleaguered city, and who, having lost heart altogether, were reproaching him daily for their common disappointment. He enjoyed infinitely more respect at the hands of the simple, generous, and loyal citizen body, which did not cease to honour in his person the sacrosanct majesty of the Republic. The consequence was that when the King at length fled from the city in secret, the unexpected news struck the burghers like a thunderbolt. It roused in them, not the feeling of relief one would have expected, but one of sincere regret, and of something like despair.

Then, and only then, when they had no longer anyone to defend, the city surrendered. They did it with honour, after four and a half months of siege, after surviving more than four thousand bombs, at the hands of some fifty thousand troops led by the ablest general of his time. They had to send a mission on purpose to St. Petersburg to beg the Czarina's pardon in the name of the city. The price paid was a heavy one : some of the best blood of the town, widespread ruins in its borders, and a war contribution amounting to millions. But they proved finely, once again, by this stout act of fidelity, that they were worthy citizens of the Polish Republic.[29]

It was not to be expected that the mutual relations between the new King August III, the second of the Polish Saxon dynasty, and the valiant city which had defended the royal rival stubbornly to the very last, would shape themselves quite satisfactorily. The fact is therefore the more noteworthy that, in spite of what had happened, the people of Dantzig trustingly placed themselves under his care as if by an age-long instinct. It was once more the common people of the city, accustomed to the

solicitous protection of its Polish King, who supported this step.

Delegates of the Third Committee turned as of yore to August for help against the patrician caprice of the Council. And they actually evoked the new Royal Decree (Ordinatio Augusti III, 1750), with its democratic temper, which broke finally with the autocracy and dealt a decisive blow at the preponderance of the patrician Council. Instead, it confirmed, defined clearly, and extended the franchise granted to the common people, so that it worked admirably. In return the grateful Third Committee, together with the merchants, set up a magnificent marble statue of the King, which is still to be seen in the old Artushof.

The wretched Lengnich, then Professor of history and law in the academy high school of the city, and later Syndicus of Dantzig, being famous as a jurist and historian, had to justify in writing the just demands of the Third Committee at the command of the King himself, although he himself inclined rather in spirit to the side of the Council of patricians. He was a learned man, the glory of Dantzig, a member of the Imperial Russian Academy, and Councillor of the Saxon Embassy. Both these titles, he tells us himself, " I quite declined to avail myself of after good consideration." He was an able and cautious diplomat, called by those who did not like him " the Prussian Tacitus," since by his taciturnity he, a historian, won his way to the Syndicateship.

He was exceedingly zealous and stubborn in his perpetuation of all Dantzig's legal fictions, especially those against the parliamentary Polish estates, and bound by the deepest affection to his own native city-state. Nevertheless, when all is said and done, the old man remained a loyal and attached son of his greater motherland, the Polish Republic, although he maintained more than one legal distinction and harboured more than one grudge. His first work of learning was " The Polish Library," written in German. Yet on the title-page of the book he specified the place where the book was published in a marked manner : " Tannenberg, where Wladislaw Jagiellon smote the Teutonic lords." He voices many subtle distinctions, e.g. that Dantzig should be " loyal " to the Polish Kings alone, and is bound only to " further the well-being " of the Polish

Crown (hinting at the antithesis between a personal union under the King and a real political union with the Republic). He gets deeply angry at Poland for assuming towards Dantzig the name *domina*. But he records in detail and with pride and affection the services done by Dantzig for Poland, and vice versa.

He takes pleasure in recording which Polish Kings "honoured the city with their presence, and stayed here either a shorter or longer time"—"Casimir twice, Sigmund III six times, Wladislaw III as sovereign three times, Jan Casimir the like number, August II four times, Alexander, Sigmund I, Sigmund Augustus, and Jan III Sobieski, each once." As for those kings who, alas, did not pay Dantzig the favour of a visit, the loyalist Lengnich notes that King Jan Albert died on the way to the city, Stephen Batory was just starting for it when he passed away, King Henry Valois was kept from a visit by the lack of time for it, and King Michael by internal and external complications, "although the Queen manifested a keen desire to see our city." The distinguished patriot of Dantzig, without being conscious of it, and even in spite of his local connexion, became a finished Pole.

It should be added here that all the famous men of the city who achieved repute in Europe belong without exception to the period of Dantzig's union with Poland, and neither to the former Teutonic time nor to the later Prussian one. Such were the native-born John Hoeffen-Dantiscus already mentioned (born 1485), Latinist and statesman; John Hevelius, famous astronomer (born 1614), the friend of Jan Sobieski, and who called the heavenly constellation he discovered *Scutum Sobiescianum*, in honour of the Polish King; the illustrious scientist Gabriel Fahrenheit (born 1686); the able lawyer and historian mentioned, Godfrey Lengnich (born 1689); and the master of painting and drawing, Daniel Chodowiecki (born 1726).[30]

We must also note that in the ancient city, besides the admittedly prevailing German culture, there existed, and even progressed, a Polish current joining in one stream with the original Slav sources of the city and its surroundings, and unceasingly strengthened by the ever closer relations and union with Poland. This Polish element, flourishing right

up to the final separation of Dantzig from the Republic fragmentary as it was, made itself felt not only in the practical spheres of life, but also in those of the intellectual evolution of the city. Polish literature played an illustrious part in ancient Dantzig, where, from capital printing-presses, from the beginning of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, many a Polish book was issued. Here, too, very early, after the famous Swedish menace (1656), a Polish paper was printed under the editorship of the native-born Jacob Weiss.[31]

As a matter of fact, according to the word of an honest German historian of Dantzig, "the Polish language must have been as common at the time (sixteenth century and after) on the lips of the people as the German. The result was that in many churches, especially in St. James, St. Bartholomew, and St. Catherine, Polish preaching was the custom." Again, according to the same unquestioned witness, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, until the seizure of the city by Prussia, "knowledge of Polish was still indispensable for every citizen of Dantzig, so that the sons of the first families, before entering the city high schools, used to be sent for a time to some one of the small towns or villages of the neighbourhood, where Polish was the prevailing tongue." This last detail, worthy of the gravest attention, clearly demonstrates the fact that until the fall of Poland its language was maintained in its purity in Dantzig, and that the communities round about were ethnographically Kashubian-Polish.[32]

Meanwhile, during the reign of August III, Dantzig's affairs with those of the entire Republic fell under the ominous influence of its most dangerous neighbour, the new Prussian King, Frederic the Great. His Silesian wars, and the fact that during these wars trade was no longer safe, reduced the export of corn from the city to a bare 20,000 measures a year. It soon recovered, with the conclusion of peace, and in the following decade went up again to 50,000 measures.[33]

It was at this time that Dantzig, on the tercentenary of its union with Poland, had an opportunity of expressing publicly its unwavering adherence to the Republic. At the two former anniversaries, the religious and political quarrels

in the sixteenth and the disastrous years of war in the seventeenth century had made joyous memorial celebrations impossible. The more eagerly, then, did Dantzig set itself, at the middle of the eighteenth century, to commemorate the three hundredth anniversary of its happy connexion with Poland. During this proud celebration (1754), and in the eloquent orations of the learned Professor Gottlieb Wensdorff, Pastor Titius, and others, in the verses written in Latin and German, and in the hearty proclamations of the Council and the Committees, there found vent both the feelings of irreconcilable dislike of the Crusader yoke and those of loyal gratitude and attachment to Poland.[34]

A couple of years later troublesome times came again to the city, as the result of the Seven Years War set in motion by Frederic the Great. And yet the danger of the moment was one which threatened not only from the side of Prussia, but still more from that of his enemy the Czarina Elizabeth. In fact, at this time, a quarter of a century after the trouble over Stanislaw, rumours of war began to reach Dantzig from the east. Again the same Russian menace appeared, though under another form.

It was in the second half of the Seven Years War. Dantzig had in the main not only not lost by the war, but had rather profited from it. It was an inexhaustible storehouse, which supplied for good money, grain and forage for the needs of both sides. But the medal had its reverse side. Both warring parties, Prussian and Russian, carrying on the conflict round about the city, conceived the fatal tempting idea of getting it into their hands. The Prussians had had it of old, as an inheritance from the Teutonic Order. At this time, however, the desperate military situation in which Frederic found himself made the thing impossible. It was shown above how the same plan was in the mind of Russia from the time of the visits of Peter the Great.

It now seemed as if Russia could achieve her wish, because at the end of the Seven Years War the power of Prussia appeared to be falling in ruins. Thanks chiefly to the pressure of the Czarina's armies, Frederic, apparently quite beaten, yielded to the superior numbers of his adversaries. The whole of Prussia proper was in Russian hands. The oath of allegiance had been exacted already

in Koenigsberg to the Czarina Elizabeth, and in the cathedral there, during three years (1758–62) the Russian Archimandrit, Tichon, spoke for Elizabeth as if for the mistress of Prussian lands.[35]

In the Russian camp, men began to think seriously of annexing Dantzig. The plan, worked out by the Commander, Field-Marshal Buturlin, was suddenly to be executed by the Lieutenant-General Tchernyshew. With this end in view he was to occupy the suburbs of the city, under the pretence of a temporary strategic necessity. The Vice-Chancellor Woronzow even began secret negotiations about the matter at the Court of Versailles.

The official correspondence of that time between Saxony and Poland proves that August III was seriously alarmed by the news of the secret Russian attack on Dantzig. The King was in Warsaw at the time. Fortunately joint influences brought to bear on the allied Court in St. Petersburg, and especially with the Czarina herself, were successful. The project to seize the city was not, as far as can be judged, properly worked out in the Russian Cabinet, but arose rather in the camp, as simply an opportune idea.

For the rest, the whole military and political situation was completely changed. Frederic recovered his power, and a general time of peace-making ensued. It sufficed that the danger threatening Dantzig from the Russian quarter was removed for the time being without further harmful consequences. And although later on similar dangers were to menace her from the east, they never were able to reach the stage of final execution.

IV

THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION

Meanwhile in another quarter an infinitely more serious storm was gathering over Dantzig, a nearer peril from which there was no escape, a danger that might be averted for a time, but could not be escaped. It was the Prussian peril. The Prussian King, heir of the Order, appeared as a candidate for the prey of four centuries ago, lost then by the Knights.

For long enough the Hohenzollerns, one after the other, had paid passing visits at various times and had a look at Dantzig. On their accession to the throne, journeying from Berlin to the coronation city of Koenigsberg, they were wont to make a halt in that town, and though they were not yet able to lay a covetous hand upon it, they at least surveyed its riches and beauty with eager eyes. Thus the Great Elector, Frederic William, passed through in 1662. Frederic I passed through five times (1690, 1697–98, 1701), Frederic William I twice (1714, 1739). The latter used his opportunity to entice away for his suite some tall grenadiers of the city, who had been assigned to him as a guard of honour. Lastly Frederic the Great visited Dantzig four times, first as heir to the throne, and then as King (1735, 1740, 1753).

This last, most distinguished as well as most dangerous guest, did not indeed strive to carry out in person the design of seizing Dantzig. Nevertheless, he was to work out most precisely the plan of occupation, and start it on the way of direct and brutal execution. For long he had had his eye on the city, and desired it from the time when, as heir to the throne, he saw how it defended its beloved King Leszczynski. He wished to be loved by the people of Dantzig,

and had his own peculiar way to compass this end. He wanted to be loved because of excessive hatred. He wanted the people so to hate mightily the enemy in him, that they would at last be forced rather to love in him the ruler. He wanted to strangle them so long as neighbours, that they would finally prefer to enjoy peace as his subjects.

This unexampled design of extortion on the part of Frederic the Great towards Dantzig, with all its refinement of detail, began with the first entrance into power of Poland's last King, Stanislaw August Poniatowski. From the King's election-day Frederic began ceaselessly to sap the strength of the defenceless Republic, and especially the city of Dantzig. Thus, under diverse pretexts, now temporary reprisals, now averred titles of overlordship, the Prussian King began to strangle the town cleverly and deliberately, and all with conscious consistency and calculated masterliness. As a first pretext he used the proclamation of universal tariffs by the Diet assembled at Warsaw 1764 for the election of Poniatowski. Although the matter was a purely internal one for Poland, and the tariff involved all her boundaries alike as well as her trade relations with all her neighbours, yet Frederic felt himself injured personally, and justified in making good the fancied wrong with his own hand, and according to his own sweet will. He made it good, of course, chiefly at the cost of Dantzig.

The city lived on its trade with Poland, thanks to the free course of the Vistula. Frederic established a station below Kwidzyn-Marienwerder, in the middle of the river; instituted unheard-of transit duties, introduced intolerable rights of search, planted his soldiers and set up his cannon (1765). Having thus pressed under his heavy hand the life-giving artery of the city, he began systematically to draw it tighter, without any mercy. It was plain robbery, but it brought Frederic in considerable returns. For this reason he paid no attention to the powerless protestations of the Republic of Poland and of Dantzig itself. Fortunately, intervention came from a stronger Power, that of Russia. Catherine II could not be deaf to the desperate complaints of the Polish King in this regard, since he had been elected under her ægis, and Poniatowski was her own candidate. As a result of her interposition

Frederic had to yield, and remove his station in the Vistula, which brought him so much gold.

But matters endlessly greater soon came along, which thrust that of the tariff into a corner. Complications of a political and religious nature arose, of which the final outcome was the First Partition of the Republic. Frederic now put forth his whole skill, first as tempter, then as negotiator. At first his purpose was, either by pretences of favour, or by crushing them with unbearable oppression, to sever the people of Dantzig from Poland, to draw them toward himself, and to reconcile them to an occupation. His next purpose was, after getting to the point of negotiations for a partition, at the same time, and as a part of the treaty, to obtain Dantzig for his own possession as an addition to his other gains from the transaction.

He began then first to make overtures to the people of the city. At a time when he was kindling in Poland the question of religious dissension as a step toward the partition, the zealous Protestant King, who had just laid his tribute on the earnings of his fellow-believers the Protestant citizens of Dantzig by confiscating their wares, now began all at once with zealous energy to appear in the rôle of champion of their religious liberties against Polish fanaticism. And to attain his ends, he began in the name of the common Protestant faith to urge the people, through his clever agent in Dantzig, to link up with the Confederation of Dissidents in Poland.

The honest councillors of the city defended themselves against uninvited guardianship. They swore that their faith was suffering no wrong, that they had no need to complain of any of their burdens as Dissidents to the Polish Crown. Finally, and really under compulsion, they joined the Confederation as ordered; but in the moment of entry they entrenched themselves under the most express reservation, that "they do not commit themselves to anything which would compromise their loyalty owed to His Majesty the King of Poland, and to the Most Serene Republic" (1767).

A couple of years later, when the project of the partition was ripe, Frederic adopted other tactics toward Dantzig. From the rôle of seduction he returned to that of oppression; from being a gracious master to being tyrannizer. Under

pretence of searching for deserters, he sent to the city recruiting contingents, and took by force from among the people recruits for the Prussian army. The unbounded deceit of these pretensions was evident to all. He insisted on taking four thousand conscripts who had "deserted," a scandalous pretence, which would have involved a fair part of the whole male population of the city. Using similar trumped-up claims, he placed Prussian regiments on the city's territory, and under the pretext of some recompense due to him he exacted a wholly arbitrary contribution from the inhabitants of 200,000 ducats (1770).

As executor of these crying injustices, he placed in Dantzig his agent, the notorious Legation-Councillor Junck, a professional thief and provocateur, about whom even a modern official Prussian historian had to admit that his chief business was "to provoke the people of Dantzig." Having exhausted these pretensions as to deserters and recruits, Frederic, who was never at a loss for devices, thought out a new plan. With the beginning of the new year he invented an "epidemic" as a reason for investing the city with a hygienic "cordon" of troops, in return for which service he obliged the city to pay him during the two years 1771–72 100,000 ducats.

Meanwhile the negotiations proper began about the First Partition of Poland. From the start Frederic had his mind set on Polish Prussia, but he did not forget Dantzig. This neighbour and friend, the King of Prussia, the zealous *defensor fidei*, the uninvited champion of the Protestant faith of the people of Dantzig, as well as of their physical health, now graciously designed to express his willingness to receive them wholly beneath his sceptre.

It is true they were in no hurry to hasten under the wings of their fellow Protestant black eagle, for they knew very well his insatiable appetite for Customs dues. But Frederic insisted on converting them to the Prussian faith in his own way. And one must do him the justice to admit that he did not let any possibilities slip. Now he was fawning, now vehement, now menacing, but ever full of resources both in wealth of his tactics and in his eager persistency. This greed and persistency struck his contemporaries forcibly. Voltaire remarked to him tauntingly that if the Czarina had

thoughts of Byzantium and Athens, he did not cease thinking of Dantzig. "Your Royal Majesty would prefer the port of Dantzig to that of Piræus: and rightly!"

Frederic went to work like a master. At the outset, when the first negotiations were on, he pretended to give up Dantzig entirely, reserving himself, of course, "suitable recompense for that city." Then, after assuring himself of quite plenteous "recompense" for a thing which did not belong to him at all, he began afresh to remember the city, this wondrous treasure, and that with increased vehemency. During the negotiations about the partition in St. Petersburg he kept urging his claim to get control of the city right to the end, before the principal mistress of the business, Catherine. He was bound to have from her adjudged that indispensable, trifling, addition of Dantzig to his share of Poland.

"As far as Dantzig is concerned," he wrote to his Ambassador in St. Petersburg, "I regard the matter as quite simple. Why, Avignon was once the Pope's, and the French took it. Strasbourg was a free city, and it was incorporated by Louis XIV. History shows many other such cases. For the rest I should not care about any such insignificant trading town. But one can see at a glance on the map that it cuts in two all my possessions."

He was deeply offended that "such a row is made" about poor "Dantzig, which would be only a nuisance (*une niaiserie*) to the Russians." He even threatened, if refused, to break his alliance with the Empress, taking advantage of her difficulties with the Turks, and frightening her with the threat of getting Austria to intervene. "I am a business man," he wrote to St. Petersburg. "Ye come to me to buy goods, to get help, and subsidies. I say, Please pay me so and so much, and in such coin. Ye reply, We do not wish to pay in this coin. In this case the merchant bows low, shuts up his wares, and prefers to betake himself elsewhere. How, then, my lords Russians! Do you want me to run risks? Do you want reinforcements from me? Agreed, but Polish Prussia and Dantzig—that is the price of my help! You see, my beloved Russians, you must decide whether you need my wares or not. Can you get along without them? Perhaps Dantzig, which you

love so dearly, can give you what I am selling too dear. Indeed I find it hard to believe that such a vanity (*une misère*) as Dantzig is should detain for a moment the clear and wise mind of the great Empress." [36]

All this eloquence availed for the time being naught. It was premature. The unhappy Frederic could not yet reach Dantzig. The resistance of the people of the city themselves was naturally not insignificant; they defended themselves desperately against their hated Prussian neighbour. They raised an alarm throughout the whole of Europe. They turned for aid to their former trading comrades and patrons, the General Estates of Holland. They turned also for help to Great Britain.[37]

We have noted that the relations of Dantzig with England were of very early date. Of yore England fed her people with Polish grain brought by way of Dantzig, supplied her fleet with magnificent timber for masts from Polish forests, and in return kept Poland provided with her fine cloths and the savoury products of her overseas colonies. In the days of Elizabeth George Carrew reached Dantzig as the Queen's special messenger, bearing a declaration of her favour and of her commercial preferences (1598). Dantzig in return sent an embassy to King James I.

It is true that at times passing disputes arising out of local commercial rivalries grew into fairly sharp quarrels between Dantzig and England; but they were arranged without difficulty to the satisfaction of both parties. The agreements made between the delegates of the English Company and the Senate of Dantzig led to a mutually helpful Commercial Treaty (1631). The men of Dantzig secured from Charles II an interpretation of the universal English Navigation Act, which gave them special advantages (1668). John Robinson, Envoy Extraordinary of Queen Anne, came to Dantzig, and concluded in her name an Anglo-Dantzig agreement, very advantageous to the city. Settled in 1706, it regulated mutual trade relations for the whole century, and has never been properly done away with to this very day.

It was just because of violence done to this last agreement by Frederic, that Dantzig turned with complaints to the English Government. At once the citizens set forth elo-

quently through the Polish Ambassador in London, Bukaty, the peril that hung over their town—not only of plundering, but even of seizure by Prussia. These exertions called forth at least a certain moral reaction. Bukaty's memorial, printed in English in London, drew the attention of the public. The young Edmund Burke time after time raised his voice against the violence being done to Poland, in his "Annual Register," in the years 1772–73.

Frederic became uneasy. He tried through Maltzan, his Ambassador in London, to check the interest shown in Britain for Poland in general and Dantzig in particular. "England," he wrote, "has no reason for worrying about Polish matters. They are really strange to her, and cannot have the least effect either upon her position or her interests."[38]

Unfortunately, the then English Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Suffolk, rightly branded at a later time by the great Chatham as an "unconstitutional, inhuman and unchristian" politician, did not make a successful defence of Poland, which was being torn in pieces, nor yet of unhappy Dantzig, exposed as a victim of Frederic the Great's extortions. The bold and far-seeing writer J. Williams estimated better than the Minister the unworthy conduct of the Prussian King, "whose family has received their all, except the lakes and sand banks of Brandenburg, from the Crown of Poland," and has never ceased to repay the Republic with the bitterest hatred and the gravest injuries.

In such a pass the people of Dantzig, who could not rely either on the help of powerless, plundered Poland, nor yet on the distant, platonic sympathy of Holland and England, once more appealed to the mighty and near-lying Russia. Here once more they did in fact find a certain temporary support. Of yore Czarina Anna had promised in a special amnesty (1736), after the city had been taken by Muennich, and the Dantzig delegation had begged for pardon in St. Petersburg, "her most Serene intervention for maintaining the present rights and liberties of Dantzig, religious and other." Later, after the city had been forced to identify itself with the Confederation of Dissidents, the same decree was confirmed by an ukase of Catherine II in Dantzig's favour (1767).

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This rôle of guardian, which Russia played toward the rich seaport, was naturally dictated by deeper selfish considerations. The policy of Catherine was as little inclined to give up the purpose of getting possession of Dantzig as had been that of Peter, or Anna, or Elizabeth. There was thus the less disposition in the Cabinet to let the rich spoil of the city go towards enlarging the Prussian share from the partition of Poland. As it was, Frederic was to extend this share far and away beyond what the treaty gave him, by use of unheard-of violence and by deceit in setting the boundaries.

The cautious councillors of Dantzig were wise enough to profit by all these circumstances, in pleading the cause of their safety before the Czarina against the Prussian King. The skilled and energetic Willebrandt, who was then Dantzig's agent in St. Petersburg, was able to reach several men of influence: Count Orlow, who had been Catherine's favourite, the influential Saldern, Prince Golizyn, and others. He succeeded in weakening the influence of the Prussian Ambassador on the Neva, Count Solms, and parried his claims to Dantzig. At the same time the Dantzig agent in London, Anderson, invoked his connections in the merchant world of the City, and gave rise to rather more express instructions from Lord Suffolk for Gunning, the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, in defence of Dantzig. Willebrandt's efforts and the favourable representations of Gunning, were supported also in lively fashion by the friendly and long-acknowledged influence of Holland. Thanks to this, the State Council in St. Petersburg tabled a thoroughly sharp protest against the Prussian designs upon Dantzig. At the end Frederic had to yield.

He did it in his own way. He yielded outwardly, in order the better to spring later on the desired booty, and meantime he took special pay for his concession. Meeting a decided opposition from Russia in the matter of Dantzig, the Prussian King set forth his formal declaration in the Treaty of the First Partition (1772), that "for renouncing all rights to the city of Dantzig and its lands, he takes by way of recompense (*en guise d'équivalent*) the rest of Polish Prussia." [39]

But Frederic the Great did not give up so easily. He

never cared for the most sacred treaties, but, just as in the two Silesian and in the Seven Years War, he broke them again with brutal violence. He was the less disposed to bind himself by the first Treaty of Partition, which was in truth nothing else than an act of open international robbery, consecrated by diplomacy. He therefore set about for himself to extend the portion of the spoil his collaborators had assigned to him. The moment he had renounced Dantzig solemnly in the Treaty, he proceeded to demand its seizure. The trouble was that, although the three Powers dividing Poland had signed the contract, a year had to pass before this was sanctioned by the plundered Polish Republic. By that time Frederic thought to better his terms, by forcing the people of Dantzig to renounce Poland and submit to his sceptre.

The refined cynicism with which Frederic set about this compulsory torturing of a defenceless city so long and so cruelly, that it must sometime surrender to his authority, has few parallels in modern history. Injustices have been done, far worse from a material point of view, and bloodier; but there never was a meaner one morally. Frederic began with what the Treaty of Partition had suggested, the immediate taking over of that part of Poland known as Royal or Polish Prussia (West Prussia) and Polish Pomerania, which was assigned to him, and by which he could thus encircle Dantzig. Free from scruples toward the "territory of Dantzig," guaranteed by the Treaty, he advanced on the spot to its very gates. He forced his way into the suburban communities, and took unquestionably city properties under the sway of Prussia. With his toll turn-pikes he beset the roads from the gates, annoyed the citizens on the way to their suburban villas, and hindered the supply of food from the district. It was a formal blockade of Dantzig. In this way he hoped to crush opposition, and incline the inhabitants to accept his patriarchal lordship.

This was all, however, only the prelude to the most serious blow with which the King meant to surprise and humble the stubborn city. Together with West Prussia and Pomerania he had already taken possession of the twelfth-century monastery of the Cistercians in Oliva, near Dantzig, which contained the tombs of the ancient

Pomeranian Princes. In his new rôle as pious successor of the abbots of Oliva, Frederic now appeared with the gratuitous claim that the whole left bank of the lower Vistula belonged to the monks; and on this principle, with the support of his worthy Minister Hertzberg's learned exposition, he put into effect the liquidation of all this fancied monastic heritage without delay.

Thus in a trice, in the utterest secrecy toward his partners of the Partition, Russia and Austria, the Prussian troops, by the middle of September 1772, had broken into Dantzig's borders, taken Langfuhr and Altschottland, even got control for the time of the peninsula of Hela, and, most important of all, became lords of the port itself. In the Neufahrwasser they hung out the Prussian Eagle, established a Prussian control-station, and began to exact dues from vessels for the benefit of the King's treasury. This meant striking at the very heart of Dantzig.

Joanna Schopenhauer, mother of the famed philosopher, herself a writer of distinction, a member of an old patrician family, writes thus on that day, describing this unheard-of violence, the seizure of the harbour of Dantzig by the troops of Frederic in time of complete peace: "Like a vampire the Prussian King had fallen upon my unhappy city, committed to destruction, and has sucked out of it its life-blood. This for many a year, until it is fully exhausted."

Under this iron oppression the people of Dantzig soon began to lose their breath. All the time Frederic, without ceasing to strangle them, kept up his system of offering tempting terms as well. The ugly Benoit, his envoy in Warsaw, bought over for him the Commission of the Warsaw Diet, set up by the Three Powers to get the Partition approved, and incited it against Dantzig. The same Prussian envoy, at the same time, did all in his power to incline the agent of Dantzig in Warsaw, Gralath, against Poland and to surrender his city. In the reports sent by Gralath to the Senate in Dantzig (1773) there is constant mention of Benoit's vehement persuasions "to this frightful step," i.e. of cutting off Dantzig from Poland and uniting it with Prussia.[40]

All the time Reichardt, the Prussian Ambassador in

Dantzig, was doing his utmost by persuasion and threat, to incline the City Council itself to submission. "My King," he declared cynically, "will have little profit from the trunk, i.e. West Prussia, if he does not also get the head," i.e. Dantzig. In any case Frederic was resolved to maintain the suzerainty thus secured over the port of Dantzig, as it brought him rich returns, and had some day or other to bring with it the falling of the city itself into his talons.

This last was delayed for the time by the desperate protests of the citizens, their appeal to Holland and England, and chiefly their appeal to Russia. It was the decided opposition of the latter Power that checked Frederic's plan of swallowing up Dantzig for the moment. Yet the thing that helped most of all was the unvarying opposition of the inhabitants themselves. The common people of the parish, especially, manifested the most obstinate stubbornness, even when the Senate began to weaken and yield under obvious pressure. The beggared City Senate and Aldermen were already decided to agree to the fateful submission forced upon them, to accept Frederic's sovereignty over city and port. The affrighted Polish King, poor Stanislaw August, from Warsaw, urged them through the person of Gralath to make this last step.

"But the Third Committee would not hear of it. On the other hand, it notified the Merchants' Exchange and the guilds, who gathered at once, and had proclaimed in the public squares that they would rather be buried in the ruins of their city, than have to submit to such sovereignty. The crowd threatened with death any one who dared to act otherwise, and even threw themselves in rage on the Prussian agent and commissioner, whenever these officials showed themselves on the street."

This simple citizen people, partly of Polish extraction, who had drawn a living from Poland for ages, and in whose memory the still ineffaced memory of the murderous Teutonic crimes of old and more recent Prussian brutalities and extortions lived, held to the Republic by unerring instinct, and shrank desperately from the Hohenzollerns.

In view of this attitude of the simple folk of Dantzig and of the Russian objections, Frederic could not realize to the full his plan for Dantzig. His fury knew no bounds. In

his first moment of disappointment he thought of new violence. He hit upon the hellish plan of cutting off the city from drinking-water. He ordered the course of the Radunia, from which Dantzig had fresh water, to be deflected, and the water-mains to be cut, in order by this heroic means to bring the city to its knees. On second thought he shrank, however, from the European scandal which would surely have resulted, and two weeks later withdrew his commands. He finally renounced the idea of Dantzig, so far as he himself, but not so far as Prussia was concerned ; and in the Treaty of Partition concluded with the Republic he renewed his promise to renounce solemnly for all time his claims to the city.[41]

Yet he did not cease victimizing the unhappy city to the end of his life, fourteen years later. There was no end of exploiting, of humiliating, of starving it out, with the help of the burdensome Commercial Treaty with Poland. This had been forced upon the latter by the pact of Partition, and excluded Dantzig, as though it were a foreign city, by numberless, savage pretences, taking now one, now another form—cruelties, tariff excesses, police abuses, and abuses in the matter of recruiting. But his chief task, the seizure of the city, Frederic left to his successors. When in his Political Testament he advised them to gather the Republic, as if it were an artichoke or a cabbage, " leaf by leaf, city by city," he had in mind above all the tasty leaf, Dantzig.

Frederic William II, his nephew and successor, remembered the advice. Pretending to knightly nobleness, he was at first welcomed with confidence by the wretched people of Dantzig, who hoped for a respite after the nightmare of his uncle's presence. He was hospitably entertained in the city on passing through, after his uncle's death, to his coronation in Koenigsberg (1786). But the new King was destined rudely to shatter the confidence thus reposed in him. Guided by his first Minister Hertzberg, his uncle's helper in the most shameful attacks upon Dantzig, he went the same way of occupation, although he veiled it by pretended friendship for Poland. Thus, in his friendly negotiations with the Great Diet of Warsaw, he kept putting forward his wish to have Dantzig as his reward. But the

Poles had learned to prize at its true value their jewel, Dantzig, and the city prized more than ever its happy relation to Poland. The consequence was that it disliked more intensely the prospect of being annexed by the hated Prussia, after all the refined martyrdom it had suffered for so many years at the hands of Frederic the Great.[42]

Once more it turned out that the common people of the city, the traders and the working-men, were permeated with the most insistent repugnance to Prussia, and the most loyal temper toward Poland. They had in their veins a large admixture of the ancient, stubborn Kashubian blood and retained the old traditions of bloody encounters with the Order. So the Third Committee sent two delegates of its own accord, two worthy members, Barth and Richter, to the Great Diet, and to King Poniatowski. They brought to Warsaw a solemn appeal, signed by "the most obedient and hard-beset subjects of His Majesty," fifteen speakers for the city, sixty-four members of the Four Quarters, as well as the Elders and Companions of the Third Committee.

"Most Serene and Most Gracious Sovereign!"—such was the way in which the defenceless Dantzig turned to the last Polish King, almost in his last hour as Sovereign—"The tiny people of Dantzig, whose home on the face of the earth scarcely looks bigger than an ant-hill, has long been unhappy. Panting heavily we await help and relief, and as yet we have not submitted. . . . A piece of bread and Freedom!—that is our cry. Most Serene Lord, our land has been torn in pieces. Our harbour, the rights to which the city has never renounced, is in foreign hands, another is lord over it. . . . We cannot exist longer, unless our territorial possessions that have been taken, together with the port, are returned to us. Most Serene Lord! We stand desperate on a brink, with a madly raging sea of fire round about us. Unless you point us back to the path we were treading until we lost it eighteen years ago (at the First Partition), we must surely fall down into this fiery abyss."

These fears of the citizens were fully justified. It is true that with the death of their worst persecutor, Frederic the Great, they had a somewhat easier life. The export

of grain had fallen, thanks to that monarch's crimes, to 9,000 measures in 1782, but it began by degrees to go up again. During the period of the Great Diet it attained an average of some 25,000 measures a year (1789–92), and that when the market prices of rye and wheat were extraordinarily high.

Only the more, however, with these evidences of reviving prosperity did the impatient appetite of the Prussians for Dantzig grow from more to more. The matter of the city became a veritable stone of stumbling in the dealing of Poland with Prussia at the time. Above all it stood in the way of the desired Polish-Prussian alliance. Frederic William II, his sly Minister Hertzberg, and Lucchesini his artful Ambassador in Warsaw, made use of every opportunity to get Dantzig from Poland as speedily as possible, without at the same time losing the latter's goodwill. They were even able to throw dust in the eyes of the English Government.

They succeeded in getting the Younger Pitt, then head of the Government, to advise Poland to cede Dantzig to Prussia (1790–91). On Pitt's recommendation, Hailes, the honest and friendly but shortsighted English Ambassador in Warsaw, declared himself for this fatal step in repeated public appearances and writings. This all was directly opposed to the ancient friendly relations existing between England and Poland. It was even opposed to England's own interests, and it can only be explained by the false suggestions made by the Berlin Government, the pretended loyal ally of England and of Poland.

Neither the Warsaw Diet nor Polish public opinion, however, fell a victim to these suggestions. They were guided by a safe and healthy conviction of the national interest in the matter of Dantzig. It is true that, while negotiating with the Berlin Government about a new trade agreement, which would lower the murderous tariffs set up by Frederic the Great, in the trade agreement made fifteen years before, and forced upon the already divided Poland, mention was also made of Dantzig itself. But this was done in order not to provoke Frederic William for the moment, since his support and alliance was absolutely necessary against Catherine. Warsaw had to free itself

from the concerted Russian yoke, and carry out needed reforms in administration, in finance, and in the army.

In spite of this, none of the advocates of an alliance with Prussia wanted really to buy it prematurely at the price of Dantzig. Not only did the pro-Russian minority, opposed to the Prussian alliance as such, take its stand fiercely against such a bargain, through the medium of speeches in the Diet, public pamphlets, and proclamations strewn through the streets, but the great patriot Staszyc did the same, though he was on principle in agreement with the majority in the Diet.

"Let us get us allies," he wrote in his celebrated pamphlet, "Warnings for Poland." "But let us not buy them. Better pay double taxes. . . . Better pay duties at the highest rate, chosen by our traitors from three lower ones. But let us keep an outlet to the sea."

And so it was. The tariff preference and the trade agreement were renounced, but "the sea was kept." Both the Diet and the Cabinet declared most decidedly that Dantzig must irrevocably belong to Poland. The solicitations of Prussia in Berlin and Warsaw were met with polite excuses. Dantzig was assigned at once in 1791 by special mention in the privileges accorded by the Great Diet to the cities, representation in the Diet, and a hearing "which is not to be denied them."

On its own part Dantzig stood with well-proved loyalty behind the Great Diet, and welcomed joyously the famous reforming Constitution of the Third of May. Kahlen, the long-resident agent of the city in Warsaw, did not wish to listen, when Hailes in confidence unwisely tried to win him over to supporting the cession of the city to Prussia. A little later, and from another side, the same man was solicited by Bulhakow, the Russian Minister in Warsaw, in the interests of the pro-Russian Confederation of Targowica, which was already in preparation, aiming to ruin Poland and the Constitution of Third of May. But here, too, Kahlen bore himself worthily, and returned a decided negative.

It happened soon, however, that the Great Diet, and the May Constitution, and the nation, found themselves menaced by the superior might of Russia, by the treachery

of Prussia, and by the crime of Targowica, and the peril of a second Partition became visibly nearer. For a moment the idea was entertained of defending the cause of Poland behind the faithful walls of Dantzig. This was in the sorry autumn of 1792, when victorious Targowica took over the administration in Warsaw, under the ægis of Russia ; and from the west the might of Prussia was reaching after the chosen booty of Great Poland, as well as for the long-desired keys of Dantzig. At that fateful hour the modest Polish Lieutenant, Stanislaw Fisher, who was partly of German blood, and who later became Kosciuszko's adjutant, and the Chief of Staff for Prince Joseph Poniatowski, first thought of Dantzig. He decided himself to investigate the chances of defending the Republic's only port. He took leave of absence, and went to the seaport city.

Lieutenant Fisher found the Prussians within the city limits, it is true, as they had long made themselves at home in Quadendorf, and even in the Scottish suburb itself. From these points of vantage they thought any fine day to make their way into the very centre of the city. But he found the walls, bastions, and arsenal "in the best of order." What was more, he found the same sentiments among the citizen-body, the merchants, and the guilds, as well as among the body of officers, as had aroused the enduring defenders of Stanislaw fifty years before.

Fisher met the councillors, the youth of the patrician and merchant classes, the officers of the city artillery, the Schuppelius and Niedermayer families, people whose sympathies were with their mother city Dantzig, and who were also warm for Poland. He examined carefully the fortifications and the arsenal. He was amazed at their fine condition, at the considerable stores of weapons and war-gear of every kind. He drank his wine with the youth of the city as a brother. He wept with them in the theatre, whither he was invited to see the noble works of Schiller, redolent of the very spirit of freedom.

These youths of the city, with their names ending in "us," were fired by the best of tempers. They aptly recalled the benefactions and privileges of the Republic, the favour of King Sigmund, the coming of King Stanislaw,

and the cannon-balls of Muennich. Above all, they recalled the iron, covetous hand of Frederick the Great, which strangled their trade and prosperity. They shuddered at the sight of the approaching second Partition, and the certainty of their being annexed by Prussia.

On returning to his division, Fisher reported his observations in Dantzig to his friend Vice-Brigadier John Henry Dombrowski, then one of the staff-officers of the Polish army, and later an illustrious general and patriot. The future creator of the Polish Legions in Italy, a learned expert in military history, knew well the glorious story of the sieges of the city. He formed the purpose of defending it once more, and of using the loyal temper of its inhabitants in an attempt to save Poland from the new peril of division which now threatened her.

Even then, at the beginning of 1793, the Prussians, after crossing the boundary, had occupied Great Poland with strong army corps, and were getting ready to take Dantzig. Dombrowski, in the face of a desperate situation, conceived the bold idea of gathering the Polish army together with the garrison and artillery of Warsaw, of striking at the Prussians, cutting his way through to Dantzig, and there entrenching to await help or some diversion through the French Revolution. Although this extraordinary scheme of Dombrowski did not come into execution, owing to unfavourable circumstances, it was all the same a striking proof of the position enjoyed by Dantzig, both political and military, at the very end of its age-long union with the Republic.

Meanwhile the last hour of Dantzig had struck, both as a Polish and as a free city. In keeping with the treaty for the Second Partition of Poland, made in St. Petersburg, Prussia got the city at last. And she got it in virtue of a most singular and scandalous international pact, as a reward for attacking revolutionary France.

" The King of Prussia," read the treaty, " binds himself together with the Roman Emperor to take part in the war against the French rebels (*contre les rebelles français*), and not to conclude a separate treaty with them, nor yet a truce. . . . By way of reward for the cost of this war he shall take possession of the lands, cities and districts (of

Great Poland), as well as of Dantzig and its territory" (*" et pour dédommagement des dépenses qu'entraine et entrainera cette guerre (contre la France). . . . S. M. Prussienne se mettra en possession de pays, villes et districts de la Grande Pologne) en y ajoutant la ville de Dantzig avec son territoire"*).[44]

In this unheard-of way, by a robbery of Poland, and as a reward for a robbery of France, Dantzig became the booty of Prussia. A richly-recompensed Russia assented, and an indifferent Europe received the news in silence. On the other hand, it was clear that no hindrance could be offered from the side of the helpless Republic. The Confederation of Targowica, into which Bulhakow had recently wished to draw Dantzig, now handed it over to Prussia in obedience to orders from the Czarina Catherine. The Diet of Grodno, constrained by Russian bayonets, had to confirm the seizure by a new pact of Partition with Prussia.

At the Second Partition, just as at the first, Berlin did not wait at all for the forced assent of Poland, whether from the Diet or from the Confederation. At once it set itself to gather up both the territories of Great Poland and the now at last ripened harvest of Dantzig. The whole scheme for finally consummating this business of annexation was a worthy epilogue to the whole ugly tragedy of violence and villainy which had long tortured the unhappy city. In feverish haste, at the beginning of 1793, Frederic William, in a confidential letter to the Supreme College of War in Berlin, gave orders for the taking of Dantzig by a sudden assault of arms. The Lieutenant-General selected for the task, Bruenneck, delayed, however, the execution of this rather risky attack. For his scouting parties reported that the men of the city had foreseen a possible surprise. They doubled their pickets and their vigilance. They had, too, in addition to the regular military garrison, some seven thousand civilian guards for an emergency, as well as eight thousand men "of every estate," ready to defend themselves to the last against the Prussians.

The best that could happen was thus a massacre, only too closely recalling the "surprise" of the Teutons in Dantzig five centuries before. In view of this fact the middle way of political pressure and armed menace was chosen.

A series of most ridiculous demands were set forth, meant to justify the necessity of occupying Dantzig by Prussian armies. The *point de départ* of these fabulous claims—those of the Berlin wolf on the Dantzig lamb which troubled the waters at the mouth of the Vistula—was the imagined Jacobinism of the bloodthirsty people of Dantzig, which threatened the safety of poor Prussia.

That is why the Prussian agent in Dantzig, von Lindenowsky, produced in January 1793 a categorical demand for the handing over of a certain Garnier, a Frenchman said to be a Jacobin envoy of the Paris Convention, who in the previous November had come to the city from Berlin. The City Council, although its investigations did not discover any guilt on Garnier's part, handed him over to the Prussians in fear of charges of provocation. The result was a violent protest, both from the merchants and from the Second and Third Committees, against such a violation of the right of asylum for a French citizen. The upshot was that the Prussian Government made new demands, both because of this " Jacobin " protest, and because of suspected secretion of papers compromising Garnier on the part of the Dantzig authorities.

Meanwhile the end of the month brought the news of the entry into Great Poland of Prussian troops, and of the taking of Thorn. The news was an ominous forecast for Dantzig of its own ruin. It called forth unbounded indignation. Crowds of people walked the streets of the city, hurling threats at the Prussians, urging the inhabitants to arms, and singing the new hymn of liberty, the Marseillaise. At once the Berlin Government began with monstrous charges arising out of these annoying meetings and revolutionary songs. It used the opportunity, too, for making plausible its suspicious deeds in connection with the imminent occupation.

" The same reasons," reads the memorable declararation of Frederic William II, issued in Berlin at the end of February, 1793, in the matter of the city and territory of Dantzig, " which moved His Majesty the King of Prussia to send his troops into certain districts of Great Poland, now lay upon him the necessity of seizing the city and territory of Dantzig. Without mentioning here the scarcely amicable attitude of the city for years toward His Majesty, it is certain

that it has become of late one of the seats of that vicious sect, the Jacobins, which goes from crime to crime, striving to spread its iniquities on every side with the filthy assistance of its messengers and proselytes. One of these thieves, after trying in vain to spread the poison of his teaching among the happy and deeply loyal Prussian people, was openly received by Dantzig ; and even when the facts were explained, it was scarcely possible to get his protectors to give him up.

" This fresh example, together with other vices of a falsely understood freedom ; furthermore, the secret connexions maintained by French and Polish co-operators in a conspiracy with that party, which by the boldness of its maxims outweighs the number of the infinitely more thoughtful citizens ; finally, the ease with which our common foe (the French Republic) can procure, with the help of friends in Dantzig, every kind of supplies, and especially grain—all these are the symptoms which have drawn His Majesty's attention to that city. He had thus to see that it was kept within the limits of action proper to its station, above all in order to secure safety for the Prussian citizens residing in the neighbourhood.

" With this in view, His Majesty the King of Prussia has ordered the Lieutenant-General de Raumer to take possession of the city with a sufficient force of troops, in order to keep order there, and safeguard the general peace. It will be best for the citizens of Dantzig to serve their cause by prudent and kindly dependence on the favour of His Majesty by voluntarily admitting His Majesty's armies, and by receiving them as friends."[45]

This capital document is worthy of notice. Apart from the above-mentioned secret pact of Partition, concluded in St. Petersburg, it is the one public, official formulation, in the name of the Prussian King and his Government, of the objective, legal and political rights of Prussia to her lordship, or rather, if we take the Prussian official definition, to her "acquiring" of Dantzig, and her holding it to this day.

" Falsely understood freedom "—this is the dislike of Dantzig for Prussian bondage; " scarcely amicable attitude " —towards the Prussians who had victimized the city for thirty years ; connexion " with Polish conspirators "—

i.e. with its rightful lord and mother-state, personified in the Great Diet; an inclination for the French Republic—which was proclaiming the modern watchwords: there you have the villainy of Dantzig, the imputations under which she was compelled under the Prussian yoke for over a century.

At the beginning of March General Raumer approached the walls of Dantzig at the head of a large army, and armed with this royal declaration. He demanded the instant surrender of the chief defences of the city and the fortress at the mouth of the Vistula, as well as the severance of all trade relations with France. The situation was a desperate one. There was no prospect of help from any quarter. After three days of noisy deliberation, the view of the merchants prevailed, that the city should be completely surrendered to Prussia, seeing that self-defence was impossible and every support from without was lacking.

But having perforce taken this decision to open the city gates to the armed Prussians, those enemies of Dantzig and of the Republic, the citizens turned with declaration of their due allegiance to the Polish Government in Warsaw. In a dolorous letter "to our King," Stanislaw August, they sorrowfully explained the situation, making it clear that, to save innocent blood and to hinder the complete destruction of the place, "deprived of all counsel and support, cut off from all assistance from Your Royal Majesty," they had found themselves obliged to submit to the overwhelming forces of the enemy. On the other hand, in surrendering by force into Prussian hands, the City Council set express conditions, and won from General Raumer certain fundamental guarantees for the future. These concerned their internal autonomy, their rights to the harbour, to safety of trade and to exemption from military service.[46]

All this amounted to a capitulation on terms, but nevertheless, as was to be foreseen, the Prussians treated it with no kind of respect. In fact, two weeks later, at the end of the month, a categorical "Occupation Patent" arrived from Frankfurt-am-Main, the Grand Headquarters of Frederic William, who, while taking the field against the French Revolution, had heard from Raumer of the readiness of Dantzig

to capitulate (*Besitzergreifungspatent*), This "Patent," with convenient forgetfulness of promises given, rejected all the city's conditions and ordered its immediate seizure. This happened, by a strange coincidence, on the very day of the murder of the Mayor Letczkow and his associates by the Teutonic commander, and just a year before the day of the Warsaw Insurrection, the memorable Thursday of Passion Week, 1793. The Senate, having neither escape nor power, at once ordered the inner fortifications to be given up. Prussian troops were at last to enter the city.

It was then that the last effort at defence on the part of the loyal citizen was made. For a fortnight, since the first agreement with the Prussian General, feeling in the town had been in a state of menacing excitement, and this broke out now in a violent storm. Indignant throngs surrounded the city hall. Amid deafening cheers men demanded war to the last with the Prussian intruder. They thundered at the cowardice and treachery of the Senate. They even began to set the warehouses of wealthy patricians on fire, as traitors to the city and the Republic. Their numbers included, during these demonstrations against the Prussians and for their liberty and Poland, the great majority of the inhabitants: all the petty traders and part of the larger merchants, the guilds, with the butchers at the head, the artisans, and then the labourers, mariners, dockers, and the soldiers belonging to the garrison of the fortress.

This all happened without any encouragement from agonizing Poland, and in fierce defiance of the Prussians. The people's own inborn instinct of self-preservation shrank desperately from dealings with Prussia, and kept firm on the side of Poland. Men rushed to the storming of the arsenal. In a trice they had laid hands on fire-arms. They seized the cannon on the ramparts, and taking by force ammunition from the artillery stores, began to cannonade with grape-shot and rifle-fire the approaching Prussian columns. These, taken by surprise and forced to retreat, opened fire with big guns and from their own lines, so that a large number of the improvised defenders of the city fell as victims.

This time also, just as it happened nearly five centuries before, the "acquisition" of Dantzig by Prussia was accom-

plished by an act of brutal violence, baptized by and at the cost of the innocent blood of the inhabitants. It was clear that this hopeless effort of the people in defence of their city must be abandoned at once, as the Prussians were in possession of the fortifications. After some days of rioting, there was nothing for it but to submit to the inevitable. At a morning hour of early April the first two regiments of Prussian infantry entered Dantzig through the four open gates of the city. A regiment of dragoons was with them. The citizens looked on in sullen silence. The common crowd broke out in unrestrained curses. But the soldiers of the city and of the Vistula fortress broke their weapons, declaring that they would not serve the Prussians against Poland and France. The whole garrison, except the officers, were led away as captives, and later on forced to enlist in the Prussian army. A month later, May, 1793, the act of doing homage and swearing fealty to the Prussian King was carried through by his orders. Dignitaries came from Berlin to represent him, and receive the subjection of the city.[47]

Thus did Dantzig come into Prussian hands. Without delay there began a forcible suppression of the ancient republican institutions of the city, which had been so prized hitherto and fostered by Poland. Then also began an enforced modelling of the city in conformity with the bureaucratic pattern of the other Prussian municipalities. The magistracy was set up on a basis truly and purely official and hierarchical. Faint traces only were left of representation for the merchants and the guilds. Above all, the " jacobin " Third Committee was of course utterly abolished. The first step of the enlightened Prussian administration went in the direction of obliterating this truly democratic institution, which had remained in Dantzig, the heirloom of the Republic. But the city nobility, composed of the better elements of the merchant and educated classes, felt keenly too the hard fist of Berlin bureaucracy. Many illustrious men of the city laid down their office in the City Government, the Courts, and the School Board, by way of protest against the Prussian intruder. Some even preferred, not minding the material loss involved, to leave their native city for ever, now that it had fallen under a foreign lord. This, among others, was the course followed

by the parents Schopenhauer, as we learn from the memoirs of Joanna, already mentioned, which are full of bitterness at the recollection.

For a time men deceived themselves with the hope of being delivered from the Prussian yoke. But these hopes, originally raised by the triumph of the French Revolution, soon vanished with the conclusion of the Treaty of Basle between France and Prussia.

In spite of this there was formed a few years later an actual conspiracy in Dantzig against the Prussians. This, if not actually organized by the Polish Emigration in Paris and Dombrowski's Legions, was at any rate in close sympathy with them. A handful of students, with the ardent Bartholdy at their head, took up the watchwords of the French Revolution, gathered secretly a few mariners, dockers, and working-men from the harbour, and resolved to raise the standard of armed revolt (1797). Their hope was to restore the former republican liberties of the city.[48]

Even soberer citizens were incited into the conspiracy, men like Father Richter, Deacon of the Church of St. Catherine, known for his irreconcilable attitude to the Prussian Government. The outbreak was fixed for the same Thursday of Passion Week 1797, as it was the anniversary of the recent battle in the streets as well as of the Kosciuszko Insurrection in Warsaw. The conspirators, provided with arms and republican colours, were gathered in the house of Bartholdy. They were to hurl themselves on the Prussian pickets, call the populace to revolt, and get possession of the city and fortress. This childish plot was discovered by the Prussian police. The youthful conspirators were condemned to death in the courts, but the verdict was commuted to a long term of imprisonment.

Under auspices none too promising, auspices such as these, the Prussian administration of Dantzig began. The new monarch, Frederic William II, preferred not to show himself in the city he had fought for so long, in view of the openly hostile temper of the people. When his successor, the young Frederic William III, came to Dantzig in 1798 with his beautiful Queen Louisa, he met with a cool reception from the citizens, in spite of official celebrations and festivals. Nor did he do anything useful, as had always happened when the

Polish sovereigns had been welcomed in triumph to Dantzig. He gave no heed to the bitter complaints as to the complete violation of the ancient rights and institutions of the city. With one cheap and questionable benefaction he was content, when he bestowed on certain of the officials of the city, who belonged to the new magistracy, and were most inclined to the Prussian regime, the German nobleman's rank, adding the " von " to their ancient Dantzig names. This titular favour was characteristic of the relations maintained between the authorities in Berlin and Republican Dantzig.

It should be stated, too, that the city did not suffer harm in material respects during the short thirteen years of Prussian rule. Rather did the improvement of Dantzig's trade, which had already manifested itself under the Great Diet, continue under Prussian auspices. Especially did the export of grain during this time advance with strides, so that in 1802 it reached the long since unknown figures of 85,000 measures.

This reacted naturally upon the prosperity of the city. But it was not at all thanks to the Prussian administration, because the latter from the very start made itself felt in the sphere of commerce through its fiscal and bureaucratic tyrannies. It was simply the result of three positive factors. First, Prussia did not at the time possess any ports, except the infinitely worse situated and mal-administered cities of Stettin, Koenigsberg and Memel, which could help in crushing Dantzig by competition. Secondly, in view of the still raging war of the French Revolution and Napoleon with the Coalition in Europe, England, Austria, and Russia, the Kingdom of Prussia, which had withdrawn from the conflict after the Treaty of Basle, was the chiefest, if not the only, source of supply for both parties. Thirdly, and this was the most important fact, after the inclusion of the heart of Poland with Warsaw in Prussia, in virtue of the Second and Third Partitions, the Prussian sources of supply were first and foremost the Polish lands.

If, then, during this period, the last years of the eighteenth and the first of the nineteenth century, the exports of Dantzig, especially of grain, were kept at a high level, it was just for the reason that the city remained, in spite of the Partitions,

in intimate touch with Prussian Warsaw; and that in spite of Prussian bondage it remained, as before, a part of the Polish commercial market, which was so profitable to it. Yet, discounting all this, that bondage was a terrible burden both to the whole Prussian part of Poland, to the capital Warsaw, and to the City of Dantzig. Whether here or there, the longing after deliverance was the same.

V

A FREE CITY

THE hour of Dantzig's deliverance struck at last, when Napoleon, after beating the Prussians at Jena, halted his army upon Polish soil. Having come to set Warsaw free from German hands, the Emperor turned his special attention at once upon Dantzig; and in January he gave the first orders as to its investment. Marshal Lefebvre, to whom, at the head of the Tenth Corps of the Grand Army, the task was assigned, had the help of the best organized divisions of the Polish army, which was then being formed. This help included the Third Polish Division, that of General Dombrowski, creator of the Legions in Italy; the Polish Northern Legion under Prince Michael Radziwill; and regiments of regular horse, volunteers from the nobility, and the newly formed military units of Posen and Kalish, under Colonel Dziewanowski and Generals Kosinski and Sokolnicki.

The task was an extraordinarily hard one. After the previous year's triumph over Prussia, the present "first Polish campaign" of Napoleon (1806–07) promised to be a heavy one. It was carried on against fresh Russian armies allied to the Prussian remnants, and was marked at the start by the bloody encounter of Eylau, almost a disaster to the French army. Meanwhile Dantzig was well provisioned. The Governor, Count Kalckreuth, had a garrison of 17,000 Prussians, 3,000 Russian foot, and three Cossack regiments. He had also access to the sea, from which, as it was wholly in the hands of the Allies, reinforcements kept arriving. Finally there were available the Russian corps of General Kamenskoi, with 6,000 men, and several thousand Prussians under General Buelow. Thus altogether there were over 30,000 troops defending the city.

On the other hand, Napoleon, after the serious losses of Eylau, could not send more than 12,000 men to the Tenth Corps before Dantzig; and there were added later hardly as many more, apart from the divisions lent for a time from the corps of Marshal Lannes and Mortier.

More than once during the siege even the energetic Lefebvre had his moments of despair and doubt as to the issue of the whole matter. Napoleon always roused him, however, in lively and even sharp fashion. The Emperor displayed in his whole correspondence with Lefebvre unusual interest in the undertaking, and full knowledge of the minutest details of the situation about the city. At the end of April, 1807, he rode to Marienburg, the ancient Crusader stronghold, which he had taken, as heir of the Polish Kings. It appears that he saw Lefebvre in person there, and gave him oral instructions. In any case, as a distinguished Prussian historian of this war, who is now a prominent Staff-officer, tells us, direct and telling orders of the Emperor in regard to the siege exercised a virtually decisive influence on the capture of the city. More than that, this competent military expert is of opinion that "the importance of Dantzig for the great undertakings" was not appreciated fully either by Frederic William III nor yet by Lefebvre, but only by Napoleon.

The Poles took a major part in the operations, and carried off the honours in the actual capture of Dantzig. They represented a quite presentable fraction of the relatively slender army of investment. They numbered in all some 6,500 men. When Dombrowski, being wounded at Dirschau, laid down his command of the Polish Division, it was taken over by the valiant if old and hunch-backed Lieutenant-General Gielgud. These Polish units, hastily gathered, and improvised as they were, left much to be desired in point of organization, and even the most necessary things, such as arms, uniforms, and food, were lacking. Many had only light military overcoats, and beneath them any sort of clothing. The poor fellows suffered cruelly from cold, rain, often from hunger, being in the trenches before the city during the worst season of the year.[49]

The siege of the city proper, apart from preliminaries in February, began in March, and the cannonade in earnest in April, 1807. One must remember that the position of

the French army after Eylau was far from favourable and its temper rather depressed.

In spite of all this, the Poles, speedily ridding themselves of occasional distempers at the start, not only did their duty at Dantzig, " holding the very centre of the line of assault," on the " most dangerous and most important station," but even by their endurance, firmness, and impetus they came to be the pick of Lefebvre's army. The Marshal soon knew their value, and loved them. In his daily orders he did them justice repeatedly, giving honourable mention to their officers and privates. Once indeed, when an enemy's sally from the city was being repulsed, he dismounted from his horse, unbuttoned his coat in order to show his Marshal's embroidery and stars, and at the head of Downarowicz's Polish battalion, himself led a splendid counter-attack, snatching the drum from the drummer's own hands.

The consciousness that they were fighting for a Polish Dantzig and a Polish sea-front served above all to maintain the high level of courage among the Polish troops. More than one fine expression of this feeling was given. The anniversary of the Constitution of the Third of May was solemnly celebrated in the lines. In a fiery speech delivered on this occasion by Father Przybylski, Chaplain of the First Infantry Regiment, Prince Sulkowski's, the men were reminded of " the waving banner of Poland on the shores of the Baltic." Time and again in the appeals and reports of Dombrowski, Gielgud, and their subordinates around Dantzig, this notion of their efforts and fights being a way of emancipation is most clearly emphasized.

But from the other side, and in Dantzig itself, the great majority of the citizens saw for the first time in the siege of their city an act of justice and emancipation. Convinced of this in their souls, these loyal patriots for the first time took almost no part in the defence. The Prussian Royal Family, fleeing from Berlin after the disaster at Jena, thought for a time of seeking shelter behind the city's walls ; but in view of the cool attitude of the inhabitants they thought it better after a short stay to flee still farther to Koenigsberg and Memel. They obviously realized that it was not possible at least for Hohenzollerns

to expect such affection and shelter from the people of the city as Stanislaw Leszczynski once enjoyed.

The effort made later by Count Krockow to form in Dantzig a corps of volunteers for Prussia met with complete failure. The Count himself for that matter soon fell into the hands of the besieging Polish troops. Equally unsuccessful were the appeals of the Governor Kalckreuth for loyal generosity on the city's part towards Prussia. On the other hand, the real temper of the inhabitants is revealed by the fact that he had to take special measures of precaution for the Thursday of Passion Week, 1807, through fear of riots on that memorable anti-Teutonic and anti-Prussian anniversary.

Worse still, the citizens maintained secret communications with the Polish outposts, furnishing necessary information and assisting the privates of the garrison to desert. This was so common that, according to Gielgud's figures, "over 4,000 Prussian deserters, Poles and Germans, passed through the Polish line, of whom 700 Poles enlisted voluntarily in our regiments."

"As far as the citizens of Dantzig are concerned," wrote Colonel Krukowiecki, who was in command of the first rank of Polish outposts, "they are all of good cheer, and await impatiently the moment when the beneficent hand of our saviour (Napoleon) will set them free from the Prussians and Muscovites."

The last serious effort to relieve Dantzig from the sea side was made at the beginning of May, with the landing of considerable Russian and Prussian reinforcements at the mouth of the Vistula. The valiant and successful repulse of this peril by the Polish troops represents their finest and most meritorious performance during the whole siege. It made the speedy surrender of the city inevitable. The fight was of the bloodiest and fiercest, as the Poles and French gave no quarter, and victory had to be bought by heavy losses. Here in this battle the young and gallant Colonel Anthony Parys fell, shot through the breast by a rifle bullef as he was leading his regiment to a final charge. He was a splendid officer of the Polish Legions in Italy, and the true hero of the present struggle for Dantzig.

On the spot where he fell his companions threw up a mound and held a solemn funeral in his honour. The illustrious

writer and patriot Prince Alexander Sapieha, who was a member of Gielgud's staff, exclaimed at the funeral, in the presence of the city, which still held out :

HEROIC RACE OF POLES!

The weakness of our fathers has not availed to erase the glory of their ancestors. Turn your gaze from this hill whither a holy ceremony has led us. Look upon Dantzig, for whose restoration to the motherland you are fighting. Fix your eyes in this direction to the endless plains of Pomerania, torn from us by treachery. For centuries we cherished this land in safety. . . . Ye see this moving element, the stretches of the Baltic which the eye cannot measure. That was our possession during the time of the Sigmunds. Polish vessels ploughed its surface, and brought abundance into our land by flourishing trade.

All this glory our ancestors handed over to their children, and it is now your task to recover what the carelessness of the latter let slip. . . . We have piled up this mound with our hands. . . . Perhaps some day, when fortune ceases to harass us, Poles will recover their former possessions, and surrounded by their children will point to this grave as an evidence of our deeds, and as a lesson of how much it cost to bring a fallen nation to a new birth.[50]

The names of Parys and of many other Poles who took part in these battles, and received in return the generous mark of the French Legion of Honour, were mentioned with high distinction in the bulletins of the Grand Army at the end of the siege and capture of Dantzig. In fact, at the end of May, a few days after the unsuccessful attempt at relief, the capitulation followed. Scarcely a month passed from the proper commencement of the siege before all was over. It is a notable fact that of all the investments of Dantzig the shortest was this one, in which the city was taken from the Prussians.

Marshal Lefebvre, by way of doing homage to the Poles, assigned them the place of honour when the city was occupied, both because of their proved valour and because they had the real right to the city. At the solemn entry into the city through the High Gate on the morning of May 27, 1807, the Marshal, surrounded by his suite, led the way in a blaze of decorations, and right behind, in full parade, with a band playing at its head, the Polish Legion followed. The six regiments of French infantry brought up the rear.

The capture of Dantzig was an event of the first rank,

not only military but also political. It finely restored the position of the Grand Army, and made possible the decisive victory at Friedland a few weeks later. Napoleon, aware beyond all others of the significance of the event, expressed his personal satisfaction to Lefebvre in a beautiful letter, granting him the dignity of "Duke of Dantzig." [51]

In those very days of triumph the Emperor made his entry into Dantzig. Welcomed cordially by the inhabitants, as were the Polish kings of yore, he took up his residence in Langgarten. He inspected with care the chief institutions of the city, the fortress of the Vistula, the Neufahrwasser harbour. He received in special audience representatives of the council and the merchant-class. He took from their hands a memorial, which set forth the sore crimes suffered at the hands of the Prussian Government from the time of the First Partition. He showed special satisfaction towards the Polish besieging forces. A review was held on the Long Square. He covered them with proofs of his favour and appreciation.

As a matter of fact Dantzig was won largely at the price of Polish blood. The aged General Gielgud emphasizes this in his report made to the Emperor. "The Third Polish Division," so he wrote, "which I had the honour to command, came to the blockade of Dantzig with 6,500 men under arms. As a result of the labours of the siege and the losses sustained in skirmishes and in the trenches, it numbers now but 4,650 men." The Polish losses were thus some two thousand.

"The inhabitants of the city," he went on, "are Poles. They are imbued with the spirit of loyalty and admiration for Your Imperial and Royal Majesty, as well as with feelings of love for their former motherland, when Poland was still a united nation."

At that time neither the future of the city was certain, nor yet the issue of the war itself. Nevertheless it was generally taken for granted that, with the triumph of Napoleon and the reconstitution of Poland, Dantzig should be returned to her motherland. Such was too the general opinion of Warsaw. It was to be expected that the first news of the taking of Dantzig by the Franco-Polish army should give rise to universal enthusiasm in the capital.

"The news was the occasion of such great rejoicing in Warsaw that on the very day it came all the houses in the city were illumined, though no such order had been given by the authorities. . . . On all the streets were to be heard the glad cheers: "Long live the great Napoleon, the deliverer of Dantzig!" At once the President of the Warsaw Provisional Regency Commission, the grey-haired Malachowski, who had been Marshal of the Great Diet, prepared a letter to the Emperor asking for the assignation, or rather the restoration, "of the city of Dantzig and all the parts of Poland round about her"—i.e. Royal Prussia and Polish Pomerania—to the Polish State in the hour of its re-birth.[52]

Nevertheless, things were to turn out quite differently. When a little later, after the victory of Friedland, the Peace of Tilsit was concluded between Napoleon and Czar Alexander, the latter's rooted opposition served above all to make the reconstitution of a large and powerful Poland impossible. The result was the mangled Duchy of Warsaw as a compromise, without Royal Prussia and Pomerania, and without Dantzig. By the Treaty of Tilsit of July, 1807, Dantzig, with the territory round about to a radius of sixteen kilometres, was declared a free and independent city. At the same time the free use of the Vistula was guaranteed. In December, thanks to the kind mediation of the French Marshal Soult, the boundaries were somewhat extended by a supplementary agreement made in Elbing between Dantzig and Prussia.[53]

Though left nominally under the joint care of Prussia and Saxony-Warsaw, Dantzig actually was at the immediate disposition of Napoleon himself, whose bust in marble took the place in the Town Hall formerly occupied by that of Frederic William. The city was given a French garrison and a French commander, General Rapp. A considerable war contribution, with numerous supplementary payments, was levied in the interests of the French Treasury. In return the town got back its constitution and the machinery of self-government: the Three Committees, the Council called officially from now on the Senate, its own courts, representations of the four "quarters," etc. At the Emperor's command, however, the Code Napoléon was introduced.

The citizens managed to get this greatly delayed and make it only an auxiliary institution.[54]

Besides the Governor, the resident French agent, Massias, held office, and afterwards also the Saxon-Warsaw one, Helbig. There were in addition quartered here, rather for purposes of espionage, the Prussian Consul Vegesack and the Russian Trefurt. The people of Dantzig had their official deputation now in Paris, as formerly in Warsaw, together with a permanent envoy with power to act, Kahlen, who had been the representative to the Republic of Poland in Warsaw of old, and was now the same for Napoleon. It is worthy of note that recommendations kept being made by the Emperor to the Dantzig delegates, just as formerly by the Kings Sigmund and Sobieski, to the effect that the city should admit Catholics to its offices and its administration.

From the autumn of 1808 the garrison in Dantzig was composed of two Polish regiments of foot of the Duchy of Warsaw. The commander was General Grabowski, who in the next year succeeded Rapp as Governor, the latter being placed on the Emperor's staff for the Austrian campaign of 1809. After Grabowski, the duties of commander were performed for a time by General Woyczynski. The relations of the citizens with the Polish garrison and the Polish commanders were always of the best. In 1810 Prince Joseph Poniatowski, War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the army of the Duchy of Warsaw, came to Dantzig to inspect the garrison and the fortress. He was received by the city with great honours, as nephew of the late King Stanislaw August and the most popular of Poles, and with the respect always shown to the royal Polish line.

In accordance with Napoleon's own orders and in agreement with the military authorities in Warsaw, headlong efforts were being made all this time to strengthen the fortifications of the city. In the spring of 1811, after the first misunderstandings between the Czar and Napoleon, Dantzig was placed under a state of siege, as it was especially threatened from Russian quarters. On the outbreak of the great war with Russia, Napoleon, on his way to Moscow, visited Dantzig for the second time in June, 1812, in order with his own eyes to verify the state of its defences. It

was to be one of the chief bases for all further operations against Moscow. This time also he received in a long audience representatives of the city authorities and the merchants. With the penetration and simplicity peculiar to him, he questioned them in detail as to their needs and burdens, as well as about the actual industrial position of their free city, which he had called back to life and retained under his protection.[55]

The position of Dantzig during this protectorate left, it is true, very much to be desired. The six years of Napoleon's rule had brought it to the verge of ruin. Its trade had wholly ceased. Many of the oldest and richest of its financial houses had become beggared, bankruptcies were numerous, the artisans had no work, and the working-classes were in misery. The people kept themselves alive with grants from the army or work at the fortifications. It suffices to note that the population of the city with the surrounding district was diminished by one-fourth. It had been over 80,000, and was now only 64,000.[56]

The causes of this disastrous situation were many. The contributions and numerous military levies of the French were a sore burden to the city. The blockade of the continent was infinitely more harmful. Instituted six months before the capture of Dantzig, by the famous Berlin Decree (1806), which declared the British Isles to be in a state of blockade, it cut the city off from its chief customers and providers overseas. Both imports and exports were as good as finished for Dantzig. Neither the Emperor's "licences" granted to the citizens, nor exceptional vessels and ladings, could help the matter, nor yet the spread of contraband. Chiefest of all, the Tilsit solution itself of the question of Dantzig and Poland, forced upon Napoleon by Alexander, was absolutely mistaken, absurd, both hurtful for Poland and ruinous for Dantzig.

The so-called "free city," cut off by West Prussia from Poland, found itself in virtually the same position, and without escape, as after the First Partition. Rather the position was even worse than after the Third Partition, when Dantzig had at least been reunited with Warsaw, beneath the Prussian yoke it is true, but at least under one single regime. To return to her natural and historical state-

unity with a free Poland, as one of the most splendid of Polish cities, a city animated with a fulness of life, and not to vegetate as a fancied free city in an artificial separation and isolation from her—this has been and will be the highest political injunction imposed on Dantzig both by nature and by history. Indeed, the most striking proofs of this are furnished by the lamentable experiences of the free city during the Napoleonic era.

Meanwhile the tragic end of this epoch was approaching. The disastrous retreat from Moscow followed. Rapp, who had been taken again by the Emperor on that luckless expedition, returned to Dantzig in December, 1812, half alive, with face and hands frozen, but full of energy. He at once declared that the city was in a state of war.

Already the Russian army was following close on the heels of the retiring remnants of the Grand Army. True, no one in Alexander's army headquarters had settled the matter at this juncture (New Year, 1813) how far the victorious pursuit was to be pushed. In the most approved circles of Russian politics, and just because Napoleon was in such desperate straits, it was not thought in the least desirable for Alexander to pursue his foe to France itself. Such an expedition would have had the appearance of advantage for Russia, but would have meant in reality the reconstitution of Prussia.

Kutuzow, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, was decidedly of opinion that a stop should be made at the Vistula, that an alliance with Prussia was undesirable, as was also further fighting *pour le roi de Prusse*. He wanted, on the other hand, to come to terms with Napoleon and make peace on the best conditions for Russia. The Chancellor Rumianzeff was of the same opinion, as was also almost the whole suite and the "general public sentiment" of Russia. In the same way a modern Russian historian and military expert, after weighing the whole military and political situation of that time, came to the conclusion that precisely this and no other solution suited "the real interests" of Russia.

Thus, then, these best possible conditions of peace, of which Kutuzow was thinking, and which were not hard to obtain from Napoleon in view of his position, involved not only the uniting of the whole Duchy of Warsaw to Russia,

but also the gaining of the line of the Vistula from end to end. This meant at once the incorporation of the whole of East Prussia. The situation seemed once more the same as it was in the time of Czarina Elizabeth, when striking at Frederic the Great. As a matter of fact, just as in the former time, this whole province of Prussia was actually now in Russian hands.

According to a competent eye-witness, Field-Marshal Boyen, a Prussian who conferred with Czar Alexander at the end of 1812, the Russian military party demanded unconditionally the Vistula as a boundary-line. " They were ready at this price to leave the rest of Europe to Napoleon, or to even the devil himself." [57]

The whole latter part of the Moscow campaign, the escape of Napoleon, the slowing-up in his pursuit, is all virtually explained by the above secret calculation of Russia. In point of fact it looked seriously as if the calculation were to be realized. In January, 1813, the Russian Generals Tchernisheff and Rydygier took Koenigsberg. Here a highly curious regime was begun, without the least regard for Frederic William III, and beneath the most serene authority of the Czar Alexander himself, just as of yore under Czarina Elizabeth. The Russian military Governor, Marquis Paulucci, had taken Memel even earlier, abolished the Prussian administration, taken over the treasury, and simply instituted a Russian government.

The question of Dantzig was closely connected with these important events. There can be no doubt that the Russian plans at the end of 1812 and during the greater part of 1813 had one aim in view—to get possession of Dantzig and either simply retain it or, in the worst case, leave it with the status of a free city as the Peace of Tilsit had done. There would, of course, be one difference—that the protector would be Alexander and not Napoleon.

In fact, Kutuzow, in a very remarkable ordinance addressed to General Wittgenstein, advised him to remove the Prussian troops from Dantzig and use for its investment only Russian units. The result was that in January, 1813, after the city was surrounded, the Cossack Commander Platow was in charge, whilst in February Wittgenstein, and to the end of April General Lewis, directed the operations.

In May Prince Alexander of Würtemberg, Military Governor of White Russia, the born uncle of the Czar himself, was sent straight from the Russian headquarters. The choice of such a distinguished personage, as well as the increase of the besieging army to well over 30,000 men, were a clear indication of the importance attached in the immediate entourage of the Czar to his getting control of Dantzig himself.

Frederic William, too, easily scented the danger, and gave orders already in April " to make all thinkable efforts " to send to the siege of Dantzig Prussian divisions, whose very presence would be a kind of pledge of Prussia's claims to the city. A weak division of Prussian " Landwehr," numbering a few thousand men, under the leadership of Count Dohna, was brought together, and it was sent in June " to the help " of Prince Würtemberg.

The Russian Commander naturally received the uninvited " help " in the most ungracious manner. He looked down on them, issued orders to them in Russian, just as to his " crews of reserves," but set them regularly in the rear, etc. Thus there was played out under the walls of Dantzig a strange tragedy-comedy, part political, part military, between the Prussian troops, who outdid themselves in their importunate eagerness, and the Russian Commander, who turned the cold shoulder mercilessly to their proffered services.

This last siege of Dantzig, in the year 1813, when, as in 1734, it was beset and finally taken by victorious Russian armies, was once again nothing less than a tragedy alike for Dantzig and France and Poland. Again Polish and French troops defended the city in her bitter need. It was infinitely important for Napoleon that Dantzig should hold out as long as possible—" that walled palladium of France on far-away reaches "—as it would be for him a solid *point d'appui* in case of a more fortunate turn of events.

Yet the garrison gathered now in the city, the Tenth Corps of the Grand Army, was nought but a collection of frozen, wounded, and exhausted wrecks of men, survivors of the fearful catastrophe of Moscow. It was a " heap of invalids," numbering nominally over 35,000 men, of whom, however, the greater part—up to 18,000—at once went into hospital, and soon died almost to the last man.

There were thus in truth never more than some 13,000 to 14,000 men fit to bear arms. It was the most complete medley of people—French, Bavarians, Dutch, Westphalians, Spaniards, Italians, and even Africans.

Next to the French, the stoutest element of defence which was to be found in the garrison, was the Poles. The Seventh Polish Division was there, under the command of Brigadier-General Prince Michael Radziwill. There were three regiments of foot, the Fifth, the Ninth, and the Eleventh, which had taken a brilliant part in the capture of Dantzig six years before, and were now called upon to defend it. There was the Ninth Regiment of Polish Lancers, which had just shed its blood liberally and distinguished itself in the Moscow expedition. Finally, there were two companies of foot and one of horse artillery, and a company of sappers. This made a total of 6,000 men, virtually half of the whole garrison that was able to fight. All were splendid soldiers, resolved to defend the ancient Polish city to the last.

Of course the Russian besiegers on their part undertook vigorous steps the moment the city was invested, to demoralize and win over precisely this stoutest Polish element of the garrison. The Russian Commander himself prepared a proclamation urging the Poles to desertion and treachery. At the same time a falsified appeal was issued, supposed to be that "of the citizens of Warsaw to their brethren in the field." In this proclamation the people of Warsaw adjured and challenged all Poles under arms in general, and those defending Dantzig in particular, "by the sacredness of their faith and of their fatherland," to leave the standard of the atheistic and crime-committing Napoleon and to place themselves at once under the protection of "the great Czar, Alexander the Magnificent," and of "the great Russian nation," akin to the Poles in blood, in language, and in near neighbourhood.

This singular appeal, written for the rest in curiously bad Polish and full of Russianisms, was naturally a wretched counterfeit. As a matter of fact, Warsaw, when captured at the beginning of February, 1813, by the Russian armies, maintained generally a patriotic and hostile attitude to its conquerors. Instead of urging people to desert, she did exactly the opposite. Her whole soul was with the Polish

army fighting in the field under Prince Poniatowski and holding loyally to France and to Napoleon. All the same, the moment the Russian armies approached Dantzig, Cossack officers sent by Platow put in an appearance among the Polish outposts and began to fraternize. When they were hustled out they ride away, scattering among the troops a host of the proclamations above mentioned.

The Governor, Rapp, was equal to the occasion, acting like a soldier and to the point. He wrote up the whole incident in the *Dantzig Gazette*, ordered the counterfeit appeal "from Warsaw" to be printed word for word, and bade it be read everywhere publicly to the assembled Polish regiments. The result was that the troops rejected with indignation the Russian request, and took a solemn oath to hold out unfailingly in the defence of Dantzig, France and Napoleon.

They issued further a written declaration, edited by Captain Wladislaw Ostrowski, who was then at the head of the Polish Horse Artillery at Dantzig. He defended the city gallantly, and became in 1831 the zealous Marshal of the famed Revolutionary Diet in Warsaw. The declaration recalled the Partitions of Poland, the massacre of Praga, the injuries without number suffered from the Powers who had divided the land, especially from Russia, and ended with a pledge "of love of country and gratitude to Napoleon."

This declaration, which was handed to Rapp by Prince Radziwill and the Polish Staff, was signed by "the generals and senior officers, the commanders, the officers and non-commissioned, as well as the privates of the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Regiments of Foot, the Ninth Regiment of Lancers, the commander, officers, non-commissioned and privates of the Foot and Horse Artillery and of the Sappers" in Dantzig. This eloquent pledge was confirmed by the Poles time after time by their splendid deeds. During the first attack made in earnest by Lewis on the city early in March, 1813, the Russian columns advancing to storm the place were scattered, thanks chiefly to the furious charge of the Polish Brigade. The grateful Rapp appeared from that time in the red cap of a Polish Confederate and often in full Polish uniform.

The conditions of the still continuing siege grew day by

day more desperate. Beneath the enemy's fire, under the influence of hunger, typhus, and insidious tales from without, the spirits of the men kept sinking always the more. When treachery was creeping into the city and among the Allies, only the Poles remained true to their duty, to their leader, their nation, and to Europe, loyal to the end here, just as on the field of Leipsic under Poniatowski. Nearly half of them—some 2,500—died, either falling on the ramparts or dying in the city hospitals.

At length, a month after the Battle of Leipsic, when he had exhausted his means of defence and there was now no more hope, Rapp signed a deed of surrender on honourable terms at the end of November, 1813. He was to leave the city with his garrison on New Year's Day, 1814, if no relief came before that time.

By the deed of surrender the Poles of the garrison were guaranteed the choice either of marching out and making their way to Napoleon's armies or of returning home. Alexander, however, for reasons which did him no credit, refused to ratify the terms. He ordered the French, together with their Commander, to be taken prisoners and sent off into the depths of Russia. The Poles were allowed to return to Warsaw, but without their arms.[58]

At ten o'clock in the morning of New Year's Day, 1814, some 3,000 Polish troops, with 230 officers, marched out of Dantzig by the Oliva Gate, under the command of Radziwill. They had their arms with them, but laid them down a league outside the walls. This was the last Polish garrison to take leave of the Polish Dantzig for over a century.

The Prussians, who were keeping a suspicious eye on the Prince of Würtemberg, were deeply alarmed at the news of the surrender of the city, a transaction arranged by the French Governor with the Russian Commander, of course without any thought for Berlin. At once they informed their King that the Russian Staff was resolved to level the fortifications of Dantzig, not to restore it to the Prussian crown, but to declare it a free city. At the same time they denounced "certain gentlemen of the Senate of Dantzig, who certainly desire a return of the city's former glory and exert an influence on some important persons here," i.e. in the Russian headquarters. Frederic William sent an order

forthwith naming General Massenbach as Governor and Colonel Dohna as Commander of the city.

Now, however, as the Prussian historian of the fortress of Dantzig expresses it, a "catastrophe" followed. The Prince of Würtemberg declared outright that he had no intention of obeying the King's orders, that he awaited the orders of the Czar, and that duty bade him consider above everything else the interests of his master and Russia. For the rest he added quite openly that in his opinion "the question of Dantzig is inseparably bound up with that of Poland."

The Russians, then, the day after the Franco-Polish garrison left the place, entered Dantzig themselves. The keys were sent to the Czar. Lieutenant-General Prince Wolkonski became Governor of the city and General Rachmanow the Commander. The Prussians were excluded wholly both from the military and the civilian administration. Permission was given them to man just the inner Heugarten Gate, between the Bishop's Hill and the Hagelsberg.

Sharp differences soon resulted. A violent scene took place between the Prince and the Prussian Generals. Count Dohna was bold enough to post up printed proclamations in the city on his own authority as "Commander." But these were torn down at once, and that possibly by the people themselves, who, as the confidential reports of Major Hake to the Prussian King inform us, demonstrated in a clear manner their hatred of the Prussian authorities. The Prince of Würtemberg threatened Dohna himself with arrest. For a month the Russians were sole lords of Dantzig, and made themselves at home in the city. Thus, at least for the short period of January, 1814, the old Russian longings of Peter and Elizabeth for the city were fulfilled.

Nevertheless the Prussians did not neglect their business. From the moment when, renouncing Napoleon, they joined the Coalition again, they undertook with great diligence the regaining of Dantzig. In February of 1813, on the first negotiations of Frederic William with the Czar as his ally, the Prussian demanded that Russia bind herself to restore Dantzig to him. Alexander demurred at the time, and in the joint agreement of Breslau-Kalish between Prussia

and Russia, he made no mention of the city at all. Nor did he cease demurring in the matter, for one or another reason, during the whole spring and autumn campaign of 1813. Even in October, after the Battle of Leipzig, he broached the idea through one of his diplomats of leaving Dantzig as a free city, or in any case not letting Prussia get it back.

But both the Prussian diplomats and the King himself kept assailing the Czar in this delicate matter with ever-increasing insistence. Unfortunately, too, they got the support of the British representative in the Allied camp, Lord Castlereagh, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who took a most perverted view of the Dantzig question, as indeed of that of Poland as a whole. Castlereagh, by the suggestions of the Prussian Cabinet, was daily kept in dread of the Russian peril, and recalling the mistaken and now out-of-date initiative of Pitt of twenty years previously, he declared himself favourable to the restoration of Dantzig to Prussia.

In the face of this Alexander could not resist further. When, then, on his victorious way to France, he received in Basle the news of the surrender of the city to the Prince of Würtemberg, he gave orders that it be restored again to Prussia. These orders reached Dantzig at the beginning of February, 1814, and were carried out forthwith. Thus the Prussians got possession of Dantzig once more, and that for a full century. [59]

Nevertheless, in spite of the Czar's orders and the act of Prussia in again taking over the city, the fundamental question of its title to Dantzig remained still an unsettled one. It was a matter for the whole of Europe, which, just like all the others growing out of the division of the lands taken from Napoleon, and of his abdication and the capture of Paris, had to be settled finally by the General Congress of the Nations in Vienna. It was on this that the unhappy people of Dantzig set their last feeble expectations. For these experienced and stubborn citizens, just as in the days of Frederic William III, or with Frederic the Great, shuddered at the thought of coming again under the rule of Prussia.

They did not at all admit themselves beaten. They did

everything they could to prevent their again falling into Prussian hands. As indicated, the resident representative in Paris, " deputy of the city of Dantzig at the Emperor's Court," in Napoleon's time was first the patron of Dantzig Kahlen, and after his death in 1811, his friend Dr. Keidel, a resourceful and energetic man, born in Bremen. The Senate of Dantzig, through its closed Committee of five senators, foreseeing the fall of Napoleon and an upheaval in Europe, worked out secret instructions for Keidel immediately after the disastrous retreat from Moscow.

These instructions, under the date of January, 1813, set forth on the eve of a reconstitution of Europe the essential demands of Dantzig. The return of the city under the Prussian sceptre was entirely excluded, as the greatest of evils, a thing quite inadmissible. But in the same way the Constitution of the city of 1807 as a free city was declared to be unsuccessful and undesirable for the future. For this situation led, so the report declared, to similar lamentable results for the city as had been experienced from 1772 to 1793, while it was cut off from Poland. Those grievous experiences proved that Dantzig could not maintain itself as a free city, even though all its sovereign rights were guaranteed. Thus, then, the instructions ended, the best solution, and the one we must aim at, would be that Dantzig be again united " with Poland, as a powerful and independent State."

After waiting through the critical year 1813 and the siege of the city, Keidel began with the desired representations to the Allied Powers the moment their victorious armies entered Paris. He first reached the Czar through the latter's Swiss friend Laharpe, and handed him in May, in the name of the Senate of Dantzig, a bold and dexterous memorial on the question of the unlucky city. He recalled the oppression and violence it had suffered at the hands of Frederic the Great and his successor. He declared the seizure of the city by Prussia in virtue of the Second Partition to be an act which international law did not warrant. He went back to the plans of the Czarinas Anne and Catherine as guardians of the city. He demonstrated that " Dantzig is the key to the Vistula, and the natural and indispensable market-place of the products and output of

Poland." Therefore, he said, "these very Polish lands are most concerned for the maintenance of an independent Dantzig."

Keidel demanded, therefore, from Alexander the deliverance of Dantzig from Prussia, and the reservation for her in the future at least of the same guarantees of a free city as had been given at Tilsit, this time, of course, under the protectorate of the Czar. Properly speaking, he departed here from his secret instructions, whose chief recommendation was the uniting of the city with Poland.

But this very reconstitution of Poland was still, during the stay of the Allies in Paris, a very doubtful thing. Then, again, the Allied statesman, Pozzo di Borgo the Russian diplomat and a convinced enemy of the Poles, Metternich and Stadion the Austrian statesmen, to whom the Dantzig representative turned for counsel, did not in the least favour the restoration of Poland by Alexander. In any case Keidel, in all his papers laid before the Allies at the time in Paris, unconditionally excluded Dantzig's return to the Prussian domination. At the same time he went privately to the British Embassy in Paris and put into the hands of the Ambassador, Sir Charles Stuart, a separate and still more cogent memorial, which was meant for Castlereagh. In this he recalled the former friendly relations of Dantzig with England. He stated emphatically that "His Majesty the King of Great Britain never ratified the delivering up of Dantzig to the Prussian King, done temporarily in 1793 and then abolished in 1807."

Dantzig's representative in Paris, in his search for salvation for his city, received, as was natural, the support of a most distinguished Pole who was present in the city, Prince Adam Czartoryski. This nobleman, who was then the friend and confidant of the Czar, took Keidel under his protection, and with him the cause of Dantzig he was championing.

"The man works very well," wrote Czartoryski about Keidel in his Paris Diary of the time. ". . . He is an excellent man; he is stirring up compassion in commercial cities for his own." The Prince himself for a year and a half had worked with the greatest industry at the reconstitution of Poland by way of a personal union with Russia,

even if it had to be under the sceptre of the Czar, since better conditions could not be realized.

In the light of this idea of a new-born Poland for which Czartoryski was working, against Kutuzow's plan of complete conquest, the cause of Dantzig assumed a fresh complexion, and turned into its normal historical path. The goal now was no more the taking over of Dantzig by the Czar in the spirit of the greed for extension shown by Peter and Elizabeth, but the rightful restoration in one form or another of the ancient and proper relation of the city to Alexander as King of Poland. This would have meant, of course, the greatest political and industrial gain both for the future Kingdom of Poland and for Dantzig itself. And it would be in exact agreement with the essential recommendations of the secret instructions prepared by the Senate.

With this idea, prompted by Czartoryski and armed with his recommendations, Keidel crossed to London, in order, as the representative of the Dantzig Senate, to continue there his efforts for saving his city from Prussia. He found in the City time-worn sympathies for Dantzig, and used them. Two distinguished members of the Union of London Merchants, Isaac Solly and Lewis Paleske, instituted a plan of intervention in the Dantzig interests. In the same way Keidel got in touch with the Opposition in Parliament and the Press. In his difficult task in London there helped him an eminent Pole who was staying in England, Count Joseph Sierakowski, a friend of Kosciuszko, whom Czartoryski had recommended to him.

In August and September, 1814, the Opposition *Morning Chronicle* printed several articles inspired by Keidel which concluded decidedly against the delivering up of Dantzig into Prussian hands. One of these was written by Sierakowski. The view of the paper was that the occupying of Dantzig by Prussia after the surrender of Rapp and the withdrawal of the Russians was to be considered as only a temporary expedient. Void of all legal justification, it should be rendered void by the decision of the nations of Europe in favour of a return to the former independence of a free city.

But all of Keidel's movements were being watched with the greatest care by the Prussian Embassy in London, and

reported to the Chancellor Hardenberg in Berlin. They were also being represented to the British Government, which was at the time under Prussian influence, as highly suspicious actions and hostile to the cause of the Allies. It was thus in vain that the tireless representative of Dantzig knocked at the doors of that Government. He turned, it is true, in person to the Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, and to the head of the Foreign Department, Lord Castlereagh. He presented again a huge memorial, in which he went back to the privileges granted by Casimir Jagiellon. He demanded the deliverance of his city from Prussian hands, and the guarantee for free traffic on the Vistula. He claimed finally—and this in the spirit of the suggestions of Prince Czartoryski—that Dantzig should be put "under the cover of the special protection" (*sous l'égide d'une protection spéciale*) of the future King of Poland. Unfortunately the eloquent representations of the Dantzig deputy did not convince the British statesmen, whose fear of Russia made them the more well-disposed to Prussia.

It was with difficulty that Keidel, as Sierakowski told the Prince, obtained from the British Government permission to attend the Vienna Congress. Apart from that he gained nothing; "rather Lord Liverpool talked to him profusely about the kindliness of the Prussian Government." To crown the whole, Weickhmann, a member of the secret Committee of the Dantzig Senate of the former year, who was now named Mayor of the city by the Prussian Government, sent to Hardenberg in Berlin the whole secret declaration, together with Keidel's confidential correspondence. The Prussians could thus, with their exact acquaintance with the facts, take successful steps to checkmate all that was being done for the city.[60]

Keidel did indeed get to the Vienna Congress, 1814–15, but all his efforts in Dantzig's cause were easily paralysed by Hardenberg. Nor did the mediation of Czartoryski avail any more. He held his ground longer, it is true, in the matter of the defence of Thorn and its incorporation into the Kingdom of Poland. But even this point was resigned; and in the face of the unfriendly attitude of the Powers, the efforts made to save Dantzig were the less able to command success. By the treaties of Vienna, made in

May and June, 1815, between the Powers that had divided Poland, as well as by the Act of the Conclusion of the Congress, Dantzig was finally assigned to Prussia.[61]

It turned out in very truth that the final disposal of Dantzig by the nations was achieved under extraordinary circumstances. For it was done in the teeth of the city's own wish; and her remarkable protests before the whole of Europe, her efforts to the very last to avoid being relegated again to the domination of Prussia, seemed worthy of more detailed mention.

At the same time the decision of the Congress of Vienna, which assigned Dantzig to Prussia, was taken not the least because of the then prevailing anxieties about a Russian hegemony in Europe, if the latter were to swallow up East Prussia. Circumstances had now changed wholly. Such fears had vanished. Mighty Russia has fallen at the hands of Prussian Germany, which has also been striving after the hegemony. In view of the restoration of an independent Polish Republic, the verdict of Vienna must be thoroughly revised in the matter of Dantzig, and that in the light of its age-long, natural, and historical connexion with Poland.

VI

IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY

With the recovery of Dantzig by the Prussians there began in the city a work of centralization and of Germanization. In February 1814 a special Organizing Commission, sent from Berlin, dissolved the previous municipal administration of the free city, which was suspected of Franco-Polish sympathies. It set up instead a new City Council, composed of creatures of the Prussian Government. It further transformed on the same principle the character of the city courts, dismissed the Code Napoléon, and restored the Prussian Landrecht. It abolished every trace of the Polish and French institutions of the free city, and adapted everywhere the general Prussian municipal administration in their place.

On the new division of West Prussia into the departments of Dantzig and Marienburg, Dantzig was made the capital of the whole province in 1816, and became, under that most capable, clever, and convinced Germanizing bureaucrat, Oberpraesident Theodore Schoen, the seat of a provincial bureaucracy, whose numbers were legion. This able administrator, and still abler destroyer of all things Polish, was at once a Liberal and an ultra-Prussian, and is one of the spiritual fathers of the later National-Liberal idea and of Hakatism. With the help of an assistant, who was worthy of him, Flottwell, who was at the time Regency Councillor in the city, and became later the famous Oberpraesident of Posen, he accomplished in the eight years of his stay in Dantzig an extraordinarily successful piece of work for German Kultur. He did much for the improvement of the administration, the rebuilding of the city, the roads, streets, and schools, everything with the studied, easily-running purpose of Prussianizing.

His work of Oberpraesident was begun with distinction. He undertook the restoration of the old Castle of the Grand Master in Marienburg, which has been destroyed by the people of Dantzig and the Poles together, as a visible symbol of the renewal of the Crusaders' supremacy (1817). Simultaneously he secured financial support and administrative privileges from the Government for the active assistance of the business world of Dantzig, which had suffered, and was threatened with complete ruin after the recent industrial and military subversions. By these methods and by his own personal influence Schoen made the first really successful breach in the bitter anti-Prussian front the people of Dantzig had maintained, because of their traditional inclination to Poland, and pushed forward markedly the work of transforming the ancient Polish city into a Prussian emporium.

All the same, these skilful operations of a superfine bureaucracy could neither hide nor repair the actual disaster the change brought upon the city, thus severing it from the natural source of its well-being, its nursing Alma Mater, from Poland. As yet, of course, the industrial misfortune consequent on this severance was not felt so keenly during the first period of Prussian occupation, after the Second and Third Partitions, since at that time a considerable part of Poland, including Warsaw, had shared Dantzig's fate of remaining under Prussia. But in the epoch which began after the Congress of Vienna, and lasted a whole century, the position of the city was at least so far changed for the worse that Poland's one port was finally cut off from the new Polish State set up by the Congress.

The results were very soon apparent. The trade of Dantzig lost the normal guarantees of its prosperity and improvement. For the time being the Berlin Government was able by a dexterous method of using its influence in St. Petersburg, and by dint of clever negotiation in trade matters with Russia, by the palliative of a profitable Customs-treaty to stimulate it artificially. But in spite of all this, it was condemned to a gradual and inevitable end. Misery made its appearance in the formerly wealthy city among the patrician merchants and among the common people, who had been producers, or who had lived on the

traffic in timber, on the warehouses, or on the harbour itself. And this was no more merely transitional, as during the war in Napoleon's time. It clearly pointed to the unavoidable, if gradual, impoverishment and decay of the city.

The population became aware of their crumbling fortunes, and their resentment became general. It was not long before violent riots occurred in the city, caused by the general poverty—a thing unheard of before in Dantzig. They happened in September 1819, August 1821, and May 1822.

It is true that shortly after the Congress of Vienna the Berlin Government was able, thanks to the Czar's readiness to serve it, and to the services of his plenipotentiaries, who had been won over by Prussia, to conclude a Trades Convention with Russia that was highly favourable to themselves. This extraordinary deed, dictated by Prussian interests, introduced tariff and Customs regulations, which either lowered or abolished all tariff on goods exported from Prussia into Poland, killed the Polish industry that was raising its head, and gave instead exclusive rights to the commerce and industry of Prussia. By doing this it brought about indirectly a certain artificial increase of the export and import trade of Dantzig, though this success was short-lived. Polish statesmen, and especially Prince Lubecki, the Treasury Minister of the Polish Kingdom, soon began an attack on the fatal arrangement. After explaining its harmfulness to the Czar, the Warsaw Government initiated a tariff war of defence with Berlin. Lubecki secured an "ukase" for a prohibitive tariff in Poland against Prussia (1822).

The next year there followed new Prussian reprisals, which even put difficulties in the way of transit from Poland to Dantzig. This was in direct opposition to the purpose of the Vienna Congress, which guaranteed the free use of the Vistula. Finally the Warsaw Government forced the conclusion of a new agreement between Russia and Prussia, which made the necessary degree of provision for the industrial interests of Poland (1825). At the same time Lubecki set about forming direct trade relations between Poland and England, in the hope of freeing the former from "Prussian tribute," from the "Cerberus

watching at our gates," the Prussian one in Dantzig. These efforts were assisted by the Polish Consuls in Dantzig, Makarewicz and Tengoborski, in consonance with the Minister.

All this should have reacted most visibly on the well-being of the city. In the event of direct trade between Poland and England, the Port of Dantzig, used only for transit, would have to be content with the minor gains of the shipping trade, instead of the former generous profits of permanent storage for buying and selling. Together with the trade in grain, that in timber also fell off; the more so that England during the blockade of the Continent set herself to procure the oaks of India and the pines of Canada, in the place of Polish timber for masts and construction. The increase in the freight was no more than the tariff imposed by Prussia. The export of Polish grain, which had risen in 1816 to 24,000 lasts, and in 1820, after the first agreement between Prussia and Russia, to 38,000, fell soon after, with the commencement of the tariff war with Warsaw, to 16,000 in 1821, and in 1822 to a bare 6,500 lasts.

Simultaneously with this economic ruin of the city, under the Prussian crown, a systematic Germanization of the place was also accomplished. It was a part of the wider Germanizing programme being undertaken at the time in the whole district. With a view to eliminating West Prussia as a separate unit, remaining from the now divided Poland, the recommendation came in that it should be united with East Prussia in a single province (1824). Schoen became Oberpraesident of both together, and his place of residence was moved from Dantzig to Koenigsberg. The united Diet of the province of East-West Prussia was to meet from now onward, according to the Royal Ordinances of 1823-24, alternately in the two cities. From this time the designs of the Government in the matter of Prussianizing the Kashubian-Polish population were pushed with even greater intensity. In the whole administration, in church, and in school, the process of centralization and of levelling went on, and that in the little corner around Dantzig as well as in the whole new province.[62]

In addition, and during this period after the Congress,

the first incipient signs of an every way notable phenomenon appeared in Pomerania about Dantzig, viz. the re-birth of the Kashubian-Polish national consciousness. The Kashubian Poles, from the dawn of history, the proper indigenous Slavs in this land, had spread out hither into the districts of Dantzig from the western Pomerania (i.e. "Seashore") of Stettin long before the dawn of the Middle Ages, and had made themselves a home under the sovereign protection of Poland and the rule of their own Pomeranian Princes. As we have related, they were broken by the deceit and violence of the Order in the memorable massacre at the beginning of the fourteenth century in their own city. From that time their ancient nobility was humiliated, their people enslaved, trodden down in body and soul, and condemned to Germanization, poverty, and extinction.

With all this they did not permit the Order to stamp them out, as it did the native-born Prussians proper; but, of a softer yet more enduring temper than the latter, they survived ages of trials, true to their popular proverb: "The Kashubian will never perish!"

Neither did they forget the ancient and mortal injuries done by the Crusaders, that massacre of six centuries ago, remembered to-day in the Kashubian cradle-song:—

> In Radun the waters are red,
> For the blood of the sires, alas!
> And that of the children was shed!

On the other hand, they preserved their close union with Poland, dating from somewhere about Boleslaw the Great's time, and confirmed by their loyalty that did homage to Lokietek, delivered from the Order and faithful to the sceptre of the Jagiellons and the elective Republic. In the good old days over the High Gate of Dantzig the Polish White Eagle stood as a brother beside the black Kashubian Griffin, which faced to the left. On the walls of the presbytery of Oliva's venerable abbey the portraits of the Kings of Poland and of the Pomeranian Princes hung peacefully side by side.

Of course, the Polish Republic, with its exaggerated respect

for the autonomy of Dantzig, could not hinder the passive Germanization of the Kashubians under the Polish crown. But all the while what remained genuinely Kashubian became mingled through and through with Polish blood and the Polish spirit, thanks to influences which leaked through from the neighbouring Great Poland, as well as through the constant influx by way of the Vistula of raftsmen, traders, nobility, from Warsaw, Cracow, or even the far-away Carpathians.

This reacted most on the Kashubian language. It retained certain primitive marks of its ancient Slavonic individuality, but in the course of time it became influenced all the more, until it became at length a variation of the Polish--just as the people themselves became a type of the Polish nation. The tongue was far more intelligible to the Warsaw or Cracow Pole, than Low German is to the man of Munich or Berlin, than Provençal to the Parisian, or the Venetian dialect to the Tuscan. It became a pleasant maritime Polish. Thereby the language constituted an intellectual rampart of defence both for the Kashubian people and for the Polish element in Dantzig.

In subsequent days the Kashubians, when the restored Prussian administration set itself to stamp out the last traces of things Polish, and because they saw the Kingdom of Poland re-born across the way, under the powerful shelter of Russia, entered on an investigation of their Polish and Kashubian languages. The learned priest of the church of St. Anne in Dantzig, Father Mronga-Mrongovius, lecturer of Polish in the City Gymnasium, and a member of the Scientific Societies of Warsaw and Cracow, undertook studies lasting for years of Polish and Kashubian vocabularies, not only from the point of view of philology, but also from the deeper national standpoint.

This did not happen without certain aberrations of a political sort, brought about by the prevailing relations between Poland and Russia. The former covetous glances of Russia towards Dantzig were repeated again in a curious way on the field of philology. The works of Mrongovius provoked the interest of the Governor-General of Poland, the Grand Duke Constantin Pavlovitch, the former Chancellor Rumianzeff, and the former Nationalist Russian

Minister of Education, Chichkoff, and these began in Dantzig to seek amid the old monuments of the Kashubian tongue new evidence of its closer relationship "with its mother-tongue, the Russian," than with Poland. In spite of this sort of temptation, the excellent old patriot Mronga kept to the end his life-long loyalty as a Kashubian to the cause of Poland, both as regards its language and its politics.

"We are praying for you," he wrote from Dantzig at the time of the Warsaw November Revolution (1830), in his own name and that of his Kashubian brethren. "Eternal Helper, do Thou deliver weakness out of the hands of the furious ones!" On the collapse of the insurrection he wept "tears of blood" over Warsaw's fate. This learned Kashubian son of Dantzig was therefore deserving of the praise of the great patriot, Prince Adam Czartoryski, and the hearty greetings of the great Polish poet, Adam Mickiewicz, sent later on from the colony in Paris to far-away Dantzig.[63]

The outbreak of the November Revolution and the hopeless course of the war between Poland and Russia, permitted Prussia to influence the traditional relations of Dantzig to Poland in a hostile fashion, and one quite opposed to the fairest tradition of the city's history. Dantzig, which was famed for its loyalty, which had always stood by Poland without hesitation against every kind of foreign invader, and which had of yore defended at such sacrifice Jan Casimir against the Swedes and Stanislaw Leszczynski against Russia, was now used and abused as the chief basis of operations for the furnishing of secret help by Prussia to the troops of the Czar Nicholas, which were despatched to stamp out the Polish revolt.

The truth appears to be that according to the contemporary witness of the Field Marshal Paskiewitch, and the Polish General-Quartermaster Prondzynski, "enormous supplies of food and ammunition were brought by sea for the Russian army, and then towed up the Vistula. According to the Russian's new plan, Dantzig and Thorn became their most serviceable basis of operations. . . . Through the Russian Consul in Dantzig, and with the help of the Prussian Government, huge stores of provisions were bought up and conveyed over the boundary, just as too great supplies of munitions of various kinds came by sea to Dantzig

in Russian ships and were brought up the Vistula to Thorn" (1831).[64]

The consequence was that revolutionary Poland, cut off from her natural allies, France and England, and defending herself with her last strength against the Russians, was handed over under pretence of a treacherous neutrality by Prussia, which was content to sacrifice the once Polish Dantzig to the behests of the Czar.

When the November Revolution was crushed and the Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland was abrogated, there was no one left to defend successfully the interests of Dantzig. Prussia took for her friendship a rich reward in the form of new, most advantageous trade agreements with Russia. Over against the ban thus put for a long time on a genuine development of Polish industry, however, a certain advance in the export of land produce from the Kingdom again vouchsafed to Dantzig for a time a certain modest increase of earnings.

It was just after this that the aged Frederic William III, father-in-law of Czar Nicholas I, furnished renewed proofs of his servility to his redoubtable son-in-law. Meeting him for a joint review of Prussian and Russian troops at Kalish in the down-trodden Kingdom of Poland, he permitted a part of the Russian army to be brought to the place by sea, and that through the harbour of Dantzig (1835). Thus on the very centenary day of the taking of the city by Muennich, which event Nicholas was only too pleased to commemorate in such a fashion, Dantzig had solemnly to receive in her midst Russian troops landing at her docks.

At the same time a new and important step was taken in the direction of the Germanization of the Kashubians of the whole seacoast. In 1837 the provincial Diet of Koenigsberg passed a resolution abolishing entirely the Polish language among the Kashubians, both in church and school. Fortunately, the new King, the liberalizing young Frederick William IV, who, on taking over the throne, visited Dantzig on his way to his coronation (1840), did rescind this burdensome edict (1843).

In these troublous times of conspiracy in Poland, an original genius, Dr. Florian Ceynowa, the first worker for educational ends among the Kashubians since Mronga,

bore witness to the indestructible community of Kashubians and Poles. Joining himself to the union of Polish patriots in 1846, he was arrested by the Prussian authorities, condemned to death, and only set free from prison by the Berlin revolution of 1848. During these revolutionary risings in West Prussia there was formed in the Dantzig region the Polish-Kashubian National Revolutionary Committee, which, however, fell to pieces shortly when the revolution in Berlin was put down. All these facts are notable, if they are not prominent, indications of the undying, because deeply-rooted, inward inclination of the people of Dantzig for Poland, and that in a period of Polish history that might be characterized as most difficult, if not altogether hopeless.

Fifteen years later there came another unfortunate and critical time for Poland, that of the great revolutionary effort in Warsaw, cleverly used up by the Berlin Government. The same game, including the same well-paid services to Russia as had marked the years of 1830–31, was again played by Prussia at the time of the Polish January Revolution of 1863. For this reason, after the detection of the notorious secret pact between Prussia and Russia of February of that year, sanctioning common action to stamp out the revolt in Poland, sharp reproofs were levelled at Berlin. Not only did Polish and Anglo-French protests appear, but even the progressive Prussian Opposition of the time made its voice heard.

Then it was that Herr von Bismarck, President of the Prussian Ministry, in defence of his anti-Polish policy, used from the tribune of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies this particular argument : that the success of the Polish Revolution would certainly mean the raising of the question of Dantzig by the new independent Poland.

A few days later Bismarck told the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Andrew Buchanan, who in an interview was questioning him about the secret pact, that on the proclamation of an independent Polish Kingdom in Warsaw "the first efforts of the new State would be to recover Dantzig." This would be a terrible blow to the power of Prussia. All the same, in spite of Bismarck's threats, it was the Assembly of the Senate of the Merchants' Corporation in Dantzig

which came out with a remarkable declaration, condemning that secret Russo-Prussian pact as a blow aimed at the Polish Revolution, as well as against the whole policy of the Berlin Government directed against Poland. Nor did they take account in the least of the coming of the new monarch, William I, with his Queen, Augusta, to Dantzig in that very year.

It was clear that the old sympathy for the Polish Republic had not yet died out in the city, in spite of all the workings of the Prussian Government. What is more, the Kashubian people of the seacoast showed their sympathy for the Warsaw Revolution in military action. According to the witness of one of the revolutionary leaders, there still existed at the beginning of 1864 a rebels' unit, composed "of nothing but Kashubian peasants, who had joined the division, but refused either pay or assistance. They marched from the Baltic to the boundary of the Government of Plock at their own expense, in the middle of winter, nor would they take wagons from any one for the journey. They crossed the line, and when forced back, they would not disperse, but demanded to be led against the enemy again. When they were told that all was lost, they dragged themselves home with tears in their eyes and at their own cost. Nor did they cease to reckon up the numbers whom they had left on Polish soil." [65]

The crushing of the January Revolution by Russia with the political support of Berlin was afterwards, as is well known, utilized to the full by Prussia in its victorious wars with Austria and France. The Germans counted on Russia's gratitude. For Dantzig itself, however, the fate of the Polish revolutionaries could mean nothing but misfortune. Moreover, the speedy development of the industry of the Kingdom of Poland, which now began, and could not longer be hindered, together with the building of a network of railways, and still more the laying down of the railway on the Vistula, coupled with the complete neglect of the regulation of the river itself—all this sorely undermined the trade of Dantzig in grain and timber with the Kingdom, as with the whole Russian part of Poland. A similar influence upon Dantzig's decline was wrought by the sudden growth of the rival ports Libau and Riga, which were pushed forward

by the Russians, and also by influential circles among the Baltic Barons in St. Petersburg.

It is very noteworthy that all this time Dantzig, under the specious pretence of official goodwill and protection, was actually being treated by the Prussian Government itself with studied purpose in step-motherly fashion. The city was allowed simply to languish away, and was forced from her one-time greatness to the very level of a second-rate provincial town. As a matter of fact the possession of Dantzig always had for Prussia a purely negative significance. The Prussians were concerned that Poland should *not* have her natural outlet to the sea, along the Vistula, the mother of her streams; that she should *not* have a normal way of export for the rich fruits of her soil; and that the maintenance of a healthy credit balance for the State Treasury should *not* be possible. Prussia was concerned *not* to permit a direct means of communication between Poland and the Western World, which was its regular customer, both as buyer and seller, as well as in case of need her powerful political ally. She was concerned that the Polish Dantzig should *not* become the rival of her own German seaports, Koenigsberg, Stettin, and afterwards Kiel and Hamburg. For all these purely negative reasons the Prussians were in fact concerned in the period before the Partitions that Dantzig should *not* enjoy the fulness of life as a part of Poland, and, again, after the Partitions that the city should *not* grow, but vegetate as a part of Prussia.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, when the development of Prussia went on with ever-increasing speed as regards organization and industry, the singularly negative attitude of the Berlin Government to the systematically persecuted city is thrown into bolder relief. This was seen, for example, when the Eastern Railway was built from Berlin to Koenigsberg. In a scandalous manner Dantzig was ignored, and the line built on purpose to avoid her (1853). This involved naturally sore losses to her trade, and these are apparent to this day.

In lieu of any tangible assistance for her trade, the Prussian Government offered the city trumped-up benefactions of a bureaucratic and militarist sort, which were of no value to a commercial town. In 1878 Dantzig was again

made the administrating capital city of the province of West Prussia. The Oberpraesident's authority was transferred to it, and the Regency, the provincial Customs office, the School collegium, and the Postal and Police administrations. The city was stuffed full of German State officials.

It was crowded up likewise with military offices. Dantzig became a " war-harbour " and the " seat of the High Command of the Seventeenth Army Corps of West Prussia." Artillery workshops were established, ship-building docks, especially for torpedo-boats, and small-arms factories were built. The attempt was even made to found different metallurgic, chemical, and machinery plants, factories for match-making, etc., all under special patronage, subsidized by the Government, and yielding lamentable financial results. This, however, was only artificial, and it could not take the place of the one thing Dantzig needed, her essential, natural, and only help, the one thing Prussian militarism and bureaucracy would not, and could not, give her, viz. free trade with a free Poland, and the restoration of her industrial and political union with that of Poland.

Meantime the Polish trade of the Prussian Dantzig kept falling off more and more. The fact struck even foreign observers, who more than once drew attention to it. Sir William White, who had for many years (1865–75) been British Consul-General in the city, drew the attention of his Government to the approaching ruin of the trade between England and Dantzig, which was for various reasons important for the former. As the grandson of Sir W. Neville Gardiner, the last representative of Great Britain in the Republic in Poland in 1794, he had been first himself English Consul in Warsaw at the time of the January Revolution, and had been removed, for being too great a friend of Poland, at the request of the Russian Government. He became later famous as Ambassador in Constantinople. This distinguished statesman, who was connected closely with Poland by family ties and remained her true friend until death, already during his residence in Dantzig was clearly aware of the importance of the city for Poland, and so for Europe.

He was a witness when, at the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, Dantzig for the third time since 1734 (the second being in 1812) saw once more the war banner of

France. In August of 1871 three armoured cruisers and a patrol of the French fleet, under Vice-Admiral Bouet-Villaumez, dropped anchor in the gulf, but after a short cannonade steamed off again to the West. There could be no talk, then, of France delivering Dantzig, and the city, after the French defeat, sank deeper and deeper. White emphasized in his Dantzig despatches the characteristic fact that, when the intensive industrial expansion of the German Empire began after the victorious campaign in France, Dantzig was undergoing a contemporary process of decay. As a matter of fact the exports and imports of the city in the next five years (1871–75) dropped again by more than 10 per cent.[66]

The decisive blow for Dantzig came, however, when a little later a fundamental change was effected in the German tariff policy in the direction of protective dues, and especially in the interests of the caste of agrarian Junkers, chiefly East Prussian, who were the real lords in the new empire. The prime step was taken in this direction when, in 1879, the new tariff law was introduced by Bismarck, which raised the Customs enormously on grain and timber transported from the Kingdom of Poland and from Russia. This very project evoked unrest in Dantzig, and the city found means of expressing its opinion during the discussion of the motion in the Prussian Diet.

In the course of this discussion, among others who opposed the plan, was that famous member of the Progressive Party in the German Parliament and the Prussian Diet, who had represented Dantzig for many a year, Henry Rickert. With the greatest emphasis he set forth in detail the disastrous consequences of the new tariff Bill for the Polish-Russian export trade in its bearing on the trade of Prussia as a whole, and its Dantzig trade in particular.

Bismarck returned an answer full of deductions that were insincere, inexact, and even illogical. In the course of a long speech he asserted that the grain from the Polish lands must in any case come into Prussia, whatever was the duty; that the Polish producer would have to pay the increase in the same, and not the German consumer; that Riga would never be able to rival Dantzig, etc. He gave the game away, however, and revealed

his real mind, when, speaking scornfully of the decay of the Vistula's traffic, he made the notable remark that of course "all the raftsmen are foreigners," i.e. Poles.

The almighty Chancellor easily got his burdensome duty accepted by the submissive Parliament. Six years later the German agrarians, having partaken of the Government's tariff benefactions, were influential in introducing a tariff reform which again put serious Customs restrictions in the way of Polish and Russian export of grain and timber (1885). Once more during the consequent bitter debates, lasting through several sessions of the Reichstag in Berlin, the opposition emphasized strongly the actual lamentable results for Dantzig of the previous tariff regulation. The member for Dantzig, Rickert, called the new and additional restrictions now projected "a murderous blow" to the trade and well-being of his city.

Bismarck had the nerve to answer with the categorical and plainly untrue assertion, that "the trade of Dantzig had advanced since 1879, and had profited by the benefactions of the new legislation." The agitation against the new scheme he branded with disdain, declaring that its aim was "to give the labourers and dockmen of the port a chance to make a noise now that a grain-duty is being introduced in Dantzig." This time, too, as was natural, the Chancellor put through his restrictions, gratified his agrarians, and finally crushed the trade prospects of Dantzig.

His real thought about Dantzig, which the "Iron Chancellor" kept diplomatically to himself as long as he was at the helm, he commenced more expressly to reveal after his fall, in indiscreet utterances over his resignation. At a reception in Varzin in 1894, when a German Nationalist deputation from the Duchy of Posen gathered to do him homage, Bismarck recommended strongly in a fiery speech of thanks that they should keep an even "securer watch on the Warta and Vistula than on the Rhine, since not an inch of soil could be yielded. . . . If a Polish State were formed, it would be the ally of our enemies; it would be an active, aggressive power, until it got West Prussia and Dantzig under its control."

Once more, too, and that shortly afterwards, when

receiving in audience a kindred deputation *en masse* from West Prussia, the eighty-year-old Prince expressed the quintessence of his views and premonitions in the matter of Poland in the following words :—

> It is my political conviction, that to have Russia as neighbour is indeed at times unpleasant and troublesome ; but a Poland would be worse. If I had to choose, I should always prefer to have to do with the Czar in St. Petersburg than with the nobles of Warsaw. . . . If the dream of the Poles were to become a reality, the danger for Dantzig would be the proximate one. The Poles would have to annex it. Dantzig would be the first desideratum of a State with Warsaw as capital. It would be the *conditio sine qua non* of a Polish Republic.[67]

But now the Prussian anti-Polish policy, which was already in Bismarck's time out to exterminate with its campaign of colonization (1886), became more severe than ever under the third Chancellor, von Buelow, with its studied persecution of the Polish schools and its confiscation scheme (1901, 1906–7). This all gave rise to a salutary Polish reaction for self-preservation in the whole of Prussian Poland, and of course, too, in the region of Dantzig. A powerful defence movement, both material and moral, starting in Poznan and supported by Warsaw, spread itself out right to the ancient Baltic confines of the Republic. At once the purely defensive action, which could not help being also aggressive in temper, was recognized by the Prussians, who were looking anxiously on, as a " Polish drive to the Baltic."

In this peaceable undertaking for self-protection, among the 750,000 Poles of West Prussia, 150,000 Kashubians took a very active part. It is true they had been for half a century greatly embarrassed by the sight of the growing prosperity of the Powers which divided Poland, and the misery of that people after the January Revolution. They were to be enticed by the growing power of Germany, or even by the sheer immensity of Russia, to desert Poland's thoroughly stricken cause. This went so far that the worthy Ceynowa, of yore the Polish revolutionary patriot, appeared at the Slav Congress in Moscow in 1867, three years after the Warsaw Revolution, to witness the sympathy of the Kashubians with the Russian Slavophile movement.

But all this meant only the semblance of clouds cast over the Polish-Kashubians' self-consciousness. During the years between the re-constituting of the German Empire (1871) and the last elections held before the war (1912), the only Polish mandates from West Prussia to the Berlin Reichstag and the Prussian Diet that were permanent were guaranteed by the loyal votes of the three Kashubian constituencies, Konitz, Starggard, and Putzig.

And just in proportion as the oppression of Poland on the part of Germany and Russia grew crueller, the old Polish-Kashubian unity began to strengthen its hold. The Kashubian poet of Dantzig, Derdowski, called on Warsaw, the Polish capital in 1885, with a dolorous ditty :—

> We of Kashubia are guarding for Poland her sea-front :
> You there in Warsaw have scarcely a thought for your kinsmen !

And at the same time he launched the striking call :—

> There's no Kashubia without Poland ;
> And no Poland without us !

From this time (1890) the Kashubian cause found in the Polish *Dantzig Gazette* a constant champion. Simultaneously the Co-operative Movement in economic matters spread from Poznan out to the Dantzig coasts and formed here, slowly at first, and then from 1895 daily faster, more than thirty co-operative Polish banks, among them the biggest in the region of Pomerania, that in Dantzig (1901). Further acts of Germanization only gave new spurs to this work. A healthy and energetic Young Kashubian movement sprang up, completely consecrated to the Polish cause, which even outstripped in its high idealism the sober politicians of Great Poland. It demanded, and with justice, the respect on Poland's part of the individualities peculiar to Kashubia, and worthy of preservation for the sake of their spirit and their past. This organization gathered in 1908–9, on the six-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of Dantzig by the Crusaders, around the symbolical *Griffin*, the first Polish-Kashubian periodical, which was soon (1912) transferred to Dantzig, as being "the chief city of Kashubia."[68]

Meanwhile the life of the city went along on the blind and confined course the Prusso-German authorities had mapped out for it, without any way of escape towards real growth. The chief Polish grain-warehouse was turned into a Prussian armoury. The instructions of the Prussian Staff were officially confirmed, that in the expected event of a war on two fronts "Dantzig, in a defensive conflict with Russia, must be a pivotal basis of operations." The garrison was increased. In Langfuhr a brigade of *Leib-husaren* was placed, a "Brigade of Death," with the warrior Kronprinz as their commander. Each year the population was treated to the manœuvres of the German fleet in the gulf. The city was gladdened by an equestrian statue of William I in his spiked helmet, a hideous abortion that ruined the High Gate. It was unveiled by William II in person, with the assistance of Prince Buelow, and amid the mouthing of lying orations, to glorify in Dantzig "the heritage of the German Knighthood" (1903).

Certainly more than one good deed was done for the city. With the help of English engineers a model water and sewerage system was installed in the years 1869–71. The regulating of the mouth of the Vistula was undertaken in 1888. After ten years of work the beautiful Free Port was opened, too shallow it is true, and soon seen to be too narrow. This was in the Neufahrwasser in 1899. Following on, the new Kaiser Port was opened in 1904. Lastly, there was founded the Dantzig School of Engineering, etc.

This Government solicitude did not, however, make up for the real, but dissimulated, persecution in the field of economic matters. Its separation from Poland became for Dantzig an incurable wound. It avenged itself steadily, both in the matter of the whole economic well-being of the city, and still more in that of communications. The partial improvement of the river mouth and the city harbour did not help much as long as the whole middle course of the Vistula was neglected, and so long as not even the minimum of two metres was reached by dredging to allow the modest type of 600-ton barges.

The ancient traffic on rafts and that with sailing-galleys on the river also declined. The newer traffic with steam, begun by the French Guiberts in 1829, and subsidized by

Count Andrew Zamoyski in 1848, could not develop as it should have. It numbered at the end of 1911, on the whole Vistula, little more than a hundred vessels, several times less than on the shorter Elbe, the Oder, etc. The city of Dantzig itself, sometime proud of her maritime position, had scarcely twenty little steamers, with a tonnage of some 18,000 tons in all, for sea-trade.[69]

As for communications on land, it had already been noted how the tariff preference granted by the Berlin Government to other seaports, especially to the two ancient rivals of Dantzig, Koenigsberg, and Stettin, which had been subsidized even by Frederic the Great, and competed with Dantzig from both sides, had never ceased sorely to injure the city. Only after a long conflict, lasting fifteen years from 1862, and conducted by the Council of the City Merchants, the indispensable but simple railway connexion with Warsaw was at length established, by way of Mlawa and Marienburg (1877).

In return, however, Dantzig was again hard hit by a one-sided political tariff scheme, which prescribed lower rates on the railways to Lodz from Stettin than from Dantzig. "Our connexion with the south of Poland," complained in 1907 the report of the Council of the Dantzig Merchants, "gives way before the advancing Stettin, which enjoys lower railway-rates, although it is much farther away. This fact, too, has had a disastrous effect on our transport trade."

Amid such conditions Dantzig's trade in grain and timber, which had flourished while Poland existed, was consigned to a subordinate position. The imports to the city of Polish-Russian grain, already hard hit by the factors mentioned, especially by Bismarck's raising of the duty, fell in the twenty years from 1890 to 1910 from 145,000 tons to 103,000 tons, or about one-third. Because of insufficient deliveries, the prices of wheat and rye in Dantzig, the one-time granary of Europe, during the years from 1909 for which reports are available, have been higher than in Hamburg, Stettin, or Koenigsberg.

A similar and steady shrinkage occurred in the imports to Dantzig of Polish-Russian timber. In the twenty years from 1891 to 1911 these sank from 500,000 to 379,000 cubic

metres, or one-fourth. Of the new articles of import, that of cotton was checked by the protective Russian tariff in favour of Turkestan cotton in 1887, and finally passed into the hands of Hamburg and Stettin. In the same way the import of coal from England was hindered. It is true that the latest trades agreement between Germany and Russia in 1904, exceptionally favourable to Germany, could not help affecting in some way Dantzig also for the better. But the degree of improvement was much smaller than in the case of the other rival German seaports.

In the course of the ten following years, up to 1913, the maritime imports into Dantzig rose, like the exports, from some 600,000 tons lading to not quite 800,000 registered tons. This slow advance is like stagnation in comparison with the swift advance in the corresponding figures for other cities during the same time. Hamburg's figures increased to over 13,000,000 tons, Bremen's to nearly 2,000,000, Stettin's to 1,900,000, and even the much smaller cities, Luebeck and Rostock, saw their trade rise by one and one and a half millions respectively. All this time the industry of the city remained an insignificant compensation, artificially fostered, and chiefly composed of official military establishments. The whole business, so the last official report tells us (1913), "was still very feebly developed," and "was more dependent on political considerations than on economic growth." [70]

All this could not but react negatively on the position and growth of the population of Dantzig up to our own time. Even in the matter of numbers the results are evident. At the middle of the seventeenth century it was the most populous city of the Polish Republic, with its 80,000 inhabitants, considerably higher than the capital Warsaw. Thinned out later, especially owing to Prussian violence in the eighteenth century, the city scarcely numbered at the middle of the nineteenth as many people under Prussian rule as it had had two hundred years before. The appearance of growth was brought about, in the teeth of the Municipality, in 1877 by an ordinance of the Government, which incorporated fourteen suburban communities into the city, thus bringing the population up to 100,000. Thirty years later the population of Dantzig, according to the

Census of 1910, had risen to 170,000, or hardly double what it had been two and a half centuries before.

It was thus far and away outstripped by the contemporary figures of other German seaports : by Hamburg with a million, by Bremen with 300,000, and even by the cities that had formerly been much smaller, Stettin and Koenigsberg, which now number each a quarter of a million inhabitants.

What is more, during the last half-century (1860–1910) the population of all the larger Polish cities, which were not under Prussian domination, Warsaw, Wilno, Lwow, Cracow, has grown threefold, fivefold, or, as in the case of Lodz, more than tenfold—which are all rates incomparably faster than those of Dantzig. This city, which was once, as I have said, the most populous of the prominent cities of Poland, to-day, after a hundred years of Prussian occupation, has lagged behind, and is the least populous of all. The first has now been made last.

The number of Kashubian-Poles registered as such in the present city lists is now estimated at the relatively unimportant sum of 6,000. In reality it could to-day be at least doubled, or even trebled, if it were not for the threats attending the registration. Dantzig is a city where the officials are not too well paid, since, not being "threatened with Polonization," it does not benefit from the supplementary pay for the East Marches (*Ostmarkenzulage*). Here, then, a host of Polish officials eke out a kind of existence, but they do not confess their nationality for fear of losing their modest posts.

In the business world of the city the number of born Poles is equally large. They live from the custom of the Government institutions of the city, haunted, too, by the fear of losing their means of subsistence. Very many of them would reject their Germanism in a moment if the age-old union of the city with Poland were renewed, and would return to their former Kashubian-Polish allegiance. Apart from these, Dantzig retains to-day some 60,000 Catholics, which means about a third of the whole population. On them the German party of the Centre has been concentrating its influence. This was done when, after Prince Buelow dissolved the Reichstag (1907), the famous

" Ride of the Centre to the East " for election purposes took place in the direction of West Prussia and Dantzig.

These influences looked at the start favourable to the Poles, but soon commenced, especially after the last elections (1912), to tend in an anti-Polish direction, as can be seen from the *West Prussian Popular Newspaper*, the influential organ of the Centre in Dantzig. The German Catholic people of Dantzig were once, as noted, away back in the Middle Ages assigned to a Polish diocese, and were afterwards sheltered for centuries beneath the ægis of the Polish Kings. There can, however, certainly be no doubt that, if they were once delivered from the influence of Prussian administration and the Centre, and restored to the former care of the Polish State and Church instead, this German-Catholic population, which formerly belonged to a Polish diocese, and were true for centuries to the Polish crown, would speedily recover their former affection for the Republic.

The same comment is likewise true of the German Protestant part of the population, whether the ancient burger circles which read the serious and moderate German *Dantzig Gazette* of years standing, and the circles roused up nationally against all that is Polish by the Hakatist *Dantzig News*, or finally the socialist masses, who feel most sorely the economic stagnation of their city, when cut off from Poland, under the Prussian authorities. Thus unquestionably the great majority of born Dantzig people, with the exception of just the Pan-German, official, military, and other purely migratory elements, would easily, without regard to estate or profession or creed, shake themselves loose from these hateful anti-Polish instigations, the moment the city succeeded in being once more joined to the Polish Republic. They would return gladly to the time-worn traditions of prosperity and progress, to enjoy the tested brotherly relations which once existed, and to cherish the loyalty of worthy subjects to " the Most Serene Republic of Poland."

Very notable signs of this are not lacking. They are to be seen from the day when with the ending of the world-war a tremendous crisis began to shape itself to the destruction of German imperialism, and the actual new-birth of

Poland and the restoration of Dantzig under her sway began to appear on the arena of practical possibilities.

Already in October 1918 the Imperial Government in Berlin received a confidential telegram from the German ambassador in Berne, that "the merchants of Dantzig are said to be turning to the Polish Government in Warsaw, and expressing the wish that Dantzig might be restored to Poland, and that they expected great good therefrom for the future of the city." The Chancellor's office in the Wilhelmstrasse was so disturbed by the report, that by way of the Imperial Office for Foreign Affairs it sent confidential word of the same to the Governor-General of Warsaw, through the central agency of the Secret Military Police.[71] At the same time the German authorities in Dantzig itself spared no effort to initiate an anti-Polish and pro-German movement. Indeed, we can see from the correspondence addressed to the German officials in Warsaw from the city in November 1918, which fell into Polish hands on the evacuation of the city by the former, "personal letters were sent around in the royal workshops in Dantzig with the question whether the receiver was German or Polish. Whoever gave himself out to be a Pole was to be discharged at once." [72]

Such haste in applying coercive measures clearly proves that the Prussian authorities had good grounds for fearing the actual tone of public opinion in the city. As a matter of fact, the local Nationalist-Prussian elements, in spite of boisterous agitation, revealed their whole weakness during the last elections to the revolutionary Parliament of the Empire, at which they secured barely one-sixth of the votes cast. But the most remarkable thing is this, that the unheard-of catastrophe of the war with the revolution, and then the economic crisis for Germany, which brought with it a marked depression in the price of land in other German seaports, caused on the other hand in Dantzig an extraordinary rise in the value of real estate and town-sites. This rise has been a plain intimation of the optimism roused in the people of the city at the splendid prospect for their mother-city, in the event of its separation from Prussia, and an eventual restoration to Poland.[73]

The last effort at hindering this possibility from the Prusso-German side has been the ventilation of the idea

to create of Dantzig a free city. Being now without prospects of keeping it for themselves, the Pan-Germans would like to hinder its being restored to Poland. Such a move, though very clever, cannot however succeed for any long period. The abstract and only superficially German nationality of the people of Dantzig could never serve as a pretext for doing violence to the city's connexion with Poland, a connexion at once real in itself and confirmed both by its geographical position and its past. The Germans, who have first-class ports of their own, cannot justly claim the one port which serves Poland. Dantzig wasted away under their domination, and it is essential to the life of a resurrected Poland. It is Poland's rightful, time-worn heritage. It was only torn from her by force ; it had flourished under her sceptre, and it again will flourish under the same fostering care. There can be no thought of letting this one Polish port be cut off from the future State under the guise of a free city, so that outside the bounds of her sovereignty it might become at her expense a powerful German emporium, set right in her side, planted at her very gates, and the guardian of her one exit to the sea and the wide world.

The destiny of Dantzig will be seen to be wholly different. Only a single right and successful solution of the problem is possible : that which serves the interests alike of the city, of Poland, and of Europe, and is from the start sustained by natural and historical justice. Dantzig must revert to Poland, Poland to Dantzig. In that event, without any injury done to the present German population, and without any pressure upon it, on the lines of voluntary and natural choice of what is one's own good, and under the influence of factors more enticing still than they were in the times before the Partitions—a more intensive business connexion with Poland, nearer communications with her centres, Posen, Warsaw, and Cracow, and union with the more effective influence of Polish national culture—under such conditions as these the ancient city of Dantzig, born anew in the present, will become the great, powerful, and prosperous seaport of the resurrected Poland.

NOTES

1. The Dantzig literature in the fine Bibliography of Polish History of Finkel (1906), NN. 17299 sqq., 23965 sqq., need completing. The best general works on Dantzig are: R. Curicke, Die Stadt Danzig, historische Beschreibung (posthumous edition by his son, Amsterdam-Danzig, 1688); Lengnich, Jus publ. civit. gedan. (ed. of Guenther, 1910); Gralath, Versuch einer Geschichte Danzigs (Koenigsb., 1789–91); Loeschin, Geschichte Danzigs von d. aeltest. bis zur neuest. Zeit (1828); Simson, Geschichte der Stadt Danzig (unfinished, 1913–18).

2. On Dantzig from the topographical point of view:—

Balinski-Lipinski, Ancient Poland I (1843), 675 sqq.; Dictionary of Geography II (1881), 513 sqq. (errors in dates and figures); Sonntag, Danz. Strandverschiebungen; Freytag, D. Danz. Werder (Zeitschrift fuer Westpr. Gesch. I (1908); Duda, The Development of Polish Pomerania, from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries (1909); A. Hirsch, Die geogr. Lage u. Entwicklung Danzigs (1912). Bare German accounts of earlier date of the fancied German-Gothic origins of Dantzig rested exclusively on an arbitrary interpretation of mentions made by Pliny (Hist. Nat.), by Tacitus (Germania), Ptolemy (Geography), Pomponius Mela (De situ orbis), etc., where the Vistula is said to be a boundary between Germans and Slavs, and the Goths and Wendts are said to be neighbours. These references are quite indefinite, and have no worth as evidence whatsoever. On the other hand, the first certain proof from the sources, that Dantzig had a Slavonic character from the beginning, is the old Saxon report of Wulfstan the Seafarer in the ninth century, interpolated by Alfred the Great into his translation of the Chronicles of Orosius. This declares that sailing along the very coast of the Baltic to the mouth of the Vistula, he had Slavonic peoples on his right hand all the time, Script. rer. pruss. I (1861), 732. A second and final proof, establishing the old-slavonic sound of the name of the city of Dantzig, we have in the earliest biography of St. Adalbert, Joannis Canaparius, Vita S. Adalberti: "ipse vero adiit primo urbem Gyddanyz," Script. rer. pruss. I, 228. In view of this the latest German historian of Dantzig, Simson, I (1913), 12 sqq., has been forced to renounce the former Gothic-German accounts, and to affirm that "tribes of western Slavs must also have been the founders of Dantzig. It is a certain fact that Dantzig is not a German but a Slav name."

3. The assigning of Dantzig to the diocese of Cujavia-Wloclawek: the bull of Eugene III, Rheims, April 4, 1148:—

"... Warnero Ulotizlauensi episcopo eiusque successoribus ... castrum Kdanzc in Pomerania cum decima tam annone quam omnium eorum que de navibus solvuntur," Cod. dipl. Pol., II, 1; Perlbach, Pomerell. Urkundenbuch (1881), N. 2.

4. Wladislaw Lokietek in Dantzig: he stayed there in January and June, 1298, in April and May, 1299, and in December, 1306. His verdicts and grants in the matters of the monasteries of Oliva, Pelplin, of the Bishop of Cujavia, etc., "actum in Dansk," "data in Gdanzk," January 13, 1298, April 29, 30, 1298, May 21, 1299, December 17, 1306, Perlbach, NN. 552–3, 572–5, 650. Cf. Dlugosz, Hist. Pol., III (1873), 28: "Descendebat autem Wladislaus Loktek personaliter in Gdansk (1306), maximo honore tam militum quam civium, de suo principatu exultantium, receptus, ubi ... fidelitatis et homagii accepit juramenta."

5. On the origins of Dantzig's trade with Poland, on the Polish raft-traffic in thirteenth century, vid. Th. Hirsch, Handels-u. Gewerbegeschichte Danzigs unter der Herrsch. des Deutschen Ordens (1858), 172 sqq.: "(im Polen der Piastenzeit) eine schnelle, das Interesse der Fremden sorglich berücksichtigende Justiz."

6. On the Teutonic massacre in Dantzig, November 14, 1308, Script. rer. pruss. I, III, passim, the admissions of eye-witnesses:—

"furtim intraverunt civitatem et occiderunt milites et uxores eorum et pueros, et sic occupaverunt civitatem," "in expugnacione et capcione castri Gdansk multos milites et bonos alios homines et eciam pueros in cunabulis (occiderunt)," Lites ac res gestae inter Polonos ordinemque crucifer., I (1890), 26, 265 sq.; the Bull of Clement V, Avin. 19 jun. 1310: "in civitate Gdansco ultro decem milia hominum gladio peremerunt, infantibus vagientibus in cunis mortis exitium inferentes, quibus etiam hostis fidei pepercisset," Theiner Monum, pol. I (1861), No. 204, Lites I, 420. The explanation of the procurator of the Order, 1310, in answer to the above Bull: "item quod predicti cives (Danzike) destruxerunt propria voluntate domos dicti opidi et iverunt ad habitandum in aliis partibus," Perlbach, N. 696, Dlugosz III, 44 sq.: "nec ulli polonicae gentis parcunt conditioni, sexui, aut aetati, sed tam puberes, quam impuberes et aetatem infantilem et lactantem absque ulla miserationis respectu extinguunt ... ut fama crudelitatis tantae diffusa, corda eaeterorum perculsa, ad faciendam in aliis civitatibus et munitionibus resistentiam pavescerent ... et securior illis occupatio dictae terrae proveniret. Raro unquam polonici sanguinis in alicuius loci conquisitione plus effusum, raro caedes inhumanior."

7. Caro (who enjoys undeserved authority, since with all his erudition he is often superficial, oftener biased, and always at bottom an enemy of Poland), Gesch. Polens, II (1863), 43, mitigates the massacre of Dantzig, averring Polish "exaggerations," and "wrong-doing and bloody violence on both sides." Major-General Koehler, Gesch. der Festung Danzigs u. Weichselmuende, "most respectfully dedicated to His Majesty the Emperor and King William I,"

I (1893), 20 sqq.: "In view of the purposes it formed in regard to Pomerania, the Order could not leave the rich city behind it, which had shown itself so spiteful. The Landmaster (Henry von Plotzke) demanded therefore the levelling of the ramparts and the evacuation of the city by the inhabitants. They had to submit. There can thus be no talk of a destruction of the city as the Polish reports had it (!). The houses probably were broken up in order to be used as building material (!). . . . We get a taste of Mongolian war methods in the treatment meted out to Dantzig and Dirschau. Dzengis Khan did much the same thing on a larger scale when he conquered the empire of the Chovaresmi, as he was not supplied with sufficient troops to permit him to garrison the larger cities. In view of the few troops at the disposition of the Order it had no choice but to act in the same way. Dzengis Khan destroyed the cities and divided up the younger inhabitants among his troops as slaves. The older ones he had put to death. The Order was content (!) to force the people of Dantzig to leave the city."

Influenced by such an explanation as this, even Simson, I, 44 sq., tries hard to excuse the massacre. On the other hand, the older historians of the city of Dantzig, Chytraeus, Curicke, Lengnich, condemned the crime of the Order in strongest terms, while the excellent Loeschin, even though writing under Prussian censure, branded in 1828 in his Gesch. Danzigs, I, 38: "The entry of the Brothers of the Order into the city, stained with the blood of 10,000 dead." Of the latest Polish works, cf. Kujot, The 14 November in Dantzig and the Region, in the Annual of the Scientific Soc. of Thorn, 1908, 87 sqq., and The Hist. of East Prussia, I, in the same journal, 1916, 1242, sqq. Cf. the small contribution of Prochaska, Memoirs of the Order, in the Archives of the Hist. Com. of Cracow Academy, I, 243. On the transfer of the Residence of the Order to Marienburg after the event in Dantzig, between September 13 and 21, 1309, cf. Lohmeyer, Gesch. von Ost und Westpreussen, I (1908), 160, 164 sqq.

8. The Order's Trade Competition: all the early historians of Dantzig complain about it. Even the newest, Simson I, 106 sqq., 110, admits it as "the cause of the later estrangement, even hostility of the city to the Order . . . Dantzig's trade could not reach its height before the fall of the Order's rule, when now no more barriers separated Dantzig from the Polish hinterland." In the best years of the rule of the Order, Dantzig had 10,000 inhabitants, cf. Foltz, Gesch. der dantz. Stadthaushalts (1912), 8. Of the solicitude of the Polish episcopate for Dantzig, the best witness is the curious Indulgence declaration of the Primate Archbishop of Gnesno and of the nine Polish Bishops in favour of the building of the church of Notre Dame in Dantzig, made in Kalish, in synodo provinciali, May 20, 1406, vid. Simson IV (1913), 119.

9. The anti-Teutonic riots in Dantzig after Tannenberg: the report of an eye-witness (1410) in Scr. rer. pruss. III (1866), 485: "So there came in a great many honourable guests . . . to Dantzig from the conflict, of whom the most were sore wounded and opined

there rest to find and healing for their wounds. While then the folk of the city were considering whether they had cast in their lot with the Polish King, or should yet do so, the guests had to leave the place. . . . The people gathered a force, the town-hall was sounded, the folk became furious . . . and smote the wounded as well as any hale ones who were with them from one street into the other. . . . They then gave the city over to the Polish King out and out, and received a Polish lord into the place as sheriff." Cf. also Kujot, Der Krieg von 1410, Annals of the Scientific Soc. of Thorn, XVII, 193 sqq.

10. The charter of Ladislaus Jagiello for Dantzig, from his camp by Marienburg, August 5, 1410:—

"habito diligenti respectu ad constantis fidelitatis indicia, quae Nobis consules, communitas, cives et incolae civitatis nostrae gdanensis exhibuerunt et . . . poterunt exhibere in futurum, horum intuitu cupientes ipsos gratiarum nostrarum prosequi favoribus et fidelitatis constantiam Nobis et coronae nostri regni Poloniae per ipsos exhibendam continuo reddere promptiores, praedictaeque civitatis nostrae gdanensis conditionem facere meliorem. . . ." Dogiel, Cod. dipl. Regni Pol et M. Ducatus Lith., IV (Vilnae, 1764), fol. 83. The authenticity of this charter, wrongly called in question by Caro, III (1869), 341, has been admitted by Hirsch, 41, and has now been attested in full. Cf. in Toeppen, Acten der Staendetage Preussens, I (1878), 106, and Simson, IV, 121, the authentic copies of this charter from the Dantzig MSS. The second supplementary royal charter for Dantzig, as well as for Thorn and Elbing, was on August 10th. The triumphal entry of the Royal envoy into the city and the doing homage to the King by Dantzig, August 7th. The retreat of the King from Marienburg, September; the surrender of Dantzig to the Order, October 1410.

11. The murder of Letzkow and his associates: Invited by the Commander Henry Reuss von Plauen, they came to the Castle of Dantzig on April 6th, their corpses were given back to the city by Plauen on April 13, 1411. The bodies were placed in the church of Notre Dame, in the chapel of St. Hedviga, with a stone inscription half-effaced but remaining to this day, which gives only the names of the victims and the date of the murder. A description of the murder as "sullicher schentlicher, boshafftiger tat," in the Dantzig Chronicles of the Order, Scr. rer. pruss., IV (1870), 376 sqq., as also the account of how "Frau Anna went before the Commander and spoke." Prussians have essayed purposely to call in question this plain Dantzig evidence, accepted by Schutzius and other earlier historians of the city, Voigt, Gesch. Preussens, VII, 143 sqq. (1835), later Caro, III, 340, turning the thing upside down, clearing the Teutonic murderers, and making traitors of the victims. Then even Simson, I, 140, justifies the slaying in a way which bears sad witness to the disruptive influence wielded even on such a conscientious investigator by the unmoral special pleading of the newer Prussian historical school: "The Order had to act to keep the stubborn city from getting to be too much for them." Reverselv the honest Loeschin, Beitraege

zur Gesch. Danzigs, III (1837), 77 sqq., proved in his study of K. Letzkau that the conclusions of Voigt were false. So, too, Hirsch, Scr. rer. pruss., IV, 385 sqq., in analysing the Dantzig reports about Letzkau, rejected the unfair conclusions of Caro and finally settled the authenticity of the Dantzig report as to the murder and the Order's guilt. Cf. Graske, Der Hochmeister von Plauen im Konflikte mit den Staedten des Ordenslandes Preussen, in The Journal of West-Prussian History, XXXV (1896), 7 sqq.

12. The first Charter of Casimir Jagiellon for Dantzig, Elbing, June 16, 1454: "das wir fleysig angesehen haben die namhaftige manner burgemeyster, rothmanne, scheppen und ganczer gemeyne unser rechten statt Danczke, ire getrawe und stete beystendikeit, do sie in gedechtnisz wider brochten die mennygung der freyheit un der goben der vordrigen geczeiten des reichs von Polan Konigen und herczugen, unseren vorfarn . . . noch dirlaufung so vil joren, in welchen sie die krewczigern mit dem yoch der dinste verbunden woren, zcu uns als zcu iren rechten und eynigen hern und erblinge widdergekart haben, und zcu uns zugeflogen sein, und sich uns und unsern nochkomlingen, des reichs von Polan Konigen, ewiglichin undir gegebin haben, von naturlicher begerlichkeit dorczu gereiczet. . . ." Toeppen, Act. der Staendetage Ost und Westpreussens, IV (1884), 282, reprinted by Simson, IV, N. 137, with slight changes from the original Charter in the Dantzig Archives. Cf. Karnkowski, De iure provinc. majorumque civit. Prussiae (Crac., 1574), s.p. The Supplementary Charter about the Taxes of Dantzig, Piotrkow, July 9, 1455.

The arrival of the King in Dantzig, May 1st, the doing of homage by the city, May 9, 1455. The Great Charter of Casimir Jagiellon, Dantzig, May 15, 1457: " . . . die burgermeister, radmannen, scheppen und ganczen gemeynen unnsir stat Danczik, unnsir liben getrewen, die stete getrewenheit, . . . vormittelst welchen szie uns in wedirwerbunge unnsir lande Prewszen, die doruch unrechte und unbilliche bekommerunge von unnsirm reiche entfremdet woren, mit steten getrewheit und vestem gemute haben beygestanden . . . geben wir und vorleyen unnsir stat Danczk . . . das sie zcu ewigen geczeiten nymands vor eynen herrn halden noch gehorsam zcu weszen seyn sullen in weltlichin sachen, wenne alleyne uns und unnsirn nochkommlingen, konigin zu Polan."

The supplementary charter, May 25th; the departure from Dantzig, June 7, 1457; the later court charter for Dantzig, Cracow, January 28, 1472; vid. Curicke, Beschreibung der Stadt Dantzig, 153 sqq.; Dogiel, IV, 157, 160 sqq. (juramentum Gedanensium); Toeppen, 314, 367, 369; Simson, 138, 141–2, 144. Casp. Schutzius, contin. Chytraeus, Wahrhaffte und eigentliche Beschreibung des Landes Preussen . . . darinne auch die Ankunfft und Erbawung der koeniglichen Stadt Danzig (1599), 203. Cf., on the other hand, the miserable bare wrath of Caro, V (1886), 105.

The taking of Marienburg by the Poles and the men of Dantzig, August 6, 1460; the inscription in the Artushof: "Danzker machts ein End dem Streit!" The Peace of Thorn, October 19, 1466. Cf.

Simson, Dantzig im 13 jaehrigen Krieg, 1454–66, Journal for West Pr. Hist., XXIX (1891); ib., XLVII (1904), 116 sqq., the improving of the city's Coat of Arms by Casimir Jagiellon, Insign. urbis ged. auctio, May 24, 1457: "zcu czeychen grosser . . . getruwheit unnsir stat Danczke czu unnsirer koniglicher maiestat . . . haben wir vorgenommen, czu unnsir und unnsirs reiches zcu Polan und derselben unnsir stat Danczke ere und czirheith, usz sunderlicher koniglicher gnad und gunst, derselben stat Dantczke wopfen zcu vornewen und zcu vorbessern, so das die stat Danczke hirnachmals eyne guldene crone im obirsteyle ires schildes habe . . .," cf. Warschauer, Die Wappen und Banner von Danzig, ib., LVI (1916), 160 sqq. On the hearty relation between the city and King Casimir, cf. Kromer, Hist. of Poland in the year 1468, in the Collection of historical writers, III (1767), 690. Cf. Matricularum Regni Poloniae Summaria, I, Casimiri regis, ed. Wierzbowski (1905), passim.

13. Swiencki, Historical Facts about the City of Dantzig, as well as the Sea-traffic and lordship of the Poles in the Baltic (Warsaw, 1811), 4, 7 sqq., and Description of Ancient Poland, I (1828), 338 sqq. Cf. L. Golembiowski, On the Polish Fleet, The Scientific Review, II (1843), 12, 92 sqq.

14. Boucicaut, Livre des faicts, Nouv. coll. de mémoires de France, II (1836): "en Prusse . . . tous passerent au royaume de Lecto, où ils firent grande destruction de Sarrasins" (1390). The Prussian expeditions of the Earl of Derby (afterwards Henry IV) with a thousand men in his suite (1390–92): he came to Dantzig via Puck on August 10, 1390, set out for the Lithuanian forest on August 21st, was before Wilno from September 11th to October 7th, returned to Dantzig on February 15, 1391, Scr. rer. pruss., II (1863), 785 sqq. On the trade of Dantzig with England in the fourteenth century, vid. Hirsch, 98 sqq. On the trade with Portugal, Spain, Italy, vid. Journal of West-Prussian Hist., V–VI (1881–2).

15. Nimmert, Danzigs Verhaeltnis zu Polen, 1466–92, ibid. LIII (1911), 111 sqq.; as to the salutary results of the deliverance by Poland from the Order's economic exploitation, ib., 179 sqq. Cf. Lauffer, Danzigs Schiffs- und Wasserwesen am Ende des XV Jhrts, Journal of West Pruss. Hist., XXXIII (1894). King Alexander reached Dantzig May 25, 1504, received the homage of the city June 2nd, and confirmed the Charters of Casimir June 3rd.

16. The report of the Dantzig envoys on Sigmund's election, in Piotrkow, December 1506, in Finkel, The Election of Sigmund, I (1910), 263 sqq.; cf. Balzer, Corp. jur. pol., 1506–22 (1906), sub voce, Gdansk. On the quarrel of Sigmund with Dantzig in 1525, vid. Lorkiewicz, The Revolt of Dantzigs (1880), and cf. Finkel Bibliography, NN. 25787 sqq., also Acta Tomiciana, vols. VII, VIII, Matricul. R. Pol. summaria IV[1,2], Sigismundi I regis (1910–12); Hanserecesse, vol. XXIII–IV (1910–13); also Zivier, A New History of Poland, I (1915), 305 sqq.; Simson, II (1916), 79 sqq.

17. The stay of Sigmund in Dantzig, April 19th to July 23, 1525: the Statutes of Sigmund I, Gedani, July 20, 1525: " . . . visum fuit clementia nostra dignum, ut potius salutarem medicum, quam

severum vindicem tantorum malorum ageremus . . . statuimus et ordinamus quod deinceps . . . centum cives ad consulendum et ad ferenda suffragia ex quolibet quattuor capitalium opificum ordine vocari et adhiberi debeant . . ." Dogiel, fol. 240 sqq., Volum. leg., I, fol. 454 sqq., Simson, IV², N. 153.

18. Sigmund August confirmed the charters for Dantzig, December 10, 1548. For the visit of the King in Dantzig from July 8th to September 1, 1552, vid. Card. Hosii Epp. in Acta hist., ed. by the Cracow Academy (1886–88), NN. 783, 831, 51; Guenther, Vom Koenigsbesuch in Danzig, 1552, in Mitteilungen des West-Preussischen Geschichtsvereins, XV (1916), 23 sqq. The religious charters of Sigmund August for Dantzig, Vilnae 5 Juli, 1557 (date corrected by Simson, II² (1917), 204): "nos qui ex officio nostro regio infirmitati hominum mederi et conscientiis illorum consulere tenemur . . . permittimus et admittimus senatui populoque civitatis nostrae gedanensis liberam administrationem et liberum usum coenae dominicae sub utraque specie . . ." Lengnich, Preuss. Gesch. (Danz., 1722), II, 155 sqq., and Jus. publ. civit. ged. (1900), 494; Simson, IV (1918), N. 164. The strivings towards union: vid. Constitutiones Karnkovianae, 14 mart., confirmed by the King at the Diet of Warsaw, 1570: noteworthy are the democratic rulings "de oneribus aequis," and "locus et jus suffragii inter ordines civitatis artificibus opificum restitutus," etc., cf. Volumina legum, II, fol. 108 sqq. Cf. Karnkowski, De jure, ut supra; Simson, Westpreussens und Danzigs Kampf gegen die polnischen Unionsbestrebungen in den letzten Jahren des Koenigs Sigmund August, Journal for West Prussian Hist., XXIII (1897), 145 sqq., and Gesch. Danzigs, II (1918), N. 169, who twice reprints the statutes of Karnkowski without knowing the text of Volumina legum.

19. The dispute of Dantzig with King Stephen Batory: Pawinski, Stephen Batory before Dantzig, 1576–7, in Sources of Pol. Hist., III (1877). See ibid., NN. 181–90, Conditiones gedanenses, the pardoning of the City by Batory, Marienburg, December 12, 1577, reprinted as inedita by Simson, II, NN. 170–71. Ibid., NN. 173–4, the edict of Batory tolerating the Augsburg Confession in Dantzig, together with the confirmation of the city's charters, December 16, 1577. On the splendid relations that followed between the city and King Stephen, and the granting of the "tractatus portorii," in Warsaw, February 26, 1585, which rescinded the Constitution of Karnkowski at the requests of the citizens, etc., cf. Curicke, 164 sqq., Lengnich, Loeschin, passim.; Goldmann, Danz. Verfassungskaempfe unter polnischer Herrschaft (1901); Simson, II², 321, III³, N. 176.

20. Dantiscus, Jonas propheta: "Urbs nova, dives opum, Dantiscum sive Gedanum, Accipe divina quae tibi mente loquor. Est breve tempus adhuc: si non peccata relinques, hoc quibus exundas tempore, fracta rues. Crevisti cito: sic etiam Superis mala grata Decresces, instant jam tua fata tibi. . . . Comprimet annonae Vistula clausus iter. . . . Externis tunc praesidiis frustrata manebis Divitiisque tuis despoliata gemes . . ." J. de Curiis Dantisci Opera, ep. olim varmiensis poem. et hymna (Vratisl., 1764), 138 sqq. Klonowicz,

in his celebrated poem, "Flis" (The Raftsman, 1595), warns the Polish squire of the exploitation practised by the merchants of Dantzig, advises to sell grain only for cash, etc.: "Already here in Dantzig there are store-houses and factories, . . . and there are traders and farmers from far and near. Ask first whether he has cash, . . . for if you take a note for your produce, the useless scrap of paper will only be a nuisance to you. Be careful. And when you have delivered your goods, duly paid for, into the red store-houses, see that you get back at once to your dear Poland." Kochanowski, in his poem The Satyre (1585), criticizes the nobility for thinking that it is "the greatest thing in life in their eyes to know the way to Dantzig with rye and potash." Christopher Opalinski, Satires (1650), "On the Luxury in Poland": "We enrich the foreigners in buying from them at high prices goods, silks, and made-up cloth, what they call 'roba per la Polonia.' They know how to get away with our grain, which we sell them cheap." In similar vein (Solikowski), in his political pamphlet, The Talk in Kruszwitz between Piast and his Guest, February 19, 1573:—

"The Guest: Now that the Crown has let the Port of Danzig, the eye with which it looks into the world outside, fall in ruins, . . . everything goes out of Poland each year to Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Turkey, for cloth, linen, silk, satin, wine, nectar, and spices. This huge export passes all moderation. . . . Piast: Every ruler and every people have more interest in sea-power than in land-power, for . . . who has the latter and does not use it or even lets it be taken away, lets every advantage slip and brings on himself misfortunes: he who has been free becomes a slave, and the rich man becomes poor."—Czubek. The political pamphlets of the first Polish Interregnum (1906), 51, 479.

21. It is striking that this view of the Polish authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as to the exploitation of Poland on the part of the merchants of Dantzig, agrees fully with the conclusions of a modern German investigator, Naudé, Die Getreidehandelspolitik der europ. Staaten vom 13 bis 18 Jhdt., Acta boruss. (1896), 345, 373, 384 sqq.: "the men of Dantzig were able by the use of clever means to bring it about, that the Poles remained in ignorance of the situation on the market, that they let the Danzig traders get their grain cheap, but on the other hand had to pay dearly for the salt, wine, silk, spices, herrings, which they got from Dantzig alone. The essence of the whole matter was this: that Poland became steadily poorer, so that it was quite apparent, and Dantzig rose in splendid prosperity."

At the same time one finds the conviction that the coast and the sea-port is a necessity for Poland, as well as pride in the Polish Dantzig, on the pages of many early Polish writers. Already Dlugosz, I, 3, 55: "Gdansk, a Polonis populata . . . nedum apud Polonos, verum apud ceteras gentes et nationes vicinas memorabile, haud magnum quidem oppidum, sed frequenti emporio celebre, quod multarum verum merces in illud flumine Wysla, qua illic . . . miscitur Oceano Sarmatico." Cf. the characteristic report, mentioned by

Bielski, Chronica, of the last campaign of Wladislaw Jagiello against the Order (1433), "how the Poles marched to Dantzig, and camped before the city, where in the course of four days they conquered the surrounding districts. And the Polish knights on reaching the sea, embarked and sailed upon it, rejoiced that they had reached it and had conquered its shores," Collected Polish Hist. Writings, II (1764), 302. (Stryjkowski) Gwagnin, Chronicles of European Sarmatia (1575): "The glory of the city of Dantzig. . . . The tradesmen here are famous and wealthy. In regard to its buildings and their position, to the beauty of the collections and the variety at the markets, to the easy approach to the river and the sea, to the indescribable numbers of the burghers living here, as well as the number of merchants who come here from afar, lastly in regard to its wealth and war-materials, the city can be listed among the very first of Europe. In a word, it is a mighty, thrifty, and famous place, and one could not easily find one where tradesmen are better off," Ibid., IV (1768), 308 sq. Stan. Sarnicki, Descr. vet. et nov. Poloniae: "quicquid habet Polonia, Lituania, Mazovia, tanquam in oesophagum, Gedanum intrat et in transmarinas regiones avehitur; et rursus, quicquid affertur ex Germania, Anglia, Gallia, Hispania, Dania, Suecia, per universam Sarmatiam digitibus gedanensium civium dispensatur . . .," ed. Mizleri-Koloff, Collectio, I (1761), 250.

22. The grain exports from Dantzig, in round figures: 1608, 87,000 lastes (measures); 1618, 116,000 (corrected 129,000); 1649, 100,000; 1655 (a war-year), 11,000; 1659, 542; 1662, 36,000; 1669, 47,000; vid. Loeschin, I, 397. These figures do not quite agree with the tables of the grain exported from Dantzig 1649–1799 as given by Czacki in The Laws of Lithuania and Poland, II (1861) 267 sqq. Cf. the table of the exports from Dantzig given by Forten, Documents to the history of the Baltic Question, I (1889), 165 sqq., N. 75: and The Baltic Question in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century, 1544–1648, I (1893), 409 sqq., 530, 590, 628 sqq., II (1894), 458 sqq., and again Studies in the Archives of Luebeck and Dantzig, in the Monthly Review of the Russ. Ministry for Education, CCLXX (Petersburg, 1890), 310 sqq. Cf. also the report of the legate Bolognetto, May 11, 1583, on the economic conditions in Poland and the trade of Dantzig, published by Korzeniowski, Informatio de rebus oeconomicis Poloniae, Scr. rer. pol. of the Cracow Academy, XV (1894), 217 sqq. Cf. the remarks of Behring, Mitteilungen des Westprussissen Geschichtsvereins, I (1902), 66 sqq. On Dantzig's trade with Turkey in 1613, ibid., III (1904), 58 sqq. Czermak, On the Corn-trade of Dantzig in the Seventeenth Century, uses a MS. of Loyko, but without giving precise details, Reports of the Cracow Academy (1898), N. 5, 8 sqq. The data of Szelongowski, From the History of the Rivality of England, Germany, Russia and Poland (1910), 4 sqq., about the figures of Dantzig's trade, are unsystematic and inaccurate. Kutrzeba, The Vistula in the History of the Polish Econ. Evolution, in the Review Econ. News (1918), NN. 33–9, gives several, sometimes very incomplete tables as to the export trade of Dantzig 1490–92 and 1608–74. Cf. Simson, II[2] (1917), 269, II[3] (1918),

516 sqq. In comparing the earlier and later export figures one must remember that a Dantzig "laste," holding 60 Prussian bushels, was the same as 28 Warsaw "korsee." The laste of wheat weighs 2,550 kilograms, that of rye 2,455 kilograms, that of oats 2,160 kilograms. On the average, then, a laste of grain makes about two or two and one-half present-day English tons.

23. Sigmund III was in Dantzig in 1587, 1593, 1594, 1598, and in July, 1623, when at the news of his presence, Gustavus Adolphus appeared in the gulf, threatening the city with the Swedish fleet. Cf. Damus, Danzig und der nord. Krieg, in The Journal of West Pruss. Hist., XII. The Diet's decisions in favour of Dantzig in 1565 are in Vol. leg., II, fol. 686; in 1626 and 1628 (a special charter for English cloths), 1629, 1631, 1632: "Having regard to the firm loyalty of our city of Dantzig toward Ourself and the Republic, . . . we decree that all grain carried on the Vistula is to be brought only to Dantzig and nowhere else," 1633, 1641 (about the right to stamp goods), 1647, Vol. leg., III, fol. 524, 580, 616, 656, 680, 737, 811, IV, fols. 11, 74, 194.

24. On the visit of Wladislaw IV and his consort, Maria Gonzaga, in Dantzig (1646), cf. Laboureur, Hist. et relation du voyage de la Royne de Pologne (Paris, 1647), 140–72. Cf. Niemcewicz, Collected Historical Memoirs, IV (1839), 134 sqq.; further Roepell, Koenigin Louise-Marie von Polen in Dantzig, in the Journal of West Pruss. Hist., XXII (1887). A view of the triumphal arches on the occasion of the Queen's coming, in Kruszynski, Dantzig Antiquities, 16.

25. Dantzig, Carolus Gustavus and Jan Casimir: Rudawski, Polish Hist. of the time of Jan Casimir, 1648–60, II (ed. 1855), 137 sqq.; Litt. regis Suec. ac com. Steinbock ad Gedanenses (1656); Lengnich, Gesch. der preuss. Lande, VII (Danz., 1734), 146, 158, 173, giving the words of the chancellor of state, Korycinski, "that in this same Dantzig alone the whole state has been maintained against the violence, tyranny, and cunning, of a terrible foe," 221 sq., 262. The resolution of the Diet in Dantzig's favour, 1658, under the caption, "The Insuring of Dantzig": "the rare virtue, faith and stability of our city of Dantzig, even more than before have been attested now especially during the Swedish War: they are worthy to serve as an example to all, and deserve our high respect"—1698, Vol. leg., IV, fols. 559, 618.

26. The Treaty of Oliva, May 3, 1660 (a day ever since of solemn holiday in Dantzig), in § 15[3] conditioned the freedom of Dantzig's trade, on pre-war footing, vid. Dumont, Corp. dipl. VI (1739), 303, and Chwalkowski, Jus publ. reg. Pol. (Regiom., 1676), 281.

27. Dantzig and Sobieski: Decretum Joannis, III, Gedani, 1678, Zaluski, Epistolae Familiares, I (Brunsbergae, 1710), fols. 721–37; Polish Geog. Dict. II, 520; Sierakowski, The Visit of John III Sobieski in East Prussia, 1677–78, in the Annual of the Scientific Society of Thorn, XIX (1912), 209 sqq., with a special description of the stay there in the light of Sobieski's secret plans to take East Prussia from the Grand Elector. Cf. Finkel, Bibl., N. 4116.

28. Peter the Great in Dantzig: Lengnich, Gesch. der preuss.

Lande, IX (1755), 294 sqq.; Loeschin, II, 127, 131, and Beitraege, III, 92; also Foltz in the Reports on West Pruss. Hist., VI (1907), 68 sqq.

29. Dantzig and Stanislaw Leszczynski: Boyé, Stan. Leszczynski (1898), Askenazy, The last Royal Election but One, in Two Centuries, I (1901). An interesting relation of the Dantzig deputation to St. Petersburg asking for pardon, 1734, is in Loeschin, Beitraege, I (1837), 38 sqq.

30. Lengnich, Jus publicum civitatis ged. (together with his biography); Jus publ. Prussiae Polonae (1758); Jus. publ. Regni Pol. On Dantiscus, cf. Siemienski, Literary Portraits, I (1865). On Hevelius, cf. Warsaw Memorial (1809), the monthly Warsaw Library (1843), also Skimborowicz, Life and Works of Hevelius (1860). On the Chodowiecki family vid. Mitteilungen des Westpreussischen Geschichtsvereins, III, 74 sqq., IV (1905), 17 sqq. Cf. Rastawiecki, A Dictionary of Polish Painters, and Oettingen, Chodowiecki von Berlin nach Danzig, 1773 (1895).

31. Polish printing-presses in Dantzig: J. S. Bandtkie, History of the Printing-offices in the Kingdom of Poland, I (1826), 82 sqq., 104 sqq.; also Loeschin, History of the Dantzig Printing-presses (1840); Mankowski, History of the Polish Prints and Literature in West Prussia, in the Annual of the Scientific Soc. of Thorn, XVIII (1911), 79 sqq., gives an exact Polish-Dantzig Bibliography, from the first printing, the Polish ABC—1528 (?), until the end of the eighteenth century. In all 219 items are given, among them some, chiefly of the eighteenth century, of special interest.

32. The Polish language in Dantzig: Loeschin I, 305, 385; Simson II, 371; cf. Hirsch, Gesch. der akad. Gymnasiums in Dantzig (1837). Decisive, however, on this point is the witness of Cellarius, overlooked until now but unbiased: Andr. Cellarius, Descr. regni Poloniae (Amstel., 1659): "incolarum urbem (Gdanzk) habitantium magna est multitudo, ex Germanis, Polonis, aliisque nationibus conflata; Germani tamen ceteris numero superiores sunt, et hos Poloni sequuntur; ac utrius nationis idioma, germanicum et polonicum, in urbe usitatum est, adeo ut plures incolae reperiuntur qui utramque linguam callent," ed. Mizleri-Koloff, Collectio magna, I, 626 (Vars., 1761).

33. The export of grain from Dantzig 1700–52, and 1752–92, Loeschin II, 207, 311; cf. the Tables of Czacki, 215, also Naudé, Getreidehandel der Europ. Staaten, 387 sqq., and Schmoller-Naudé, Die Getreidehandelspolitik Brandenburg-Preussens bis 1740, Acta boruss. (1901), 258, which gives the exact details of the exports of Dantzig from 1715–35. Cf. Schmoller-Naudé-Skalweit, id. 1740–56 (1910), 137, 166, 468 sq., 563, with curious data of the already bitter competition waged by Stettin and Koenigsberg with Dantzig.

34. The jubilee of the Deliverance of Dantzig from the Teutonic Knights: Of the first one, 1554, no news remain, of the second one, 1654, a medal with the inscription "Gedani annos ante ducentos . . . ab infanda crucigerorum tyrannide liberatae tertium libertatis suae saeculum, regnante Io. Casimero, feliciter inchoanti memoria," cf.

Kruszynski, 27. The tercentenary, 1754, had a medal struck with this inscription on its circumference: "prussiaco-lechici Casimirus foederis autor . . ." and on the face: "Deo auspice Augusto III Poloniarum rege . . . jubilaeum gedanense unionis prutenopolonae memoriae sacrum . . ." Gottl. Wernsdorff, Oratio saec . . . in auditorio Athenaei ged. magn. senatus jussa (Gedani, February 27, 1754): "Libertatem, jura, immunitates vestras, moenia, tecta, possessiones, bona omnia, vestra sacra, securitatem, otium, vestram vestrorumque omnium vitam, conjuges, liberos, indigenae, nobilitatis salutem . . . augustissimorum regum Poloniae praesidio . . . conservatam atque restitutam videtis. Nihil horum omnium vobis integrum, nihil salvum esset, si isti adhuc domini capitibus nostris insultarent, quorum molestissimum jugum majores vestri diu pertulerunt, et qui rapinis, contumeliis, injuriis, cruciatibus, caedibus, provinciam vestram exinanire, evertere, extinguere allaborabant, et extinxissent tandem, nisi . . . anno abhuc trecentesimo, profligata equitum teutonicorum tyrannide, mitius imperium clementissimorum Poloniae Regum explendisset . . ." (a detailed account of the Crusaders' crimes, of Letczkow's murder, of the brutalities done to the people, "erga rusticanos homines et miseram plebeculam," and especially the violence inflicted on the trade of the city, "in mercaturam quae altrix et quasi anima reipublicae est"). Cf. J. B. Chr. Freislich, Cantate bey dem Jubelfeste der Stadt Danzig (Danz., February 27, 1754):—

"So hub auch Danzig sein gebeugtes Haupt empor
Und sahe sehnsuchtsvoll Dir, Casimir, entgegen.
Du kamst, Dir folgte Freiheit, Ruh und Segen. . . .
Gott, lass uns dies mit Thraenen und mit Blut
Sehr theur erkauftes Gut
Nie wiederum verlieren . . .
Es wird, bey Polens Schutz, auch Dantzigs Wohlergehn
Spaet unerschuettert stehn."

Cf. Fr. Klein, Das befreyte Preussen an dem dritten Jubelfeste der Stadt Danzig (Danz., February 27, 1754):—

"Wie ein entfuehrtes Kind, das seine Mutter siehet,
In ihren offnen Arm, verfolgt von Raeuber, fliehet,
Sie nimmt es in den Schooss, . . . es kuesst die milden Haende,
So liebreich machtest Du der Preussen Noth ein Ende,
O Polen! als es sich, vom Orden neu bedrueckt,
In Deine Arme warf . . . O Danzig, dieses Glueck,
Das Polen Dir gebar . . .
Wie viel vollkommner muss es nun Dein Buerger schmecken,
Da schon dreyhundert Jahr Dich Polens Fluegel decken."

Cf. J. P. Titius, Oratio saec. (Ged., March 6, 1754):—

"(Gedanum) crudeli ac barbara tyrannide convulsa . . . incomparabili Jagellonici sanguinis benignitate et clementia recreari coepit . . ." (In a long tale, praise of the Polish Kings and of the tolerant and practical kindness Poland had shown for Dantzig's trade); Titius, Carmina saec. quae in panegyri dantiscana canebantur (Ged., 1745): "des weissen Adlers Kraft (hat) Schutz und Freyheit Dir geschafft."

35. The occupation of East Prussia with Koenigsberg by Russia was provided for in the Austro-Russian pacts of Maria Theresa with Elizabeth, February 2, 1757, April 1, 1760, vid. Martens, Recueil I, 269. On the Russian occupation of Koenigsberg, vid. Russ. Antiquities, LXXXIX. On Tichon Jakubowski and the Orthodox Church in Koenigsberg, 1758–62, cf. Reports of the Jaroslav Eparchial News (1893), N. 29, also the Woronzoff Archives, IV (1873), 315 sqq., and The Russian Rule in East Prussia, in Reports of West Pruss. Hist. (1915), XIV, 54 sqq. On the intended seizure of Dantzig by Russia, vid. the Russian Note of December 4th, letter of Bruehl, December 18, 1760, Eelking, Letters of Count Bruehl (1854), 167 sqq. Cf. Lengnich, 458, and on the negotiations of the Vice-Chancellor Woronzoff with the Court of Versailles in this matter, Ségur, Politique de tous les cabinets, I (Paris, 1802), 161.

36. The first brutalities of Frederic the Great, the control-station of Marienwerder, the cause of the Dissidents, etc., vid. Schmitt, Hist. of the Rule of Stanislaw August (1868), also Damus, Die Stadt Danzig gegenueber der Politik Friedrichs des Grossen und Friedrich-Wilhelms II (1887). Cf. The Polit. Corresp. of Frederic the Great, and the Collection (Sbornik) of the Russian Hist. Soc. (which Damus has not consulted), passim. The Dantzig Diploma of Catherine II, April 5, 1767, confirming the earlier one of Anna of May 10, 1736, declared virtually the sovereignty of Russia over the city, even against Poland, in guaranteeing in a one-sided way the sanctity of the Assurance of August III, and prescribing for Dantzig "that it seek refuge with confidence and humility under our protection and that of our successors, hereafter as heretofore." Sbornik, XXXVII, NN. 318–19, 521, 541, 556–9, 563–4, 572–3, 580, LXVII, 357, 367, LXXII; also Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen, XXIV–XXXIV (1911). Frédéric le Gr., Mém., 1763–75, Oeuvres, VI, 12: "comme il était évident que le possesseur de la Vistule et du port de Danzig assujettirait cette ville avec le temps, on jugea qu'il ne fallait pas arréter une négociation aussi importante (le partage) pour un avantage, qui proprement n'était que différé."

37. Dantzig and England: On earlier relations and in part their differences, vid. Loeschin, Simson, Journal of West Pruss. Hist., passim. The Privilege Patent of Charles II for Dantzig, Whitehall, July 18, 1668. The Anglo-Dantzig Treaty, Dantz., October 22, 1706. The English Residents in Dantzig: Fr. Gordon, 1632–42, John Robinson, 1706, and his curious opinion "that there is not in any place of Europe so great a number of British natives and their posterity, whose industry God has blessed with such plenty and affluence as here in Dantzig"; Jac. Jeffries, 1721; Arch. Gibsone, 1724–50; Trevor Correy, 1754–80; Alex. Gibsone, 1780–93. Cf. Michael, Englands Stellung zur ersten Theilung Polens (1890), Litwinski, Polish and British Interests in Dantzig, December 4, 1918.

38. Frederic to Maltzan (in London), Potsd., April 18, 29, 1771: "je ne vois, pourquoi on s'embarrasse tant dans votre île des affaires de la Pologne. . . . L'Angleterre n'a aucun sujet de s'embarrasser des affaires de la Pologne; elles lui sont effectivement tout-a-fait

étrangères . . . la cour britannique . . . peut se mettre l'esprit entièrement en repos à leur compte," etc., Pol. Corr., NN. 19846, 76 sq. The Memorial of Bukaty to the Earl of Suffolk, July 11, 1772. Vid. also J. Williams, The rise, progress and present state of the northern governments, II (Lond., 1777), 555: "the intelligent part of mankind will undoubtedly be amazed, that a prince (Frederic II), whose family has received their all, except the lakes and sand-banks of Brandenbourg, from the crown of Poland, should on every occasion endeavour to destroy that power, to which he and his ancestors have been so much obliged. But by recurring to history, it will be clearly seen that this now illustrious family, from the time that they were first distinguished among the common robbers, who hid their plunder in the marshes of Brandenbourg, down to this day, have adhered so closely to the serpents' politics, that they have always stung the bosom which warmed and supported them."

39. The treaty of the First Partition, between Prussia and Austria, St. Petersb., July 25, 1772, § 1: "S.M. le roi de Prusse . . . se désistant en même temps de toute prétention sur la ville de Dantzig, prendra, en guise d'équivalent, le reste de la Prusse polonaise." The Pact of Partition between Prussia and Poland, Warsaw, September 18, 1773, § 2: "excluding the city of Dantzig and its territory, . . . the Prussian King renouncing every claim to the city of Dantzic and ts territory." The Prussian-Polish Acte séparé conten. tout ce qui a rapport au commerce, Warsaw, March 18, 1775, § 6: "la ville de Dantzig étant totalement étrangère au roi de Prusse, sera assujettie aux mêmes lois et conditions que l'étranger . . ." Vol. leg. VIII, fols. 42, 80.

40. The occupation of Dantzig's harbour by Frederic's forces, September 16, 1772. Cf. Jantzen, Réflex. sur la propriété du port de Dantzig (Dantz., 1773); also Johanna Schopenhauer, Jugend- und Wanderbilder (ed. 1884), XI. Cf. Aus Gralaths Berichten ueber die erste Theilung Polens, in Reports of West Pruss. Hist. Society, I (1902), 27 sq. On the taking of the peninsula Hela, vid. Stephan, Die Ansprueche Preussens auf Hela, 1772, in Reports of West Pruss. Hist. Soc., VIII (1909), 60 sqq. Cf. Journal of West Pruss. History, XLIX.

41. The opposition of the Third Committee, June 1, 1774, and the couplet nailed up on the Artushof at the time:—

"Der erste Junius 1774: Siegt, oder wenn der Preuss sich wider uns empoert,
Sterbt, eine Sklavenwelt ist unser nicht mehr werth."

The report of Geret, June 11, 1774, Schmitt, Materials, II (1857), 249 sq.; cf. Damus, 59 sq. On the cutting of the drinking water of the Radun, vid. the Cabinet Order of Frederic, October 13, 1773, published first by Preuss, Friedrich der Grosse, Urkundenbuch, IV (1834); rescinded by Royal order of October 27, 1773: "wegen Wassers fallen lassen," cf. Pol. Corr. Friedrichs des Grossen, XXXIV, also Klopp, Friedrich II (1860), 306 sq. Cf. the vain apology

of Baer, Hat Friedrich der Stadt Danzig das Trinkwasser entzogen ? in Reports of West Pruss. Hist. Society, V (1906), 50 sqq.

42. Dantzig and the Great Diet: Kalinka, The Four Year Diet, (1884–8); Korzon, The Internal History of Poland in the reign of King Stanislaw August, II (1897), 44 sq. Askenazy, The Polish-Prussian Alliance (1919). The growth of the export trade and the price of grain in Dantzig, 1789–92, Czacki, op. cit., cf. Loeschin II, 311. The short-sightedness of England in the matter of Dantzig, Pitt's advice to give it to the Prussians, in Prince Oginski's Mémoires I (1826), 92 sq. Oginski at that time personally negotiated with Pitt in London on account of the Dantzig question. Hailes' propaganda papers, Mémoire sur les affaires de la Pologne, Réplique à l'examen du mémoire (Vars., 1791). A Conversation between a Pole, a Russian, and an Englishman in the matter of Dantzig, "in a Club" (Warsaw, 1791). Cf. Lord, The Second Partition of Poland (1915), 170 sq.: "Hailes displayed . . . an amazing though often a misguided and tactless activity." Staszic, Warnings for Poland (Wars., January 4, 1790), foreword, 18 sqq.

43. The Letter of the Third Committee to Stanislaw August, Dantz., September 13, 1790: "Das kleine Voelkchen der Danziger . . . war lange nicht mehr gluecklich und seufzete nur, wartete . . . auf Huelfe und Trost und erlag nicht. . . . Eine Brotkruste und Freiheit!—das die Losung der Einwohner . . . Sire, unser Territorium ist zerstueckelt, der Hafen ist noch immer im Besitz einer maechtigen fremden Macht . . . Sire, wir stehen verzweifelt auf einem schroffen Felsen, von der schrecklichen Brandung umgeben. . . . Geruhen EW. Kgl. Maj. uns auf unsren gebahnten Weg, den wir seit achtzehn Jahren umsonst suchen, durch einen Richtsteig zu fuehren, oder wir muessen in die Brandung herab!" Cf. Zablocki Writings (1903), 225 sqq. "On the Jibe pasted on the corners of the Streets, to the effect that Dantzig and Thorn were for sale." The Constitutional Privileges for the cities, April 18, 1791, § 12, Vol. leg. IX.—Fisher, My Journey to Dantzig, October 29th to 31st, till November 4, 1792, cf. Askenazy, Hist. Studies, II (1904), 479 sqq.

44. The Seizure of Dantzig: The treaty between Prussia and Russia for the Second Partition, Pétersb., January 23, 1793, § 4: "S.M. le Roi de Prusse s'engage de son côté à continuer de faire cause commune avec S.M. l'Empereur des Romains dans la guerre . . . contre les rebelles francaise et à ne faire ni paix ni trève séparée . . ." (This condition was finally broken by Prussia at the Treaty of Basle with France, 1795, which, however, did not hinder Prussia from gaining in virtue of this pact indirect confirmation by France herself of her seizure of Dantzig.) § 5: "Et pour dédommagement des dépenses qu'entraine et entrainera cette guerre (contre la France), . . . S.M. Prussienne se mettra en possession de pays, villes et districts (de la Grande Pologne) . . . en y ajoutant la ville de Dantzig avec son territoire," Martens, Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie. II, N. 44.

45. The declaration of His Majesty the Prussian King in the matter of the taking of the city and territory of Dantzig, Berlin,

February 24, 1793; reprinted in the Suppl. to the Warsaw Gazette of March 27, 1793, N. 35; id., in French in the Hamburg Corr. (1793), N. 48; cf. Angeberg, Recueil des actes traités, etc., concernant la Pologne (1862), 304 sq.: "sans parler des dispositions hostiles que cette ville (de Dantzig) entretient contre la Prusse depuis une suite d'années, elle est devenue actuellement un des points de réunion de cette secte rebelle (des jacobins), qui marche de crime en crime. . . . Un de ces malfaiteurs (Garnier) . . . a été publiquement reçu à Dantzig même, et ce n'est qu'à force de remonstrances qu'on a pu l'arracher des mains de ses défenseurs. Ce récent exemple, d'autres abus fréquents d'une liberté mal comprise, les relations intimes que les populations entretiennent en France et en Pologne avec un parti qui, à l'aide de l'audace de ses principes, domine la majorité des citoyens bien intentionnés, et enfin la facilité que trouve l'ennemi commun (la République française) à se procurer, grâce au secours de ses adhérents à Dantzig, des provisions de toute sorte, et particulièrement du blé: telles sont les différentes circonstances qui ont appelé l'attention du roi de Prusse sur cette ville et l'ont decidé à lui imposer un frein nécessaire. . . . A ces fins, S.M. . . . a chargé son lieutenant-général de Raumer, d'occuper, avec un corps de troupes suffisant, la ville et le territoire de Dantzig. . . ."

46. The appearance of General Raumer with his army before Dantzig, March 6, 1793. On the movements for defence of the city, vid. Official Recess on the Events of the Occupation (1793), and cf. the coloured account by Damus Die Stadt Danzig gegen die Politik, 162 sq., also Festschr. zur hundertjaehrigen Gedenkfeier der Vereinigung Danzigs mit dem Kgr. Preussen, 1793 (1893). Cf. also Pruemers, Das Jahr, 1793 (1893), 42 sq., 746, 749; and Baer, Ein Beitrag zur Gesch. der Erwerbung Danzigs durch Preussen, 1793, in Reports of West Pruss. Hist., X (1911), 58 sqq. Protest of Henning, the Polish Legation counsellor, in the name of the Republic and the Polish King, against the taking of Dantzig by Prussia (Danz., March 11, 1793). The letter of the men of Dantzig to Stan. August, ad regem nostrum, Ged., March 12, 1793: " . . . (on the oppression of Raumer and the Russian agent in Dantzig, Sokolowski) ad Seren. Reg. Majestatem Vestram, Domine nost. clem. confugere constituimus illico, verum id non licere amplius edocti, . . . ab omni consilio quid juvaret destituti, quocunque Sacr. Reg. Majestatis Vestrae auxilio interclusi. . . ."

47. The Prussian Occupation Patent, March 25th; the taking of the outer fortifications, March 26th; the taking of the town, April 4th; the annulling of the terms of surrender by the ministerial proclamations, April 18th, 19th. The act of doing homage to Prussia, May 7, 1793. The incomparable address delivered on this occasion by the Regency President of West Prussia, von Schleinitz, Dantzig, May 7, 1793: " . . . Bei der Besitznahme Westpreussens (1772) befand sich Dantzig in einem bluehenden Zustande. . . . Ein ununterbrochenes Glueck haette vielleicht Uebermuth, Ueppigkeit und Hartherzigkeit erzeugen koennen. Um euer jetziges Glueck in seinem ganzen Umfange zu fuehlen, war es daher noethig, euch erst durch eine zwanzigjaehrige

Erfahrung zu ueberzeugen, dass . . . getrennt von der Provinz, eine glueckliche Existenz fuer euch unmoeglich war. Es war noethig, euch erst davon zu ueberzeugen, dass . . . (nicht) euer bisheriger Schutz- und Oberherr (Polen) . . . sondern dass nur Friedrich Wilhelm der Mann war, bei Dem ihr Trost, Hilfe und Rettung finden konntet. Ohne diese Ueberzeugung waeret ihr vielleicht mit weniger Inbrunst in seine Vaterarme geflogen (!). Euer Sinken musste also dazu dienen, euer Aufbluehen, euer Steigen desto mehr zu verherrlichen. Der in Polen herrschende Partei- und Empoerungsgeist . . . drohte, nach dem Beispiel Frankreichs, auch in diesem Lande alle buergerlichen, politischen und religioesen Bande aufzuloesen . . ."

The Organization Patents for Dantzig, March 25, June 2, 1793; the Administrative Reglaments, April 3, June 3, September 30, 1794; the Sea Customs Tariff, November 14, 1796, Novum Corpus Constitutionum prussico-brandeburgensium, IX (Berolini, 1796), fols. 1472, 1609, 2107, 2201, 2289, 2317, 2623 sq., X (1801), 739 sq. Cf. Simson, Gesch. der Danz. Willkuer (1904), 166 sq., Baer, Behoerdenverf. in Westpreuss. (1912) 125 sqq.

48. Johanna Schopenhauer, Jugend- und Wanderb., Arth. Schopenhauer, Inaugural-Dissertation (1812). After the taking of Dantzig, the French consul there, Pons, was arrested by the Prussians (1793). During Kosciuszko's Revolution Parandier, the French agent with the Polish Emigration, presented the Committee of Public Safety a sharp memorial protesting against the leaving of Dantzig in Prussian hands: Parandier, to the Comité de sal. publ., Paris, August 25, 1794. So too during the Directoire there exists in the Paris Archives of Foreign Affairs a series of official pronouncements, 1795–6, against the seizing of Dantzig by Prussia. On Bartholdy and his conspiracy, cf. Loeschin, II, 320 sqq.

49. The flight of the Prussian Royal Family through Dantzig, 1806: vid. Hohenzollernjahrbuch, IX (1906); Bailleu in the Reports of West Pruss. Hist., V (1906); Schippel, ibid., VII (1908). The conquest of Dantzig by Franco-Polish troops, 1807: Napoleon to Berthier, Vars., January 23, 1807, and the whole correspondence with Lefebvre, bearing witness to the unusual interest of the Emperor in Dantzig, espec. NN. 11680–1, 12593, 600, 4, 57, 707–12, Corr. de Napoléon, XIV–V. The original state of the Polish forces besieging Dantzig: the Northern Legion, 2148; the III Division, parts of the 2nd and 3rd regiments, 1320; in Gardanne's Division, parts of the 2nd and 3rd regiments, 1921; in Polenz' Division, Dziewanowski's horse, 423; in all not quite 6,000. Situation générale de la Grande Armée, April 1, 1807, Mémorial du département de la guerre, VIII (1843), 294; at the end the number was 6,500; cf. Gembarzewski, The Army of the Duchy of Warsaw (1905), 60, 96, 144 sqq.

Dombrowski to Zajontchek, in Gniewo, April 3, 1807: "We here keep working our way ever nearer to Dantzig. My Poles have the most dangerous position, and the most important. They are fighting daily." Napoleon was in Marienburg, April 25th, cf. Corr. of April 24, 26, 1807, NN. 12470, 4; it seems that he approached Dantzig and saw Lefebvre; cf. Heinel-Berg, Aufzeichn ungen aus

der Vergangenheit Marienburgs, in Reports of West Prussian Hist. Society, XVI (1917), 5.

50. The battle of the Mouth of the Vistula (Weicselmünde) and the death of Parys on May 15th; the funeral at Wonneberg, May 17th; the reports of General Gielgud and General Hauke from before the city, vid. Rembowski, Coll. Writings of General Hauke (1905), 56 sqq. The report of Gielgud to Prince Poniatowski on May 20th, cf. Poznan Gazette (1807), supplem. to N. 44. (The articles in this paper on the Polish activities before Dantzig were mostly edited in Dombrowski's Headquarters, as we see from the minutes of his Staff Correspondence.) Gielgud to Napoleon, Wonneberg, May 26, 1807: "La troisième division polonaise que j'ai l'honneur de commander, est arrivée au blocus de Dantzig avec 6,500 hommes présents sous les armes . . . elle se trouve réduite aujourdhui à 4,650 hommes présents sous les armes. . . . Les habitants de la ville de Dantzig sont Polonais. Ils sont animés de sentiments d'admiration et de fidélite pour V.M.I. et R. et d'amour pour leur ancienne patrie. Comme tout le reste de la Pologne, ils ne se plaindront point de recevoir l'ordre de V.M. d'habiller complètement toute la troisième division polonaise, qui a aidé avec tant de zèle á les délivrer du joug prussien, à les réunir à leur ancienne patrie. . . ."

51. The Surrender of Dantzig, May 26, 1807; Description of Lefebvre's and the Polish Army's entry, Wolski, A Portrait of Misfortunes of War, 1806–7, in Annual of the Scient. Soc. of Thorn, XVI 1909), XVIII (1911), 13 sq., 21, 34. On the rejoicing in Warsaw at the news of Dantzig's surrender, vid. Correspondence from Warsaw in the Poznan Gazette, N. 45, June 1, 1807. The fine address of Napoleon to the French Senate on May 28th, with the granting of the title Duc de Dantzig to Lefebvre, Correspondance de Napoléon, N. 12667. Cf. General Chlapowski, Memoirs (1899), General Weyssenhoff, Memoirs in the Monthly Warsaw Library for 1902. One sees from these memoirs how hard the task of the young and inadequately equipped Polish armies was before Dantzig. The Letters of General Kosinski from before Dantzig, in Poznan Gaz. (1807), NN. 43 sq., cf. also Sokolnicki, General Sokolnicki (1912), 146 sqq., setting in fair colours the latter's not very remarkable part in the whole. Cf. Bennigsen, Memoirs II, 85 sqq., 100 sqq., with the curious Dantzig reports of the Russian Commander-in-Chief, General Kamenskoj; also Briefe ueber die Belag. von Danzig von einem Augenzeugen (Hamb., 1807), and Duisburg, Gesch. der Belag. und Blok. Danz. (Danz., 1808); further Die Belag. von Danz., 1807 (from Kalckreuth's original papers, Posen-Leipsic, 1809); Danz. waehrend und nach der Belag., in Briefen (Amst.-Hamb., 1809); Plotho, Tageb. 1806–7 (Berlin, 1811); Saint-Aubin, Siége de Dantz. en 1807 (Paris, 1818), 72, 97, 103, 117, 123, 126, on the Polish activities, the death of Parys, etc. Cf. Hoepfner, Krieg von, 1806–7, III (1851), 336–529; Koehler Geschichteder Festung Danzig, II; Lettow-Vorbeck, Krieg 1806–7, IV (1896), 194–272, with interesting observations on the "Bedeutung Danzigs fuer die grossen Operationen."

52. Napoleon in Dantzig, June 1, 1807: the parade of the first

Polish Legion on that day, the reception of the city authorities on June 2nd, his departure the same afternoon; Mém. de la ville de Dantz. for Napoleon, June 1, 1807. Malachowski to Napoleon, Vars., June 3, 1807, asking for "la ville de Dantzig et toute la partie de la Pologne qui l'avoisine."

53. Dantzig as Free City: the Franco-Russian Treaty, Tilsit, July 7, 1807, § 6: "la ville de Dantzig, avec un territoire de deux lieues de rayon autour de son enceinte, sera rétablie dans son indépendance, sous la protection de S.M. le roi de Prusse et de S.M. le roi de Saxe, et gouvernée par les lois qui la régissaient à l'époque, où elle cessa de se gouverner elle-même"; § 8: "S.M. le roi de Prusse, S.M. le roi de Saxe, ni la ville de Dantzig, ne pourront empêcher par aucune prohibition, ni entraver par l'établissement d'aucun péage, droit ou impôt, de quelque nature qu'il puisse être, la navigation de la Vistule," Martens Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie, XIII (1902), N. 493. The Franco-Prussian Treaty, July 9th, § 14: "S.M. le roi de Prusse renonce . . . à la possession de la ville de Dantzig," §§ 19, 20, ut supra, 21: "la ville, port et territoire de Dantzig seront fermés, pendant la durée de la présente guerre maritime, au commerce et à la navigation des Anglais," cf. the proclamation of Frederic Wilhelm III, Memel, July 24, 1807, renouncing Dantzig. The Dantzig-Prussian Treaty as to Boundaries, Elbing, December 6th, signed by Dohna for Prussia and Senator Labes with his colleagues for Dantzig, §§ 2, 4.

54. The solemn restoration of the previous form of administration in Dantzig, July 21, 1807. The Dantzig Deputation to Paris, vid. Granier, Berichte aus der Berliner Franzosenzeit, 1807–9, Publicationen aus den Preussischen Staatsarchinven, LXXXVIII (1913), 41. Its reception by Napoleon at St. Cloud, September 6, 1807, and its return in May, 1808. The Celebration of the introduction of the Code Napoléon in Dantzig, in the Cathedral of Notre Dame, July 21, 1808. The city's Memorial to Napoleon in the matter of the War Contribution, July 15, 1808, handed in in Erfurt by a Dantzig Deputation. A Memorial for Napoleon on July 24, 1811, set forth the sinking of the population during four years from 64 thousand down to 44, and the complete ruin of the trade. Many interesting documents for the story of Dantzig in the Napoleonic period are convened at the Parish Archives des affaires étrangères und Archives de la guerre, in the relations of the French Consuls to Danzig: Chopin and Massias, and in the correspondence of General Rapp with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Champagny and Maret, and Marshal Berthier.

55. Napoleon in Dantzig again, June 7, 1812, reception of the city authorities and the merchants on June 8th, according to eye-witness: "der Kaiser im bekannten einfachen gruenen Kleide, mit dem Hute unter dem Arme, eine Tabaksdose in der Hand, ging in bestaendiger Begleitung Rapps, der sein Dolmetscher war, vor der Reihe auf und nieder, blieb in einem Sprechen, Fragen, Erwidern und Antworten, und floesste mit jeder Minute mehr eine solche Dreistigkeit ein, dass es beinahe eine Conversation wurde, und ein jeder auch unge-

fordert, sprach, was er fuer zweckmaessig hielt. . . . Er wandte sich (immer) wieder zu den Kaufleuten und begann ein foermliches Handelsconseil . . ." (a long and curious dialogue of the Emperor with the merchants) . . . (finally) "erklaerte er nach der Regierung (i.e. turning to the Senate's representatives), Je garderai votre ville; je connais trop son importance. Elle est l'embouchure de la Vistule et le débouche de la Pologne. . . ." Napoleon left Dantzig for the Army, June 11, 1812.

56. As to the military state of Dantzig at the time, cf. interesting details given by Richemont, colonel du génie, directeur des fortifications, in his Memoir sur Dantzig, 1812 (MSS. from General Hauke's Papers). The prophecy in the celebrated poem of Mickiewicz, "Pan Thaddeus," refers to the time of the Moscow Campaign :—

> "Long live Dantzig city!—Once our port,
> 'Twill be our port again!"

Cf. the later letter of Mickiewicz to Mronga, ut supra. Cf. also for the Napoleonic period, Danziger Zeitung, 1807–13, passim; Blech, Gesch. der Siebenjaehrigen Leiden Danzigs, 1807–14, I (Danz., 1815); and on the results of the blockade, Tarle, The Blockade of the Continent (Petersburg, 1913).

57. The purposes of Russia as to the Vistula line, 1812–14: Bernhardi, Toll, II, 366 sqq., and Gesch. Russlands, II, 735; General Schilder, Alexander I, III, 137, 142; Pertz, Stein, III, 300; Lehmann, Stein, III. Cf. Boyen, Erinner., II, 250, 526 sq.; Meinecke, Boyen, I, 247; Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte, I, 423; Oncken, Befreiungskriege, I, 217, 257 sqq.; Osten-Sacken, Milit. Gesch. der Befreiungskr. 1813, I, 84, 163 sq.

58. The Siege of Dantzig, 1813: Blech II (1815); Tort, Le Typhus contag. de Dantz. en 1813 (1817); Artois, Rel. de la déf. de Dantz. (1820); Mém du gén. Rapp (1823—a falsification, but it includes the siege documents of 1814); Loeschin, II (1828); Campredon, Déf. de Dantzig en 1813, journ., notes, lettr. (1888); Auriol, Déf. de Dantzig en 1813, Rev. hist. XL (1889); Koehler, II (1893); Reboul, Camp. de 1813, I (1910), 368 sq. As to Russian espionage in Dantzig, vid. The War for the Fatherland (Russian), V (1904), 6, 240; Langeron, Mém. 1812–14 (1902), 170 sq., on the mission to Dantzig in January, 1813, in disguise of a Russian colonel, the famous Figner, who so deceived Rapp, that the latter gave him letters to Napoleon—which Figner of course handed over to the Russian Headquarters. Vid. Wojenski, Acta, docum. and materials for War of 1882–13, I (1909), 425; cf. The Centenary of the Taking of Dantzig, in Russian War Historical Series, II (1912), 425 (valueless). The interest of the Russian General Staff in Dantzig is attested by the multiplicity of data and studies about the city in the Archives of the General Staff in Petersburg, NN. 1764, 1804–6, 2054, 2087, 2130–43, 2286–93, 4773. Anthony Ostrowski, Biography of Thomas Ostrowski, II (1873), 402 sq. (based on the notes made by his brother Ladislaus in Dantzig, 1813). Cf. General Kolaczkowski, Memoirs (1899), 15. On the incident with the

Russian officers in the outposts and the false proclamation, vid. Danziger Zeitung (1813), N. 33; cf. Angeberg, Recueil (1862), 600 sqq. The Surrender of Dantzig, November 28, 1813, signed in Langfuhr, § 6: "les troupes polonaises . . . appartenantes à la garnison, auront une pleine et entière liberté de suivre le sort de l'armée française. . . . Mess. les officiers polonais . . . donneront chacun leur parole d'honneur par écrit, de ne pas servir contre les puissances alliées, jusqu'à leur parfait échange."

59. The Russo-Prussian dispute about Dantzig: Schultze, Um Danzig, 1813–14 (1903): Schoen, Papiere III (1881), 349, 278; Delbrueck, Gneisenau, IV (1879), 175; Krollmann, Landwehrbriefe, 1813 (1913), 75 sq., the letters of Dohna from before Dantzig. The instructions of Czar Alexander to D. Alopeus, his Ambassador at the Court of Berlin, Kalish, March, 1813: "rétablir les anciennes villes hanséatiques, mais d'en augmenter le nombre, en comprenant, dans cette catégorie . . . Dantzig . . . (pour) servir d'étape aux produits russes." Vid. the Franco-Russo-Prussian truce at Pleswitz, June 4, 1813, §§ 5–8, on communications with Dantzig. The Coalition Convention (Russo-Prusso-Austrian) at Reichenbach on June 26, 1813, § 2: "l'aggrandissement de la Prusse . . . par la cession de la ville et du territoire de Dantzig," Martens Recueil, III (1876), N. 68, VII (1885), N. 259, XIV (1905), N. 500.

60. The action of the city and of Keidel against Dantzig's restoration to Prussia: The instructions of the Senatorial Committee of the city (Weickhmann, Wernsdorff, Doering, Trendelenburg, Soermans), for Keidel, Dantz., January 8, 1813. The Memorials of Keidel for the Czar (via Laharpe), Paris, May 31st, for Castlereagh, June 1, 1814: " . . . S.M. Britannique n'a jamais reconnu la soumission passagère de Dantzig au sceptre prussien, effectuée en 1793 et terminée en 1807, de même qu'une pareille reconnaissance n'a jamais eu lieu de la part de la France . . ." Memorial for Pozzo di Borgo, July 27th, for the English Govt., Lond., September 19, 1814; Hardenberg to Weickhmann, Berlin, September 5th. Articles in the Morning Chronicle about Dantzig, August 25th, 31st, September 7, 1814. Cf. the appeal of the City of London "for the purpose of affording relief to the suffering inhabitants of the city of Dantzig," February 1st. Panten, Danzigs Rueckkehr unter Preuss. Herrschaft, in Zeitschrift fuer Westpruess. Gesch., XIII (1884), 98 sq.; cf. Jaucourt, Corresp. (1905), 17 sq.; Askenazy, Europe and Poland, in Wars. Libr. (1909), III, 51; Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, II (1917), N. 1496; Wawrzkowicz, England and Poland at the Congress of Vienna (1919), 3380, 383 sqq., adds to that question some new details from the London Record Office, the Archives of Berlin and Vienna, and those of Czartoryski.

61. The restoration of Dantzig to Prussia: Acte final du Congrès de Vienne, June 9, 1815, § 23: " . . . S.M. le roi de Prusse, . . . ses héritiers et successeurs, posséderont de nouveau, comme auparavant, en toute souveraineté et propriété . . . la ville de Dantzig et son territoire, tel qu'il a été fixé par le traité de Tilsit." The Prusso-Russian Treaty of May 3, 1815, §§ 22–6, 39, 30, as to the free shipping

in the boundaries of Dantzig as set in 1772, Martens, Recueil, III, NN. 79, 81.

62. The Prussian reorganization of Dantzig: Schoen, Papiere, passim; Askenazy, Russia–Poland (1907), 159 sq.; Schottmueller, Die Einrichtung der Kgl. Regierung in Danzig vor 100 Jahren, Journal of West Pruss. Hist., LVII (1917), told in a deceitful and apologetic exposition. The misery and riots in Dantzig, Loeschin, II, 500 sq. The trade disputes of Prussia with the Kingdom of Poland: vid. the Prusso-Russian Trade Conventions, St. Petersburg, December 19, 1818, with the supplements, § 2, séparé et secret and table des droits d'import.; March 11, 1825, cf. Martens Recueil, VII, NN. 297, 308. The Prussian Customs List of October 25, 1821, modified April 10, 1823; cf. Askenazy, Two Centuries, I, 400 sqq. In the Archives of the Warsaw Treasury interesting fragments are preserved of the consular correspondence of Heydeken, Makarewicz, Borakowski, Tengoborski, from Dantzig, with the Warsaw Government, 1818–30, including a series of projects and treatments as to the trade between Dantzig and Poland.

63. The Kashubians: Kujot, History of Polish Prussia, I (1913), 196 sq. Kentrzynski, in the Monthly The Land (1911), N. 22; cf. the protest of the Kashubians against his too smooth account, which cannot be scientifically justified, in their Review, The Griffin, IV (1912), 76; the remarks of Romer, The Poles in the Sea-coast and Lake Regions (1019), 8, 15 sq., are superficial and uncritical; on the language question, cf. Baudouin-Courtenay, The Kashubian Language and Problem, in the Journal of the Russian Ministry of Education, V (1897), also Karlowicz, The Kashubian Dialect, in The Vistula Journal, XII (1898), and Ramult, Dictionary of the Pomeranian or Kashubian Language (1893). Chichkoff to Mronga, Petersb., July 16th; Rumianzeff to Mronga, Homel, August 4, 1826, published in the Preface to Mrongovius' Complete Polish-German Dictionary (Koenigsb., 1835), VII, XI sqq. One should, however, moderate the overdone condemnation of Mrongovius because of this correspondence, e.g. Matusiak, Panslavism among the Kashubians, in the General Review (1894), Poblocki in The Griffin, I (1908), Koscinski, The Slavonic Idea among the Kashubians (1908). On the other hand, cf. Slaski, In Defence of Mrongovius, The Griffin, IV, 185 sqq.; Frantzew, Polish Slavonic Science (1906), 125. Cf. Mrongovius to Prince Adam Czartoryski, Dantzig, November 30, 1822; to The Warsaw Scient. Society, April 18th; to the learned Polish historian, Maciejowski, Dantzig, November 1, 1831; The Griffin, IV, 314 sqq. Mickiewicz (as deputy of Prince Czartoryski) to Mrongovius, Paris, February 28, 1852, Collected Works, XII, 237 sqq.

64. Dantzig at the time of the November Revolution: Chtcherbatoff, Prince Field Marshal Paskiewitch; General Prondzynski, Memoirs, III (1909), 29, 46 sqq. As to Dantzig after 1831, cf. Brandstaetter, Land un Leute des Landkreises Danzig (1879), 325 sqq. The figures as to exports, very incomplete, from 1835–38, in Radziszewski, The Polish Bank (1910), 397, and in 1849, Makowski, The Turn-over of the Grain Export in Dantzig, in the Warsaw Library, XXXVIII

(1850), 374 sqq. The exact figures are to be had in the collection of the Jahresberichte der Aeltesten der Kaufmannschaft der Stadt Danzig (1847–70).

65. Dantzig at the time of the January Revolution: the speech of Bismarck in the Prussian Chamber, February 18, 1863: "Danzig in preussischen Haenden zu bewahren," Reden, II, 75. Buchanan to Russell, Berlin, February 22nd, the words of Wilhelm I, of course inspired by Bismarck: "the first efforts of the new Polish State would be to recover Dantzig, and if that attempt succeeded, the fatal consequences to Prussia were too evident." February 28th, March 1st: " . . . the representations of the elders of the Mercantile Corporation of Dantzig . . . in which special attention is called to the injury that has accrued or might accrue to their interests in consequence of the agreement with the Russian Government (i.e. the Warsaw Convention of February 8th)." Confid. Corr. of the Brit. Govt. respecting the insurr. in Poland, ed. Filipowicz (1914), NN. 70, 118, 138, On the Kashubian revolts, vid. Stella-Sawicki, The Year 1863 (1902), 103 sqq. Cf. The Griffin, III, 56.

66. Sutherland Edwards, Sir W. White, his life and corresp. (1902), calls in question his relationship to an illustrious Polish statesman. Cf. the Polish Review, CL (Cracow, 1903). The French Squadron in the Gulf of Dantzig, August 21, 1870: vid. Der deutsch-franz. Krieg, 1870–71, red. von der Kriegsgesch. Abth. des Gr. Generalst., I (1874), 117 sqq., II, 1317 sqq. The figures of the export of grain from Dantzig: vid. Wasilewski, Dantzig from the point of view of Trade and Industry, in the Journal of Agriculture (Niwa), X (1876), 485 sq., 569 sq. Exact data given in the collection Jahresberichte des Vorsteheramts der Kaufmannschaft zu Danzig (1871–1913).

67. The speeches of Rickert and Bismarck in the German Parliament, May 21, 24, 1879, February 10, 16, 1885, given in Bismarck's Reden, VII, 236, 262 sqq., X, 166, 233 sqq. Bismarck's speeches in Varzin, September 16, 1894, " ein Polenreich . . . (mit) Westpreussen, Danzig u.s.w. (waere) stets der Bundesgenosse unsrer Feinde," September 23, " . . . ich will immer lieber mit dem Zaren in Petersburg als mit der Schlachta in Warschau zu tun haben. . . . Wenn das polnische Phantasiegemaelde verwirklicht wuerde, so waere zunaechst Danzig in Gefahr. Die Polen muessten Dantzig annektieren," Bismarck's Reden, XIII, 104 sqq.

68. The Kashubian Renaissance: On Floryan Ceynowa, vid. Koscinski, The Slavonic Idea among the Kashubians (1908); The Griffin, I (1908); Frantzew, The Slavonic Idea among the Kashubians, in Russian Philological News (Warsaw, 1908), N. 4. On the contemporaneous Young Kashubian Movement, vid. the Polish Dantzig Gazette and The Griffin. Curious light is thrown on the suspicious attitude of the Prussian Government to this movement, and especially on the Union for Kashubian Folk-origins, by the pamphlet of Cardinal von Widdern, Polnische Eroberungszuege in Westpreussen, Ostpr. und Pommern (1913), 33 sqq. On the number of the Kashubians, cf. the earlier calculation of Ramult, Statistics of the Kashubian People (1899), further the newer and reliable data in The Griffin, I, 8 (1909),

229, and in the Reports of the Union for Kashubian Folk-origins, I, 8 (1910), 226. Bernhard, Die Polenfrage (1910), gives a coloured account of the economic movement; Spandowski, The Polish Banks in Pomerania, The Griffin, III (1911), an accurate one.

69. General Koehler, Gesch. der Festung Danzigs, II, 504: "Danzig muss in einem Defensivkriege mit Russland den Pivotpunkt abgeben." On the problems of the Vistula and the port of Dantzig: Keller, Memel-Pregel und Weichselstrom, I (1899–1900), 348 sq., IV. 289, 453 sqq.; Piechowski, The Vistula as a Highway of Communication and Trade (1905), in Warsaw Economist (1905), IV; Reyman, Die Weichsel als Wasserstrasse (1913), 49 sqq.; Ingarden, Waterways (1916), 29 sqq.; Matakiewicz, Polish Waterways (1917), 12 sqq.; Sadkowski, Unsere zukünftigen Wasserstrassen (1918), 27 sq.; Czernecki, The Organization of Internal Polish Trade (1918), 64 sqq. (without value).

70. The economic situation and the present-day turnovers of Dantzig: Rueckgang des Dantziger Handels, in Danz. Ztg. (October, 1903); Beyer, Der Danziger Warenhandel (1904); Uhlmann, Der Deutsch-Russische Holzhandel (1905), 70 sqq.; Muensterberg, Der Handel Danzigs (1906), 27 sqq., showing the persecution of Prussia from the railway side. Cf. Spandowski, The Condition of the Artizan in West Prussia, 1897–1907, in the Annual of the Scient. Soc. in Thorn, XV (1908), 130 sqq.; Fehrmann, Danzigs Handel und Industrie (1912), 8, 14, 18 sqq.; Statist. Jahrb. deutscher Staedte, XVIII (1912), 144; Stam, Dantzig as Poland's Chief Port (1918). Vid. the report of the office of the chairman of the Merchants of Dantzig for 1908 for the preference given to Stettin to the disadvantage of Dantzig's trade with Poland. Ibid. for 1912, p. 7: "die Schiffbau- und Maschinenindustrie in ebenso unbefriedigender Lage, wie schon seit einer Reihe von Jahren." Kroeker, Zur industr. Entwickl. Danzigs (1916), 31, 35 sq., confirms the weak growth of the chief branches of Dantzig's industry, "because the largest manufacturing plants of the city are state factories, whose amount of production depends not on economic development, but on political considerations." On the City's Population, vid. Preussisches Gemeindelexicon, II (1912); Stat. Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich, XXXVI (1915).

71. Copy, Foreign Office (Herr Solf): The following telegram, received from the Imperial Ambassador in Berne (Baron Romberg), on October 20th, is herewith brought to the attention of the Imperial Ministry of the Interior: "Mir wird aus zuverlaessiger Quelle mitgeteilt, dass sich die Danziger Kaufleute nach Warschau an Polnische Regierung gewandt und Wunsch ausgesprochen haetten, Danzig moechte zu Polen kommen, da man sich fuer Danzigs Zukunft Gutes vom Koenigreich Polen als Hinterland verspraeche." "See to it that inquiries are made as to the correctness of the report, Berlin, October 21, 1918." "The Secretary of State for the Interior, Berlin, W. 8, October 27, 1918, Wilhelmstr., 74. Sent Copy to the Chief of the Administration in the General Government of Warsaw (Herr Steinmeister), with request for a statement in the matter." "The Chief of the Administration of the Gen. Govt. in Warsaw, October 30, 1918, sends this (i) to the Government Commissioner (Prince Oettingen),

and (ii) to the Central Police Station (Herr von Born-Fallois), with the request for news, as to whether anything is known of such a step on the part of Dantzig merchants toward the Polish Government."

72. Administrative oppression in Dantzig: Clara D., to Max D, Dantz., November 8, 1918: ". . . Hier tut sich was. Das Volk wird verrueckt mit ihren Polen und Deutschen. . . . In den koeniglichen Betreiben sind Listen umhergegangen, wer sich zu Polen oder Deutschland bekennt: wer Pole werden will, wird sofort entlassen." On the elections to the German Parliament, January 19, 1919, out of over 90,000 votes cast in Dantzig, the Deutschnationale got about 14,000.

73. The troubles of the present Prussian Govt. in the matter of Dantzig have been increased by the formal abolition by the Russian Soviets-Govt. of all the Treaties of the Partitions of Poland, and among them the second one in 1793, which gave Dantzig to Prussia: "The empowered Representation of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviets-Republic has the honour to draw the attention of the Imperial German Govt. to the fact, that the said Russian Administration has decided in the Council of the People's Commissioners (in view of and in keeping with art. 4 of the Russian-German supplementary treaty to the Peace of Brest, March 3, 1918), to report to the Imperial German Govt. as follows: that the treaties, agreements and settlements herein noted, are in the opinion of the Govt. of the Soviets-Republic contrary to the changes which the war has brought with it . . . (then comes a list of various Russian treaties with different States of the German Empire). . . . At the same time the said Govt. of the Soviets-Republic has decided in its Council of People's Commissioners, on the basis of the same art. 4, to abolish all the treaties and acta, agreed upon between the Govt. of the one-time Russian Empire and that of the Kingdom of Prussia in regard to the Partition of Poland, since they stand contrary to the principle of self-determination of nations and the revolutionary consciousness of right of the Russian people, which has recognized the irrevocable right of the Polish people to independence and unity. This involves the following treaties and acta: 1. The secret Treaty for the Partition of Poland, January 4, 1772. 2. The St. Petersburg Treaty for the First Partition of Poland, July 25, 1772. 3. The Declaration of Prussia as to her rights and claims on Poland, September 1, 1772, reported to the Representatives of Foreign Govts. in Warsaw by the Note of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 22, 1772. 4. The Treaty between Russia and Prussia, January 23, 1793, for the Second Partition of Poland. 5. The Agreement for the Third Partition of Poland made in St. Petersburg, October 13–24, 1795. 6. The Boundary Settlement of Poland, made in Grodno June 21–July 2, 1796, together with a secret description of the boundaries. 7. The Agreement of October 10–21, 1796, as to the interpretation of art. 3 of the Treaty of October 13–24, 1795, as regards the boundaries of Cracow. 8. The Treaty about Polish matter of January 15–26, 1797. 9. The Vienna Treaty of April 21–May 3, 1815, about the Duchy of Warsaw. 10. The Treaty of Berlin of October 30–November 11, 1817, about the

boundaries of the Kingdom of Poland, with additional agreements. 11. The Minutes belonging to the same of November 7–19, 1817. 12. The Final Boundary Settlement between the Kingdom of Poland and the Prussian States, April 12–24, 1823. 13. The Treaty of October 4–16, 1833, on the common dealing with Polish questions. The Govt. of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviets-Republic has further decided on the basis of the said art. 4, not to let any of the secret treaties, agreements, or settlements made by the Govt. of the one-time Russian Empire with the Govt. of the German Empire or its allied States come again into force, since they stand contrary to the Decree of the Commissioners of the People of October 28, 1917, "On Peace."

The German Imperial Chancellor's Office to Gen. Govr. von Beseler, Berlin, September 30, 1918:

"E. Exz. beehre ich mich, Abschrift einer Verbalnote der hiesigen russischen Vertretung zu uebersenden, in der diejenigen Vertraege aufgefuehrt sind, die nach Ansicht der Sowiets-Republik nicht wieder in Kraft treten sollten. Die auf Seite 5–7 aufgefuehrten Vertraege betreffen die Teilung Polens. Diese Dokumente sind nie veroeffentlicht worden (this strange statement proves an astonishing ignorance of the Berlin Chancellor's Office, as all the acta mentioned above which have to do with the Partitions of Poland are known to have been published long since) und koennen daher nur im Geheimen-Staatsarchiv eingesehen werden. Praktische Bedeutung haben diese Vetraege fuer die Gegenwart kaum mehr. Es wuerden daher diesseits keine Bedenken bestehen, dem Wunsche dem russischen Regierung zu entsprechen. E. Exz. waere ich fuer baldfaellige Mitteilung dankbar, ob etwa von seiten des kaiserlichen General-Gouvernements oder der polnischen Regierung auf eine wieder-in-Kraftsetzung einzelner Bestimmungen der Vertraege Wert gelegt wird."

"Copy respectfully sent to the Imperial Legation Secretary in Warsaw, Prince Oettingen, for his perusal. Berlin, September 30, 1918." In the margin: "At this moment the abolishing of the Treaties of Partition, a fact which would soon get to be known, would only serve to kindle the agitation as to Posen.—Graf. Lerchenfeld."

INDEX

Adalbert, St., 103
Alexander I of Russia, 23, 64, 65–68, 70, 73–74, 75–76, 82–83, 122
Alexander Jagiellon, 28, 108
Alfred the Great, 103
Alopeus, 123
Anderson, 39
Anna of Russia, 25, 26, 38, 75, 115
Anne, Queen, 37
Artois, 122
August II, 23, 28
August III, 24, 26–31 *n.*
Augusta of Prussia, 89

Bandtkie, 113
Barth, 44
Bartholdy, 55
Benningsen, 120
Benoit, 41
Berthier, 119
Beseler, 128
Bielski, 111
Bismarck, 88, 92–94
Blech, 122
Boleslaw the Great, 7
Bolognetto, 111
Borakowski, 124
Born-Fallois, 127
Boucicaut, 14, 108
Bouet-Willaumez, 92
Boyen, 68
Brühl, 115
Brüneck, 49
Buchanan, 88, 125
Bukaty, 38, 116
Bülow, General, 58
Bülow, Bernard, Chancellor, 94, 99
Bulhakow, 46
Burke, 38
Buturlin, 31

Canaparius, 103
Caro, 9, 104–107
Carolus Gustavus, 19, 20, 112
Carrew, 37
Casimir Jagiellon, 12, 14, 18, 28, 107, 114
Castlereagh, 74, 76, 78, 123
Catherine II, 33–45, 49, 75
Cellarius, 113
Ceynowa, 87–94, 125
Charles II, 37
Charles V, 15
Charles XII, 22
Chlapowski, 120
Chodowiecki, 28, 113
Chwalkowski, 112
Chytraeus, 105
Clement V, Pope, 104
Constantine, Grand Duke, 85
Correy, 115
Croy-Arschot, 21
Curicke, J. R., 103
Curicke, R., 103, 105, 109
Czacki, 111, 113, 117
Czartoryski, A., 76–78, 86
Czartoryski, the Princes, 123

Damus, 115, 116, 118
Dantiscus (*see* Hoeffen)
Derby (*see* Henry IV), 14, 108
Derdowski, 95
Dlugosz, 8, 104
Dogiel, 106, 107
Dombrowski, H., General, 48, 55–59, 119
Dohna, 69, 73, 120
Döring, 123
Downarowicz, 60
Duisburg, 119
Dumont, 112
Dzenghis Khan, 9
Dziewanowski, 58, 119

Eleonore, Queen, 28
Elizabeth, Queen, 37
Elizabeth of Russia, 23, 30, 38, 68, 73, 76, 114
Eugene III, Pope, 7

Fabricius, 21
Fahrenheit, 28
Figner, 122
Fiszer, 47–48
Flotwell, 80
Francis I, 15

129

Frederic I, 32
Frederic II, 29–38, 75, 97
Frederic August, 119
Frederic William, the Great Elector, 32
Frederic William I, 32
Frederic William II, 40–45, 49, 50, 55, 111, 117, 119
Frederic William III, 55, 59, 68, 87, 121, 123
Frederic William IV, 87
Frederic William, the Crown Prince, 96
Freislich, 113

Gardanne, 119
Gardiner, 91
Garnier, 50
George III, 76
Geret, 116
Gibson, Alexander, 115
Gibson, Arch., 115
Gielgud, 59–63, 119
Gneisenau, 123
Golizyn, 39
Gordon, 115
Grabowski, 65
Gralath, 41, 42, 104, 117
Gross, Anne, 11
Gross, B., 11
Guiberts, the, 96
Gunning, 39
Gustavus Adolphus, 19, 112
Gvagninus, 111

Hailes, 45, 46, 116
Hake, 73
Hardenberg, 78, 122
Hauke, 119
Hecht, 11
Helbig, 65
Henning, 118
Henry III, Valois, 28
Henry IV, 14, 108
Hertzberg, 41, 43, 45
Hevelius, 28, 112
Heydeken, 124
Hirsch, 8, 15, 104
Hoeffen, Dantiscus, 7, 28, 104, 112
Hohenzollerns, the, 32, 43, 60
Hosius, 109

Jakubowski, 114
James I, 37
Jan Casimir, 19–21, 28, 88, 112
Jan Albert, 28
Jan III, Sobieski, 22, 28, 65, 112
Jantzen, 116
Jaucourt, 122
Jeffries, 115
Jonas, 109
Junck, 35

Kahlen, 46, 65, 75
Kalckreuth, 58, 61, 119
Kamenskoj, 58
Karnkowski, 106, 107
Keidel, 75–77, 123
Klonowicz, 17, 109
Kochanowski, 110
Köhler, 9, 104
Kolaczkowski, 122
Korycinski, 22, 112
Kosciuszko, 47, 119
Kosinski, 58, 120
Krockow, 61
Kromer, 108
Krukowiecki, 61
Kruszynski, 114
Kutuzow, 67, 77

Labes, 121
Laboureur, 113
Laharpe, 75, 123
Langeron, 122
Lannes, 59
Lefebvre, 58–59, 62–63, 119
Lengnich, 27, 28, 103, 113, 115
Leopold II, 48, 117
Lerchenfeld, 128
Letczkow, 11, 53, 114
Lettow-Vorbeck, 63
Lewis, 68, 71
Lindenowsky, 50
Liverpool, Lord, 78
Lojko, 111
Löschin, 103, 105, 114, 115–122
Louis XIV, 36
Louis XV, 25
Louisa, Queen of Prussia, 55
Lubecki, 82
Lucchesini, 45

Maciejowski, 124
Makarewicz, 70, 124
Maltzan, 38, 115
Malachowski, 64, 121
Maria Gonzaga, Queen of Poland, 112
Maria Theresa, 115
Massias, 65
Metternich, 76
Meyer, 22
Michel Wisniowiecki, 28
Mickiewicz, 86, 122, 124
Mizler-Kolof, 111, 113
Mortier, 58
Mraga-Mrongovius, 85, 86, 122, 124
Münnich, 25, 38, 87

Napoleon I, 58, 59, 64–66, 70–72, 80–82, 119–122
Nicolas I, 86, 87

Niedermayer, 47
Niemcewicz, 112

Oettingen, 128
Oginski, 117
Opalinski, 110
Orlow, 39
Ostrowski, T., 71, 122
Ostrowski, W., 122

Paleske, 77
Parandier, 119
Parys, 61, 120
Paskiewicz, 86
Paulucci, 68
Peter the Great, 23, 30, 39, 73, 77, 112
Pitt the Elder, 38
Pitt the Younger, 45, 117
Platow, 68, 71
Plauen, Count, 11
Plauen, Reuss H., Commander, 11, 107
Plélo, 25
Plinius, 103
Plotho, 120
Plotzke. 105
Polenz, 119
Pomponius Mela, 103
Poniatowski, Prince J., 47, 65, 71, 119
Pons, 119
Pozzo di Borgo, 76, 123
Prondzynski, 86, 124
Przybylski, 60
Ptolemy, 103

Rachmanow, 73
Radziwill, M., 58, 71, 72
Rapp, 64, 71–72, 77, 122
Raumer, 51, 52
Reichardt, 41
Richemont, 122
Richter, Deacon, 55
Richter, Deputy, 44
Rickert, 92–93
Robinson, 37, 115
Romberg, 101
Rudawski, 112
Rüdiger, 68
Rumianzew, 67, 85, 124
Russell, 125

Saint Aubin, 120
Saldern, 39
Sapieha, 62
Sarnicki, 111
Sawicki-Stella, 89, 125
Schilder, 67
Schiller, 47
Schleinitz, 118
Schoen, 80, 83, 123
Schopenhauer, A., 41, 55, 119
Schopenhauer, Jane, 41, 55, 119
Schopenhauers, the, 55
Schultze, 72
Schuppelius, 47
Schutzius, 12
Ségur, 115
Shichkoff, 86
Siegfried v. Feuchtwangen, 9
Sierakowski, 77, 78
Sigmund I, of Poland, 28
Sigmund III, 28
Sigmund Augustus, 28
Soermans, 123
Sokolnicki, 58, 120
Sokolowski, 118
Solf, 101, 126
Solikowski, 110
Solly, 77
Solms, 39
Soult, 64
Stadion, 76
Stanislaw Leszczynski of Poland, 23–26, 32, 47, 86, 113
Stanislaw Augustus Poniatowski of Poland, 38, 42, 52, 115, 117, 118
Staszic, 46, 117
Stein, 122
Steinbock, 113
Steinmeister, 126
Stephen Batory, 17, 18, 28, 109
Stuart, 76
Suffolk, 38, 39, 116
Sulkowski, 60

Tacitus, 103
Tchernyshew, A., 68
Tchernyshew, Z., 31
Tengoborski, 124
Tikhon, 31
Titius, 30
Tort, 122
Trefurt, 65
Trendelenburg, 123

Vegesack, 65
Voltaire, 35

Warner, 104
Weickhmann, 78, 123
Weiss, 29
Wernsdorff, 30, 114, 123
Weyssenhoff, 120
White, 91, 125
Willebrandt, 39
William I, 89, 96, 125
William II, 9, 96, 104
Williams, 38
Wittgenstein, 68

Wladislaw IV, 28, 112
Wladislaw Jagiello, 10, 11, 27, 106, 111
Wladislaw Lokietek, 7, 104
Wolkonski, 73
Wolski, 120
Woroncow, 31, 115
Woroncows, the, 115
Woyczynski, 65
Wulfstan, 104
Würtemberg, Prince A., 69, 72, 73

Zajontchek, 119
Zaluski, 112
Zamoyski, 97

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